Military

PROBLEM 4-2: Despite some indications of improvement, task forces fail to properly plan for and rehearse deliberate breaches. Specific problems:

1. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSRs) are not addressed in detail during the planning process.

2. Wargaming for the breach operations lacks sufficient detail.

3. Most units do not talk through the events setting conditions for a successful breach because they use the "box" technique, causing them to miss the events leading up to the breach.

4. Breach rehearsals are lacking at all levels of the combined arms team. Task force "rock drills" typically gloss over all details of the actual breach.

5. Rehearsals are often planned for but rarely executed at task force level.

6. Units fail to plan for assault breaches.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-3: (Repeat of Problem 4-2)

1. Task forces fail to properly plan for and rehearse deliberate breaches.

2. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSRs) are not addressed in sufficient detail during the planning process.

3. Wargaming for the breach operations is not sufficiently detailed.

4. Criteria is not established for what determines when conditions are set and when to commit the breach force.

5. Breach rehearsals lack sufficient detail at all levels. EXAMPLES: 1) task force rock drills typically gloss over all details of the actual breach, and 2) mounted rehearsals are often planned, but rarely executed.

6. Rehearsals are often planned for but rarely executed at task force level.

7. Units fail to plan for assault breaches.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-4: Fundamentals of breaching operations are not understood or implemented at the task force level.

1. Task force Combined Arms Team members do not generally understand or apply breach tenants:

• Intelligence
• Synchronization
• Mass
• Organization (support, breach and assault forces)
• Fundamentals (suppress, obscure, secure and reduce) or characteristics of the offense:
• Surprise
• Concentration
• Speed
• Flexibility
• Audacity

2. Task forces and brigades often attempt to reduce without attaining appropriate level of suppression and obscuration of the enemy.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-5: Combined arms breaching operations are poorly planned, rehearsed, and executed.

1. Planning for task force in-stride or deliberate breaching is not done to the level of detail required for successful execution.

2. Breach rehearsals at the task force level are generally only wargames.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 4-6:

1. The breach tenets (intel, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass, and synchronization) are overlooked during mission analysis and COA development.

2. There is a misunderstanding of the application of the "breach tenets" at the TF level.

3. Generally units do not reverse plan actions on the objective. There is no specified, clearly defined endstate of what the TF should look like on the objective.

Techniques

1. Home Station training should begin with NCOPD/OPD instruction to ensure all personnel involved have the same basic understanding of breach operations, definitions, and doctrine.

• Training for task force leaders must focus on how to synchronize the elements conducting a deliberate breach.

• Train company/team lanes to reinforce company level tasks and responsibilities.

• Conduct battalion/task force breach training; whenever a company/team is breaching, the breach is a task force level operation.

• Breaching should be incorporated into every field training exercise.

2. Task force planners and leaders must understand and train IAW FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, and FM 100-5, Operations, in relation to offensive breaching operations.

3. Commanders and staffs need to become familiar with FM 5-71-2 and FM 5-71-3 for developing plans on combined arms breaching to ensure all five tenants of breaching have been planned adequately. The commander's intent merits special consideration during breach planning. Reverse planning drives the maneuver formation to ensure that forces are in the correct relative positions to accomplish their breaching roles and actions on the objective.

4. The tenets of breaching (intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breach organization, mass, and synchronization) must be considered in all breaching operations and wargamed as part of the planning process.

5. The TF main effort must be clear and must be supported by the SOEO (scheme of engineer operations). The engineer must understand the scheme of maneuver and must plan to shift engineer forces and equipment consistent with the commander's main effort. This shifting of forces is critical in successive breach operations. The engineer planner ensures that the SOEO serves as a combat multiplier and not just a force provider.

