SECTION
N
NEEDS EMPHASIS (cont)
TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY/NBC (cont)
TA.6 Negative Trend 7: Decontaminated unit operations
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 7-1: Task forces are generally unprepared to conduct thorough decontamination operations. Contaminated elements fail to provide the personnel to augment the detailed equipment decontamination element. Contaminated elements also fail to provide the personnel and equipment necessary to conduct detailed troop decontamination.
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 7-2:
1. Deliberate decontamination sites and link-up points are usually identified in plans; however, the plan sites are rarely used, creating link-up problems between the contaminated unit and the decon platoon.
2. Augmentation and support for decon operations is still a problem.
- Most brigade NBC staffs fail to realize their staff coordination and supervisory responsibilities for decon operations.
- Units rarely task specific elements (such as Military Police, Engineer, and medical personnel and equipment) to reinforce decon operations.
- Units do not adequately stock equipment for Detailed Troop Decon (DTD) or plan for resupply after the operation.
- Task forces are limited in conducting decontamination operations due to lack of water hauling capabilities.
3-4QFY96
PROBLEM 7-3: Units do not know how to nor do they have the required equipment to conduct Detailed Troop Decon (DTD).
1. Common equipment not on hand are:
- Drums of STB
- General purpose detergent
- Immersion heaters
- Protective mask PLL
2. No one soldier is responsible for the DTD equipment.
3. The prime mover is not identified.
4. Soldiers are not trained on how to operate a DTD.
5. Orders do not address in detail requesting procedures and location on the battlefield of DTD equipment.
1-2QFY97
PROBLEM 7-4:
1. Task Forces (TFs) do minimal planning for Operational Decontamination.
2. Most TFs have the M17 SANATOR that enables them to conduct Operational Decon, but seldom consider its use to aid them in sustaining their combat power.
3. Communication with the M17 crew is nonexistent, and the crew is usually in the BSA or combat trains.
4. There is often no water plan to support the Operational Decontamination; no consideration is given whether to use available assets from the TF or request to higher headquarters for support.
5. Selection of possible link-up points and C2 issues are never planned.
Techniques
1. Chemical staffs must plan for Operational Decontamination. Successful decon operations depend on proper augmentation of the decon platoon. Remember, the chemical decontamination platoon can provide one individual to coordinate with the contaminated element and then supervise decon operations. Task forces must obtain and then control decontamination equipment at a central location and then use the task force NBC officer or NCO to supervise the decon operation in conjunction with the decon platoon leader.
2. The unit should train a decon team in each one of its units to be prepared to augment the decon platoon at the decon site.
3. The brigade assumes responsibility for augmentees and CSS coordination, to include water transport. The brigade ensures the augmentees and CSS assets link-up with the decon platoon prior to decon operations.
4. At link-up, the augmentees and CSS assets are under the control of the decon platoon leader.
5. Detailed, thorough decontamination operations must be trained at Home Station prior to deployment so troops are familiar with how the operations are conducted and the time and equipment necessary, etc.
6. Have brigade identify the augmentees for DTD in the OPORD. Wherever the augmentees come from, have their NBC NCO teach them how to run the DTD before they are called upon to execute it.
- Identify in unit SOPs responsibility for maintaining the unit's DTD equipment and what vehicle it will be moved on.
- Identify in orders where the DTD equipment will be located to best support a thorough decon and how they will be contacted and moved to the linkup point.
TA.6 Negative Trend 8: Smoke missions
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 8-1: PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade staffs provide a directed smoke mission but give execution control to the maneuver task force.
2. Too often the brigade directed smoke mission does not complement the task force maneuver commander's scheme of maneuver.
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 8-2: Smoke platoon leaders/sergeants, when integrated early into the planning process, develop more than one course of action to accomplish their offensive or defensive smoke mission(s). Too often, however, smoke missions are not "wargamed," and smoke assets are wasted on poor missions or a lack of valid missions.
1. Nearly all smoke missions fail to integrate projected and generated smoke.
2. Generated smoke is not integrated into the maneuver plan.
3. Typically, a smoke platoon mission is "just move along the task force and blow smoke."
4. When a valid smoke mission is planned and synchronized with the maneuver plan, forces are unable to maneuver in the smoke effectively due to their lack of training in limited visibility.
