Military

2. Task forces consistently have time/distance problems when establishing triggers for targets.

3. Most Fire Support Elements (FSEs) are not prepared or organized to plan or execute control of fires. At execution, artillery units are unable to maintain control of fires during movements of the field artillery (FA) battalion TOC.

4. Brigade staffs do not adequately supervise battle planning to ensure task force plans are synchronized with the brigade plan.

5. Inadequate fire support plans are frequently the product of the FSO's failure to effectively coordinate and integrate with commander and staffs during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION:

1. Problems with employing CAS, controlling fires, conducting jump-TOC operations, and battle synchronization are most often the result of inadequate battle staff integration during planning and preparation.

2. Although proficiency in staff planning and decisionmaking fosters a higher probability of mission success, good planning is of little value if units are not adequately trained to execute their various tasks. Several of the problems reported in the fire support trends suggest that skill levels of most fire support units are not to standard.

Multiple target grids generated from a variety of sources
Critical information not disseminated to the aeroscout observers
No assigned primary and alternate responsibility for control
ALO not included as a member of the targeting team

Triggers emplaced with incorrect time/distance factors
No established composition standards for day/night triggers

No transfer of information
Inappropriate use of single station IFSAS-equipped vehicle as the Jump TOC
Lack of standard procedures at controlling platoon FDC to control and mass fires

All needed manuals not on hand
Personnel responsibilities not fixed prior to deployment
Graphics generally not posted on fire support map
Threat, flight routes, coordinating measures, friendly positions not routinely updated

Task force observers not in position; not in communication with fire support
Targets not along likely enemy avenues of approach
No rehearsal conducted to identify gaps between brigade and task force fire plans

The deficiencies listed above could be the result of inadequate training at Home Station. Unit commanders can improve performance of these tasks by incorporating the techniques provided below and on pages NT-9-12 of the Compendium in unit SOPs and training those techniques to proficiency at Home Station.

3. The NTC Commander, Operations Group (COG) has identified close air support (CAS) as a primary issue in the fire support BOS. FS/CAS is the COG's number four priority for trend reversal and is a candidate for the TRADOC Remedial Action Program (T-RAP). Recommend a fire support newsletter be written in the near-term and published by CALL which addresses the significant fire support problems, including CAS, and provides detailed TTPs for effective fire support planning, preparation and execution.

III. INDIVIDUAL TRENDS ANALYSES

Positive Performance

1. Observers to support deep operations (Compendium, pg. P-3 / PT-2)

This positive trend was reported twice, one year apart, and with nearly the same verbiage. These reports do not provide sufficient justification to support a trend reversal. However, TTPs that work are needed to ensure that positive performance continues. In 4th Qtr FY94, the O/C reported "observers inserted deep had a much greater success rate in surviving long enough to accomplish their mission...compared to the prior three quarters." In 3-4 Qtr FY95, the O/Cs added a technique for handling increased C2 requirements (creating a platoon headquarters "out of hide") that was not included in the 4th Qtr FY94 report. If this is truly a positive trend, recommend the proven techniques for improved survivability and increased C2 be provided to field units for implementation at Home Station.

Needs Emphasis

1. Close Air Support (CAS)

NOTE: CAS is a priority trend that was erroneously not included in the Compendium. It is added here in its entirety, to include associated techniques.

TREND: Control of CAS is often an afterthought of the brigade staff, rather than being integrated thoroughly in the brigade plan. As a result, too many brigade schemes of fire support do not incorporate CAS planning factors. CAS is frequently misdirected; it is not directed against the commander's high payoff targets at the critical place and time to ensure success of the brigade's mission. Brigades frequently overlook requirements for moving Tactical Air Controllers to a position on the battlefield from which they might successfully control the delivery of weapons.

Several problems hinder brigade efforts to employ CAS:

• The employment of CAS is not rehearsed.

• There are multiple target grids generated from a variety of sources.

• There is ineffective airspace management. Airspace Coordination Areas (ACAs) are not planned in advance to deconflict gun target lines and attack aviation battle positions.

• There are often no plans for Suppression, Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), both lethal and non-lethal, and when there are, they are not usually coordinated to deconflict times in the battle. This results in CAS sorties being aborted or a loss of aircraft to air defense systems.

• Information critical to employing CAS is not disseminated to the aeroscout observers.

• There is a lack of qualified controllers at the right place at the right time.