6. The most effective tool available to the commander is the rehearsal. TF rehearsals focus on synchronizing the maneuver of support, breach, and assault forces to achieve the SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce) breaching fundamentals and highlight key events that must be coordinated during breach execution. A deliberate breach implies sufficient intelligence to construct a good model at a rehearsal site where all elements involved can rehearse until they meet the standard necessary for successful execution. Combat power must be focused at a defined point of penetration with detailed synchronization of all battlefield operating systems.

TA.6 Negative Trend 5: Counterreconnaissance operations

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 5-1: Commanders rarely develop a complete counter-recon plan that integrates all available TF assets.

1. The commander responsible for counter-recon rarely establishes a solid command relationship with the combat multipliers OPCON or attached.

2. Too often a lack of urgency and visibility given to the counter-recon mission has a direct negative impact on the counter-recon force.

3. Engagement area development is the exception rather than the rule.

4. Commanders fail to identify who, what, where, and when to kill the enemy.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 5-2:

1. Too often task forces do not produce a fire support plan in support of counter-reconnaissance operations.

2. In instances where a plan is produced, there is insufficient coordination for the assets necessary to accomplish the mission.

3. In too many instances, task force FSO fail to get/receive adequate guidance from the task force commander and the FSCOORD.

4. S2s are too often not consulted about tactics and techniques the enemy uses in their regimental reconnaissance missions.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 5-3:

1. Too often, there is no effort made to search out and destroy enemy recon forces. Security operations at the brigade level tend to be limited to a permeable screen at the FEBA. The usual brigade security effort is one counter-recon company per task force, which lines up along a phase line and does nothing more. The brigade seldom takes other actions to search for and destroy recon forces operating throughout the depth of the AO.

2. Counter-recon forces are given other missions which detract from their ability to perform the security mission.

3. As the overall plan is developed, security operations are an afterthought once the base plan is developed.

PROBLEM 5-4: Military Police are not effectively employed in the counter-reconnaissance role for the brigade rear area.

1. Military Police have responsibility for security in the brigade rear area and are constantly patrolling in order to detect and neutralize enemy elements. However, this patrolling has not been integrated and synchronized with a brigade counter-recon effort.

2. MP platoon leaders and S2s are not tying enemy infiltration/exfiltration routes to MP patrol plans.

3. Rear area named areas of interest (NAIs) receive very little emphasis. RESULT: The platoon leader develops patrol plans without the benefit of expert intelligence analysis.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 5-5: (Repeat of Problem 5-3 )

1. Too often there is no effort made to search out and destroy enemy recon forces. Security operations at the brigade level tend to be limited to a permeable screen at the FEBA. The usual brigade security effort is one counter-recon company per task force, which lines up along a phase line and does nothing more. The brigade seldom takes other actions to search for and destroy recon forces operating throughout the depth of the AO.

2. Counterrecon forces are given other missions which detract from their ability to perform the security mission.

3. As the overall plan is developed, security operations are an afterthought once the base plan is developed.

Techniques

1. The FSO must plan the counter-reconnaissance battle with the S2. Plans do not need to be elaborate:

• Coordinate the assets; ie., mortars or artillery.

• Obtain the commander's guidance for counter-reconnaissance fires.

• Task sufficient elements to execute the fight.

• Give observers the authority to refine planned targets in conjunction with the counter-reconnaissance force commander.

2. The TF commander, S3, and S2 should be able to articulate the conduct of the counter-recon effort and how it will be synchronized and fought by the counter-recon commander. The key is for the counter-recon commander to meet sector secure times with enough combat power to meet his task and purpose.

3. Commit a force capable of finding and destroying the enemy recon forces throughout the depth of the area of operations (AO). This may need to be a total combined arms force integrating "lookers" other than just the thermal sights of M1s and M2s. Give the counter-recon force no other mission.

4. Plan security operations early and with the same amount of attention and support given to any other combat operation.

5. Military Police platoon leaders must make rear area counter-reconnaissance functions a critical consideration for brigade reconnaissance planners. Constantly gather data about terrain and road networks which are essential for proper analysis of enemy reconnaissance efforts in the rear area. Tie terrain and road networks information into enemy priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and the location of friendly units on the battlefield to establish an economical patrol plan for the MPs which will put them where the enemy is most likely to be.