3-4QFY96
PROBLEM 8-3: Units plan smoke missions without taking into account weather conditions.
1. Units establish the visibility criteria based upon perfect weather conditions.
2. Units do not time out their movement to determine what time of day it will be when they want the smoke.
1-2QFY97
PROBLEM 8-4: Units develop smoke plans to obscure breach sites without synchronizing the different types of smoke.
1. The brigade chemical officer will work with the chemical company commander and smoke platoon leader and come up with a plan; the FSO will have a different plan, and rarely are smoke pots utilized.
2. No key person is identified to plan and achieve visibility criteria that is key to the commander's intent.
3. Field artillery units often run out of smoke at the critical point in the breach operations.
4. There is no deliberate plan to tie in with the other types of smoke to increase smoke platoon survivability.
5. The brigade's allotment of smoke pots is usually left in the BSA or with a unit that will have nothing to do with the breaching operation.
6. For those units that do utilize smoke pots, the smoke pot guide is not used to determine numbers and spacing of pots to achieve the commander's intent.
Techniques
1. Smoke missions are generally executed more successfully when the planning, coordination, and execution are controlled by the main effort task force.
2. Make the brigade chemical officer the sole proponent for smoke. Chemical officers that have been smoke platoon leaders know more about smoke and those weather conditions that affect smoke more than anyone.
- Establish a targeting cell that includes the chemical officer, FSO, engineer, and S2 to come up with a synchronized smoke plan.
- The chemical officer must develop a smoke annex to the brigade order and brief the plan.
- Designate a single smoke control officer that adjusts both mechanized and artillery smoke. This control officer will have direct communications with the brigade chemical officer and FSO.
- The smoke plan should be included in the brigade maneuver and FS rehearsals, with the chemical officer still the critical link.
3. Refer to FM 71-2, which clearly states over a dozen uses for smoke in the offense and defense.
4. References for coordinating smoke missions are FM 3-50, FM 3-101-2, and FM 71-2.
5. Environmental issues do not allow most units to train with smoke at Home Station. However, computer simulation programs exist to assist units in at least gaining the knowledge on how to plan and use generated smoke.
6. Division chemical staffs must develop a training program for brigade and task force chemical staffs (officers and NCOs) in the planning requirements for NBC assets, particularly smoke platoons.
7. Plan smoke missions according to time of day required. Be realistic on what a smoke platoon can do based upon weather conditions. A smoke platoon cannot make an obscuring blanket on a breach at 1200 hours. Adjust requirements for smoke based on weather. A curtain, given the appropriate number of smoke platforms, is more realistic at 1200 hours than is a blanket.
TA.6 Negative Trend 9: Security operations
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 9-1: Security in the UMCP is not to standard and tends to be neglected due to the maintenance workload.
1. Security is not considered a priority in the UMCP and, therefore, the units usually have no security SOP.
2. Units that do possess an SOP usually do not execute them.
3. Units seldom integrate vehicles and crews into the security mission of the UMCP.
1-2QFY97
PROBLEM 9-2:
1. HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations.
2. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys and no ability to destroy anything they do observe.
Techniques
1. Units must ensure that security is a priority, and must establish an SOP that profiles 360 degree security and proper placement and crew-served weapons around the perimeter.
- The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) should personally integrate into the security SOP all vehicles and crews that are in the UMCP for maintenance.
- UMCP site selection should enhance the survivability and security of the UMCP.
- Other passive measures such as noise and light discipline must be strictly enforced.
- Every soldier in the UMCP should be given a hasty fighting position with assigned sectors of fire.
2. Security operations should not be given to company/teams alone.
- Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing OPs behind the security force that enable the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires on him while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
- Screening involves destruction within capabilities; this limits scouts to destruction with indirect fires which is more effective against large formations than individual vehicles.
- Integration of mission analysis products into R&S planning to allow battlefield calculus to determine the required composition of the recon force to include the availability and positioning of mortars and artillery.
TA.6
Mobility/Survivability/NBC, Part III
TA.7
Combat Service Support
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
