Military

PROBLEM 1-5:

1. Battery commanders often go into battle with no apparent ammo plan.

2. While platoon leaders often know how much total ammo they have prior to a battle, the ammo is not managed at battery level.

3. Most battalion FASPS establish ammo resupply triggers, but the triggers are ineffective because the platoons could not track ammo expenditure during the battle.

4. Batteries with Platoon Operation Centers (POCs): POCs had an accurate count of ammo prior to battle, but the ammo count was often never updated until sometime after the mission.

5. Batteries without POCs: FDOs or platoon leaders were to track ammo, but they do not have the time to accurately do so. RESULT: Batteries run out of extended range ammunition, for example, before requesting resupply; other batteries run out of DPICM before requesting resupply.

6. Battery commanders are often unaware of the ammo they will receive until it arrives in positions. This causes a delay as the commander decides on a distribution plan.

7. In batteries where the commander delegated ammo resupply to platoon leaders, the platoon leaders often took the ammo they needed from the nearest truck available. RESULT: Ammo trucks have incomplete rounds, making ammo management and tracking by pre-configured combat load impossible at battalion level.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-6: (Repeat of Problem 1-1) Units are having difficulty forecasting, managing, and resupplying ammunition because they are not working with accurate ammunition counts. Battery leaders are not actively conducting ammunition accounting and fail to place emphasis on the importance of accurate counting. Subsequent resupply further worsens the overall accounting problems.

PROBLEM 1-7: (Repeat of Problem 1-2) Class III resupply operations are too often not synchronized between the main support battalion (MSB), the forward support battalion (FSB), and the maneuver task forces. Resupply windows for the brigade combat team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods rather than event driven.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-8: Health service support (HSS) units are not doing a very good job managing fuel and petroleum products.

PROBLEM 1-9: (Repeat of Problems 1-2 and 1-7)

1. There is a lack of synchronization in Class III(B) resupply operations between the main support battalion (MSB), the forward support battalion (FSB), and maneuver task forces.

2. Resupply windows within the brigade combat team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods versus event-driven and do not consistently support maneuver operations by maintaining full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.

3. The forecasting of Class III(B) by the BCT through the use of LOGSTATS is poor and contributes to the lack of CLASS III(B) resupply synchronization.

PROBLEM 1-10: (Repeat of Problem 1-3) The task force is not able to manage or track Class III/III(P) or Class V on-hand status. Orange reports submitted to the S-4 are not completely filled out.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-11: The FA battalion staff does not adequately plan, prepare, and execute ammunition resupply using the "double loop" system.

1. Field artillery battalions try to execute the double loop resupply system; however, ammunition resupply consistently hampers their operations.

2. Staffs do not adequately identify anticipated ammunition requirements or resupply triggers based upon critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).

3. Ammunition platoons are forced to deliver ammunition during the night due to late or conflicting guidance.

4. Inaccurate or slow reporting of ammunition counts to the TOC/ALOC by the batteries hampers resupply planning.

5. Routinely, emergency Class V resupply is not present in the combat trains.

6. Palletized Load System (PLS) flat racks are not configured to allow commanders to empty a flat rack when conducting resupply to the FAASV. Without an empty flat rack, the ammunition platoon cannot reconfigure for follow-on missions.

PROBLEM 1-12: Management of the Class IV/V supply point is poor. While most units have an adequate SOP for the management of the Class IV/V point, the SOP is ignored.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-13: Ammunition shipments from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not documented using proper supply procedures. The shipments are processed in the same manner as issues, using a DA Form 581 instead of a Transportation Cargo Manifest Document (TCMD).

PROBLEM 1-14: Ammunition convoys moving forward from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not clear concerning the location of the Brigade Support Area's (BSA's) Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP).

PROBLEM 1-15:

1. An increasing number of MI companies are deploying to the NTC without the requisite amount of logistical support to sustain themselves.

2. In an attempt to provide inexpensive IEW support, units deploy without organic recovery or refueling vehicles or fail to draw them.

3. Units rely on the brigade HHC to fulfill these requirements for them.

PROBLEM 1-16: Units have difficulty establishing various responsibilities for the management of Class IV and V barrier material.

PROBLEM 1-17:

1. Field artillery battalions do not normally properly plan, prepare, and execute Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations.

2. Battalion staffs identify R3SP requirements but do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan.

3. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.

PROBLEM 1-18:

1. Units poorly track on-hand and requisitioned chemical defense equipment (CDE) and normally arrive in theater (NTC) without any idea of what they have.

2. When units deploy, they do not consider the threat when determining exactly what to bring.

3. Most units arrive with significant CDE shortages, and the chemical officer/NCO, S4, and the commander are not aware of these shortages.

4. There is zero tracking of CDE during the course of the campaign. Units rarely order replacements for CDE that has been used as a result of fighting on a dirty battlefield.

(NOTE: Units often voice "lack of funding" as the primary reason that equipment is not on hand. Although limited funding is a viable issue at Home Station, it cannot be the excuse given for casualties brought on by chemical or biological agents on the battlefield.)

PROBLEM 1-19:

1. Units often have great storage plans but execute them poorly once the ammunition begins arriving at the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP). This usually occurs because the plan, although good, is not disseminated to the soldiers who must execute it.

2. Missiles are often positioned so that the warhead is aimed at other ammunition pads instead of outside the FASP toward a hill mass.

PROBLEM 1-20:

1. Forward Support Battalion (FSB) support operations officers (SPOs) do not look from line of departure (LD) backwards when planning to top off maneuver tankers after LOGPAC operations.

2. SPOs do not coordinate for refuel windows with supported units.

3. SPOs fail to establish a system to receive an updated fuel on-hand report from Company A prior to LD.