TA.6 Negative Trend 6: Reaction to chemical attack

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-1: Soldiers often fail to properly react to chemical attack. Soldiers fail to properly assume the appropriate MOPP level IAW FM 21-1-1-SMCT and as specified in unit SOP. Soldiers fail to put on boots and gloves and often fail to have the MOPP gear immediately available, IAW FM 3-4 or as specified in the unit SOP or the OPORD.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 6-2: Units react slowly to possible chemical attacks or contaminated areas. Soldiers rely too much on M256 kits; they do not use M8/M9 paper when they should.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-3: When units encounter persistent or non-persistent agents on the battlefield, they do not have a plan to react. Maneuver units have stalled along their axis of advance for over 45 minutes while trying to confirm if the chemical agent is either persistent or non-persistent.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 6-4:

1. Most NBC staffs arrive at NTC without an NBC TACSOP-1.

2. Task Forces arrive at NTC without standard procedures for NBC avoidance (FM 3-3), protection (FM 3-4), decontamination (FM 3-5), or defense (FM 3-100).

3. Task forces do not understand how to plan or execute NBC operations, smoke operations, or respond to chemical attacks.

Techniques

1. Units must develop and train a TTP or SOP for reaction to chemical agents on the battlefield. Routinely incorporate NBC training into every possible Home Station training event.

2. For an offensive mission (tailored for specific units):

• Prior to LD, all drivers crossing LD are in MOPP III, everyone else in MOPP II.

• At the first sign of chemical agent, the drivers pull down their hatches and everyone else goes to MOPP IV.

• The unit does not slow its momentum

3. MP teams have been teamed with chemical recon vehicles to provide additional security during movement and to act as TCPs at persistent chemical sites. While making use of FOX reconnaissance vehicles, it is very important to maintain soldier proficiency in the use of all available detection equipment.

• The C2 is either the brigade chemo, chem recon platoon leader, or in some cases the chemical company commander

• The plan is then rehearsed, not only at the unit level, but at brigade and task force rehearsals.

4. Remember that the M256 kits detect only vapor, while M8/M9 papers detect liquid contamination. Use the M8/M9 papers.

5. Once identification of chemicals is known on the battlefield, the brigade must quickly disseminate the information and ensure the information reaches the lowest level. Units must capitalize on digital information technology.

6. Produce, implement, and validate a workable NBC TACSOP at Home Station.

1. References:

   • FM 3-3 (chemical/biological contamination avoidance)
   • FM 3-4 (NBC Protection)
   • FM 3-5 (NBC decontamination)
   • FM 3-100 (NBC defense, chemical warfare, smoke and flame operations)
   • FM 3-101 (chemical staffs and units).

2. Create an NBC working environment IAW FM 3-101, page 5-3 (chemical staff considerations). Chemical staffs at TF force level should:

   • Identify the NBC threat
   • Determine if current chemical force is sufficient
   • Monitor the status of NBC defense equipment in the TF
   • Monitor the status of NBC preparedness in the force
   • Develop training plans to correct NBC defense training deficiencies
   • Develop chemical support plans to support current operations
   • Develop NBC defense plans to protect the force
   • Monitor the NBC situation
   • Monitor the status of chemical units
   • Recommend changes to the plan based on the NBC situation
   • Coordinate with higher headquarters for support as necessary
   • Continuously update the commander on all NBC operations
   • Remain technically and tactically proficient in all NBC issues as they relate to the TF mission

3. Improve cross talk between company and battalion NBC personnel. Create a program that ensures the battalion NBC staff discuss NBC issues regularly with their company counterparts.

TA.6 Mobility/Survivability/NBC, Part II

TA.6, Part IV