TECHNIQUES:

a. In using ETACs forward for final control, the TF commander and brigade staff must plan adequately for the ETAC or ALO to be capable of maneuvering to a suitable location to control CAS. Issues include ETAC/ALO mobility, communications, and force protection/risk analysis. Maneuver and communications issues must be worked out and trained at Home Station. ETAC/ALO planning considerations and operational considerations for both maneuver and communication need to be included in brigade SOPs.

b. The highest risk mission for the ETAC is forward with the scouts/COLTs. Train the ETACs to be integrated with the COLTs. An additional benefit to this relationship is the ETACs ability to send intelligence data on long-range VHF radios if FM communication with the COLTs fails.

ANALYSIS: Problems with planning and executing CAS were reported by O/Cs in five of the past seven quarters.

2. Triggers versus target location (Compendium, pg. N-17,18 / NT-9,10)

Units should use and practice the techniques described in the Compendium at Home Station to become proficient in determining a "ballpark" trigger during planning and preparation for combat operations, and for establishing standard day/night triggers. Recommend the techniques be included in unit SOPs.

3. Jump TOC operations (Compendium, pg. N-18,19 / NT-10,11)

Battalions that have employed the techniques provided have successfully conducted Jump TOC operations during combat operations. Units that train these techniques at Home Station will see an improvement in performance at NTC.

4. Fire Support Element (FSE) organization (Compendium, pg. N-19 / NT-11)

Units cannot perform to standard if there is no set standard from which to measure performance. SOPs must be in place which specify standards for performance, and units must train to those SOPs at Home Station. The specific information listed at pg. NT-11 of the Compendium should be included in brigade FSE SOPs, trained, and adjusted as necessary for maximum efficiency.

The FSE must have senior representation present during all phases of the plan-prepare-execute cycle in order to ensure fires are adequately planned, units are adequately prepared and rehearsed, and control of fires is maintained. It is not feasible for the FSE to split into 12-hour shifts, because there are not enough personnel in the FSE to maintain continuous operations with half of them gone. The recommendation at pg. NT-11 of the Compendium suggests that FSE personnel be "surged" during key times rather than working in shifts, specifically the FSO, FSNCO and target officer.

If there is no published description of the surge technique, (and units at NTC are successful using it), details of the surge technique should be written and provided to brigade FSEs. Specifically, provide time schedules, identify who is available for what key events, and describe the division of tasks and how to maintain control continuity.

5. Fire Support plan transition from Deep to Close (Compendium, pg. N-19,20 / NT-12)

According to O/C reports, the problem with transitioning from deep to close operations surfaced in 4th Qtr FY94 and again in 3-4 Qtr FY95.

The brigade FSO is the Fire Support BOS representative. He must must ensure the task force plans are synchronized with the brigade plan. Failure to do so implies a lack of brigade staff integration, inability to conduct planning to standard, and inability to supervise or properly conduct rehearsals.

IV. SPECIFIC DTLOMS IMPLICATIONS

HOME STATION TRAINING:

1. Close Air Support. The techniques recommended for ALO, FSO and FSCOORD interaction, development of CTB cards, and maneuver planning for ETACs and ALOs, should be incorporated into unit SOPs and practiced during Home Station training.

2. Observers inserted deep. Recommend proven techniques for improved survivability and increased C2 be written and published as TTPs and provided to field units for implementation during Home Station training.

3. Triggers versus target location. Units should use and practice the techniques on pg. NT-9,10 of the Compendium at Home Station to become proficient in determining a "ballpark" trigger during planning and preparation for combat operations, and for establishing standard day/night triggers. Recommend the techniques be included in unit SOPs.

4. Jump TOC operations. Battalions that have employed the techniques provided at pg. NT-10,11 of the Compendium have successfully conducted Jump TOC operations during combat operations. Units that train these techniques at Home Station will see an improvement in performance at NTC.

5. Fire Support Element (FSE) SOP. Units cannot perform to standard if there is no set standard from which to measure performance. SOPs must be in place which specify standards for performance, and units must train to those SOPs at Home Station. The specific information listed at pg. NT-12 of the Compendium should be included in brigade FSE SOPs, trained accordingly, and adjusted as necessary for maximum efficiency.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT:

Transitioning from deep to close operations. As representative of the Fire Support BOS, the brigade FSO must ensure the task force plans are synchronized with the brigade plan.

ORGANIZATION:

Fire Support Element (FSE) organization. There are not enough personnel in the FSE to maintain continuous operations if split into 12-hour shifts. The recommendation at pg. NT-11 of the Compendium suggests that FSE personnel be "surged" during key times rather than working in shifts, especially the FSO, FSNCO and target officer. If there is no published description, details of the surge technique should be written and provided to brigade FSEs. Specifically, provide time schedules, identify who is available for what key events, and describe the division of tasks and how to maintain control continuity.

Table of Contents

TA.1 Maneuver Operations

TA.3 Air Defense Operations