TA.1 MANEUVER
| I. PRIORITY TRENDS MATRIX | 4QTR FY94 | 1QTR FY95 | 2QTR FY95 | 3-4QTR FY95 | 1-2QTR FY96 |
| Positive Performance | |||||
| 1. Use of GPS | X | X | |||
| Needs Emphasis | |||||
| 1. Movement formations and techniques | X | X | X3 | X2 | X |
| 2. Use of dismounted infantry | X2 | X | X2 | X2 | |
| 3. Actions on contact | X | X | X | X | |
| 4. Direct fire planning and execution | X | X | X2 |
II. MANEUVER OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
FINDINGS:
1. Recent battle results, both offensive and defensive, demonstrate increased loss rates for BLUFOR elements. When combat operations are successful, elements are able to synchronize the whole spectrum of operating systems, including maneuver. When unsuccessful, maneuver stands out clearly as problematic, remembering that in the BOS concept, maneuver encompasses direct fire. In force-on-force battles at the NTC, direct fire has been, and remains, the biggest casualty producer. Therefore, problems delivering effective direct fire in conjunction with maneuver become magnified.
2. Maneuver operations are not drilled to previous stndards of proficiency at Home Station.
3. Dismounted infantry are often unfamiliar with dismounted drills from FM 7-7J, and dismounted drills are not routinely trained at Home Station in conjunction with BFV crews. Battle staffs too often do not consider dismounted infantry in planning. (Although mech companies are seldom resourced for dismounted operations at NTC, the battle staff should consider dismounts as an option during planning.)
4. The ability to develop a scheme of maneuver and conduct direct fire planning is suffering from the commander's and battle staffs' inability to integrate all BOS during the military decision-making process (MDMP).
5. The Commander, Operations Group (COG) considers "actions in the Red Zone", or "actions in (on) contact" (inability to employ effective movement formations and techniques or establish fire superiority before maneuvering on the enemy) as his priority issue for trend reversal.
DISCUSSION:
1. The OPFOR consistently executes fire and maneuver more successfully than the BLUFOR, as evidenced by loss results. In particular, the OPFOR demonstrates a superior ability to mass at the point of main effort and to synchronize available combat power. While some BLUFOR equipment is technologically superior to comparable OPFOR equipment, the OPFOR's consistent ability to win is dramatic tesitmony supporting the value of learning by doing - especially when the doing is supported by adjustments based on near-term and short-term evaluation and feedback. The OPFOR's maneuver tgraining opportunities are simply far more abundant than any other maneuver element in the conventional force, and their battlefield maneuver performance relfects the benefits resulting from those traning opportunities.
2. Actions on contact are battle drills that should constitute the bulk of company or platoon level Home Station maneuver training.
3. Staff members, including maneuver commanders, come out of the MDMP with missing information, inadequate support, unclear orders and confusion, rather than clear understanding of their task. As a result, staff members cannot adequately address actions on the objective in their subordinate unit orders and rehearsals, and cannot control or mass fires.
4. It is essential that our Army not lose sight of conventional ground maneuver operations. The problems our heavy forces are having with their ability to effectively maneuver must be resolved. As a start to this end, the NTC Ops Grp and CALL are developing a newsletter of TTPs for actions on/in contact. Publication is expected in 2nd Qtr FY97. The actions in/on contact issue is a prime candidate for the TRADOC Remedial Action Program (T-RAP).
III. INDIVIDUAL TRENDS ANALYSES
Positive Performance
1. Use of GPS (Compendium, pg. P-2,3 / PT-1,2)
This positive trend was reported in 1st and 2nd Qtrs, FY95, and not mentioned again during the past four quarters. The fact that no recent reports have been made is an indication that the techniques for the combined use of PLGR and BUCS are now being used on a regular basis, and are therefore no longer considered a "trend". To ensure this positive performance continues, if not already accomplished, recommend these techniques be incorporated into system TMs, trained at the schoolhouses, and emphasized during maneuver training at Home Station.
Needs Emphasis
1. Movement formations and techniques (Compendium, pg. N-11,12 / NT-6,7)
This is clearly a training problem, and based on very recent feedback from NTC, performance is getting progressively worse rather than better. BLUFOR forces do not take effective action in contact with the enemy, and are easily destroyed, time and time again, in the OPFOR fire sacks. Units have good movement formation TTPs for use during Home Station training; however, units must drill these TTPs at Home Station and incorporate them into their SOPs.
2. Use of Bradley Fighting Vehicle dismounted infantry (Compendium, pg. N-12-15 / NT-7)
Several
problems are identified here: (1) dismounted infantry are unfamiliar with dismounted
drills from FM 7-7J and dismounted drills are not routinely trained at Home
Station in conjunction with BFV crews (unit training deficiency); (2) Commanders
are not asking for, or S-2s are not providing, information on the possibility
of enemy infantry in the objective (TTP deficiency-IPB); (3) battle staffs
seldom consider dismounted infantry in planning (TTP deficiency-staff integration);
(4) pre-combat inspections (PCIs) are not conducted to standard prior to rehearsal
(TTP deficiency-leadership); (5) appropriate dismounted drills are not rehearsed
(TTP deficiency-staff integration); and
(6)
standards for OP occupation are not enforced or properly supervised by squad
and section sergeants (TTP deficiency-leadership).
