TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY
I. PRIORITY TRENDS MATRIX | 4QTR FY94 | 1QTR FY95 | 2QTR FY95 | 3-4QTR FY95 | 1-2QTR FY96 |
Positive Performance | |||||
1. Decontamination operations | X | X | |||
Needs Emphasis | |||||
1. Breaching operations | X | X | X | X | X |
2. Use of M8A1 chemical alarm | X | X | X | ||
3. Reaction to chemical attack | X | X | X | ||
4. Decontaminated unit operations | X | X |
II. MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
FINDINGS:
1. Units have significant problems with conducting breaching operations, as evidenced by the consistent reports from O/Cs each quarter. The problems occur in all three phases of the plan, prepare, and execute framework.
2. Units have problems with reacting to chemical attack. Chemical attack is one form of enemy contact, and actions on contact (to any enemy threat) is reported by NTC as one of the most critical problems for most units.
3. The performance of decon platoons is positive -- they are competent in their tasks. But this positive performance is fraught with problems getting needed augmentation support from contaminated units. Failure to provide augmentation is a brigade staff deficiency.
4. Commanders and leaders too often do not properly oversee the employment of the M8A1 alarm and performance of Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) prior to deployment.
DISCUSSION:
1. Seventy-five (75) percent of problem trends in the Mobility/Survivability BOS during the past seven quarters pertain to chemical warfare (i.e., augmentation and support of decontamination operations, use of the M8A1 chemical alarm, and reaction to chemical attack).
2. Problems with breaching operations were reported every quarter.
--
"lack of understanding of breaching fundamentals"
-- "lack of obstacle intelligence"
-- "insufficient wargaming"
-- "breaching not fully addressed in OPORDs"
-- "lack of effective task force rehearsals"
-- "lack of synchronization with the overall plan"
-- "lack of adequate support and security"
-- "unknown conditions or triggers"
-- "suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSRs) not addressed"
3. Experience has consistently shown that failures during mission planning and preparation result in failures in mission execution. This is demonstrated repeatedly in all BOS, and again here in the Mobility Survivability BOS with the issue on breaching operations. Improper planning (incomplete mission analysis, fragmentary course of action development, non-integrated wargaming) leads to poor preparation (substandard OPORDs, ineffective rehearsals), which results in mission failure (no understanding, no focus of combat power at a defined point, no detailed synchronization of all BOS).
III. INDIVIDUAL TRENDS ANALYSES
Positive Performance
1. Decontamination operations (Compendium, pg. P-3,4 / PT-2)
This positive performance refers to the performance of the decon platoon. Note also that this positive performance of the decon platoon is blemished with problems in getting needed support from contaminated units. The decon platoon knows its job, but according to the reports, it cannot be fully successful unless it has the augmentation support of the brigade staff and contaminated units. The augmentation problem may actually be the peculiarity that generated this positive performance trend. The augmentation problem is further addressed below at TA.6 Negative Trend 4: Decontaminated unit operations.
Needs Emphasis
1. Breaching operations (Compendium, pg. N-21-23 / NT-12,13)
Home Station training is needed at battalion/task force level to exercise breaching operations IAW FM 90-13-1. Read and follow the training techniques recommended in the Compendium, pg. 12, 13. Home Station training must train task force leaders to synchronize the elements of a deliberate breach. Conduct breach training often, not just once or twice. Incorporate breaching into every field training exercise and into unit SOPs. Train each task until the fundamentals are understood and the drills and triggers become second nature.
2. Use of M8A1 chemical alarm (Compendium, pg. N-23,24 / NT-13)
Failure to properly employ the M8A1 alarm is a supervisory oversight. Company/team leaders are responsible for pre-combat checks and proper employment of equipment. They must become familiar with their troop leading roles and responsibilities. Proper employment of the M8A1 must be trained and enforced during Home Station training. Using the techniques on pg. NT-13 of the Compendium, units must develop SOPs for marking and employing M8A1s and drill to those standards.
3. Reaction to chemical attack (Compendium, pg. N-24,25 / NT-13,14)
"Actions on contact" is reported by NTC as one of the most critical problems for most units. (See TA.1 Negative Trend 3: Actions on contact and also TA.1 Negative Trend 1: Movement formations and techniques.) Chemical attack is one form of enemy contact, and units should be trained to react instinctively with the proper actions. Using the techniques at pg. NT-13,14 of the Compendium, units must develop specific battle drills into unit SOPs and practice the various drills during Home Station training exercises until they become natural responses.
4. Decontaminated unit operations (Compendium, pg. N-25 / NT-14)
O/Cs reported in 4th Qtr FY94 and again in 1-2 Qtr FY96 that "decon platoons know how to conduct their part of deliberate decon"..and...."decon operations are often executed in adequate time and to standard." At the same time, the O/Cs reported that the key to particularly successful decon operations is the proper augmentation and support provided by the brigade staff and the contaminated unit, but that support elements were "rarely tasked to reinforce decon operations." (TA.6 Positive Trend 1: Decontamination operations, above) This further reinforces the need to make leaders aware of their troop leading roles and responsibilities. The brigade staff must assume responsibility for augmentees, CSS coordination, link-up coordination, and for ensuring a decon team in each one of its units is trained to be prepared to augment the decon platoon at the decon site. These responsibilities must be detailed in unit SOPs and trained at Home Station.
IV. SPECIFIC DTLOMS IMPLICATIONS
HOME STATION TRAINING:
1. Breaching operations. Home Station training is needed at battalion/task force level to exercise breaching operations IAW FM 90-13-1. Read and follow the training techniques recommended in the Compendium, pg. NT-13,14. Home Station training must train task force leaders in synchronizing the elements of a deliberate breach. Incorporate breaching into every field training exercise and into unit SOPs until the fundamentals are understood and the drills and triggers become second nature.
2. Reaction to chemical attack. Chemical attack is one form of enemy contact, and units should be trained to react instinctively with the proper actions. Using the techniques in the Compendium, pg. NT-13,14, units must develop specific battle drills into unit SOPs and practice the various drills during Home Station training exercises until they become instinctive responses.
LEADER DEVELOPMENT:
1. PCCs of M8A1 alarms prior to deployment. Pre-combat checks are the responsibility of company/team leaders.
2. Employment of M8A1 chemical alarm. Leaders must be responsible for ensuring that proper employment of the M8A1 is trained and enforced during Home Station training. Using the techniques at pg. NT-13 of the Compendium, commanders/leaders must develop SOPs for marking and employing M8A1s and drill to those standards.
3. Decontaminated unit operations. The brigade staff must assume responsibility for tasking augmentee elements, CSS coordination, link-up coordination, and for ensuring a decon team in each one of its units is trained to augment the decon platoon at the decon site. These leadership responsibilities must be detailed in unit SOPs and practiced at Home Station.



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