An emphasis on the importance of dismounted infantry drills, conducted in conjunction with Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) crews, must be made to field unit commanders for training at Home Station. TTPs for selecting, occupying and improving dismounted observation posts (OP) sites must also be trained and practiced at Home Station.
Leaders must be given remedial training on the importance of PCCs/PCIs for saving soldiers' lives. Failure to regularly conduct PCCs/PCIs is reported as a negative trend at the NTC. Further discussion of the PCCs/PCIs problem is at TA.4 Negative Trend 12: Pre-combat checks/Pre-combat inspections. The TTPs outlined in FM 17-98 for proper set-up of OPs must be enforced by leaders, and they must also ensure that unit SOPs designate procedures and standards for OP occupation.
3. Actions on contact (Compendium, pg. N-15,16 / NT-8)
The Commander, Operations Group (COG), considers this negative trend (which he calls "Actions in contact") the number one maneuver problem for all units going through the NTC. OPFOR more effectively executes fire and maneuver, with a particular ability to mass combat power and synchronize the BOS. Based on O/C observations, it appears that maneuver operations are not drilled to previous standards of proficiency at Home Station. When units arrive at NTC, they find that the NTC OPFOR does use conventional ground maneuver operations, and their forces are easily destroyed, repeatedly, in the OPFOR fire sacks. As stated above, actions on/in contact are battle drills that should constitute the bulk of a company or platoon level scheme of maneuver. Maneuver skills must be intrinsic to the unit before deployment; there are not enough days in the field at NTC to train maneuver operations. This means units must be resourced at Home Station for training and drilling maneuver operations to required standards. Using the techniques at Pg. NT-8 of the Compendium, units must develop specific battle drills into unit SOPs and practice the various drills at Home Station until they become second nature.
4. Direct fire planning and execution (Compendium, pg. N-16,17 / NT-8,9)
Planning takes place during the military decision-making process (MDMP). Frequently, staffs do not integrate all BOS during MDMP, resulting in missing information, inadequate support, unclear orders, and confusion, rather than synchronization, on the battlefield. As a result, staff members, including maneuver commanders, come out of the MDMP without clear understanding of their task. Maneuver commanders cannot adequately address actions on the objective in their orders and rehearsals, and cannot control or mass fires.
Though the MDMP presents a problem, the principals of direct fire planning can and must be trained and understood at Home Station. Practice the steps necessary to build an engagement area, etc., and practice actions on contact for a movement to contact and the fire and maneuver inherent in a deliberate attack. Develop and incorporate standard procedures into unit SOPs.
IV. SPECIFIC DTLOMS IMPLICATIONS
TRAINING:
Use of GPS and map reading. Recommend the techniques for the combined use of PLGR and BUCS (Compendium, pg. PT-1,2) be considered for incorporation into system TMs and trained at schoolhouses.
HOME STATION TRAINING:
1. Use of GPS and map reading. Recommend the techniques for the combined use of PLGR and BUCS (Compemdium, pg. PT-1,2) be emphasized during maneuver training at Home Station.
2. Use of BFV dismounted infantry. An emphasis on the importance of dismounted infantry drills, conducted in conjunction with BFV crews, must be made to field unit commanders for training at Home Station. TTPs for selecting, occupying and improving dismounted observation posts (OP) sites must also be trained and practiced at Home Station.
3. Actions in/on contact. BLUFOR forces are easily destroyed in the OPFOR fire sacks. Home Station training must include maneuver exercises that focus on actions on contact. Using the techniques at pg. NT-8 of the Compendium, units must develop specific battle drills into unit SOPs and practice the various drills until they become instinctive.
4. Home Station training resources. Units report to NTC a systemic problem in accomplishing Home Station training. The reports point to resource limitations which hinder their ability to train and exercise to desired standards of proficiency. Indeed, NTC O/Cs identify a need for improved Home Station training to increase skill levels across all BOS. Home Station training is essential for success at NTC and on the battlefield. Further study is warranted to assess the impact, at Home Station, on diminished training resources and increased training distractors.
5. Direct Fire Planning. The principals of direct fire planning must be trained and understood at Home Station. Train and practice the steps necessary to build an engagement area, etc., and practice actions on contact for a movement to contact and the fire and maneuver inherent in a deliberate attack. Develop and incorporate standard procedures into unit SOPs.
LEADER DEVELOPMENT:
1. PCCs/PCIs. Leaders must become familiar with the importance of PCCs/PCIs for saving soldiers' lives. Failure to regularly conduct PCCs/PCIs is a negative trend at the NTC (Compendium, pg. N-58 / NT-30).
2. Proper set-up of Observation Posts. The TTPs outlined in FM 17-98 for proper set-up of OPs must be enforced by leaders, and they must also ensure that unit SOPs designate procedures and standards for OP occupation.
3. Enemy analysis: Commanders are not asking for, or S-2s are not providing information on the possibility of enemy infantry in the objective, and are not planning for dismounted operations. (This is further evidence of the difficulty commanders and staff members experience in integrating IPB products.) Leaders must be responsible for acquiring all needed information, and must gain proficiency at integrating IPB products during MDMP. IPB process trends and techniques are at pg. N-3-5 / NT-2 of the Compendium.
Table
of Contents
Preface
TA.2
Fire Support Operations
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