Military

PROBLEM 2-2: The engineer battalion TOCs do not properly coordinate, track, and report the status of obstacles in a timely and complete manner.

PROBLEM 2-3: (Repeat of Problem 2-1) Company/team commanders are not siting tactical obstacles together with their supporting engineers to ensure obstacle effects meet the TF commander's intent and are integrated with direct and indirect fires.

1. Engineer platoons typically site in tactical obstacles without prior coordination with the company/teams responsible for covering obstacles with fires. This problem is fueled by the brigade/battalion desire for a quick transition to the defense and early emplacement of obstacles.

2. Tactical obstacles are emplaced prior to TF engagement area recon and company/team fire plan development.

PROBLEM 2-4: Obstacles are not being used to attack enemy maneuver and rarely multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower.

1. Too often the obstacle plan is developed in a vacuum as are the other portions of the plan.

2. If obstacles are even considered during wargaming, the obstacles are assumed to be "in place" as the wargame begins. Units are not adjusting obstacle plans based on wargaming results.

3. Most units do not take terrain into account when planning obstacles. EXAMPLE: Drinkwater Lake offers two main avenues of approach, one north and one south of the lake. The south approach is most often listed as a battalion-sized avenue. A proper terrain recon, or even a map recon, would show this avenue shrinks to a platoon or smaller at the southeast tip of the lake. However, units still choose to defend on top of the chokepoint where they cannot maximize the terrain available.

4. Maneuver teams do not understand what turn, fix, block, and disrupt mean in terms of their direct fire plan. Each of these obstacle intents should tell the commander something about how to plan his direct fires. Thus, even when obstacles are integrated at TF level, the intent is being missed at lower levels.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-5: (Repeat of Problem 2-4) Obstacles do not attack enemy maneuver and rarely multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower.

1. Obstacle plans are developed in a vacuum.

• Units fail to adjust obstacle plans to take into account wargaming results.

• Units rarely take into account terrain in their obstacle plan.

2. Units are unable to relate obstacle result terms (i.e., turn, fix, block, disrupt) to their direct fire plan.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-6: Minefield Records (DA Form 1355) are not:

• Completed to standard
• Completed in a timely manner
• Forwarded to higher headquarters as required

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-7: Obstacles are not being planned nor emplaced to attack enemy maneuver and frequently do not enhance the effects and capabilities of friendly firepower.

1. Task forces have weak knowledge of FM 90-7, the doctrinal reference for obstacle integration.

2. There is a lack of understanding of mobility corridors/avenues of approach and their fundamental relationship to the target, location, and effect of tactical obstacles.

3. The SITEMP is prepared with little to no engineer involvement.

4. A Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) is seldom produced, even though it is vital to obstacle planning. The MCOO helps ensure that the obstacles planned will affect the enemy avenues of approach and maneuver corridors.

5. All leaders do not understand how obstacles and fires are integrated to achieve obstacle effect:

1. There is confusion over what a turn, block, fix or disrupt obstacle means in terms of the direct fire plan at the company team level.

2. Each of these obstacle intents should assist the commander in planning his direct fires. This enables the commander to maximize the effectiveness of fires while exploiting the weaknesses that the obstacles have created for the enemy.

PROBLEM 2-8:

1. Emplacing engineer and company/team commanders often fail to understand the intent of the obstacle group to achieve synchronization of obstacle effects and fires.

2. Engineer and company/team commanders seldom plan sufficient time for the siting effort.

3. Too often the engineer company commander begins the tentative siting process with no integration of the engineer platoon leaders.

4. The location of control measures are not made clear to the engineer platoon leader, and the engineers do not understand the company/team commander's intent.

5. Few, if any, engineer companies have SOPs that outline the steps required and define who is responsible for the obstacle siting and refinement process.

6. The engineer platoon leader has little understanding of the ranges and limitations of key weapon systems at the task force level.

PROBLEM 2-9: (Repeat of Problem 2-6) Minefield records, DA Form 1355, are incomplete and are not forwarded to higher headquarters as required.

PROBLEM 2-10: Engineer units have difficulty planning and executing effective situational obstacles in support of maneuver -- particularly the use and synchronization of FASCAM resources.

1. Engineer staff officers are not incorporating FASCAM planning considerations into their Engineer Battlefield Analysis (EBA).

2. Basic staff coordination and synchronization of tasks required for FASCAM obstacles have rarely been implemented effectively.

Techniques

1. Home Station training should include battle drills to ensure obstacles are synchronized with maneuver and fires; emplaced obstacles should not dictate the maneuver plan, but support the maneuver plan.

2. See FM 20-32, Chapter 4, "Mini Rehearsals," for a good example of a battle drill that company/teams with their supporting engineers can conduct near motor pool facilities at a very low cost. This type exercise can be a one day event that trains and proofs battle drills walked through first in garrison. As proficiency is gained, incorporate the drills as "full up" operations during field training exercises.

3. Obstacle plan management, from initial materiel estimate to completion, should include:

• Obstacle plan development to meet the brigade commander's intent and scheme of maneuver (to include brigade directed obstacles and brigade developed obstacle belts).

• Obstacle materiels estimate.

• Initial obstacle and survivability timeline; constraints based on METT-T and anticipated delays/disruptions due to historically based equipment, personnel, and materiel non-availability.

• Coordination with the S4 (Bde/TF/Engr) for the early movement of obstacle materiels to expedite the transition to the defense and the establishment of the Class IV and V point.

• Engineer technical representative at the Class IV and V point to ensure materiels are packaged and issued by priority.

• Timely submission of obstacle plans (groups and directed obstacles) from the TF engineers.

• Submission of obstacle and survivability status reports IAW TSOP on an established schedule.

• Enforcement of the reports submission schedule by the engineer battalion XO and ABE section, using the engineer company net if required. Stress the negative results caused by delayed status reporting.

• Brief the engineer battalion commander and the brigade commander at established time intervals throughout the defensive preparation.

• Visits to the unit emplacing obstacles by engineer battalion leaders and staff members.

• Recommendations for reallocation and/or reprioritization of assets and efforts.

4. Maneuver commanders should become familiar with FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. This manual is an excellent doctrinal reference as to the purpose of each obstacle, its intended effect, and how obstacles should be integrated into the commander's direct fire plan.

5. Engineer commanders should conduct OPD classes for their habitually associated maneuver units on how to effectively plan and site obstacles they are responsible for and what key information engineers are looking for when they show up to emplace obstacles.

6. Each combined arms exercise (CPX, MAPEX, TEWT, BSS) that is conducted should incorporate a rock drill that focuses on the siting of obstacles with the company team commanders and the engineer platoon leaders being the key players.

7. Increase use of DA Form 1355 at Home Station Training, to include NCODP and OPD classes on contents, preparation, and submittal requirements.

8. Develop SOPs in synchronization with the maneuver commander on how to develop an engagement area. Place ranges of all key weapons systems as outlined in FM 90-7. This should include both live and training ranges of systems.

9. Task force staffs must integrate all elements of the BOS during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and identify all specified, implied, and essential tasks regarding FASCAM. The unit must develop an SOP for transmitting SCATMINWARN report and follow-up reports of execution and self-destruct times. The planning process must identify target/obstacle triggers based on enemy events. The plan must clearly:

• Associate enemy events with NAIs, decision points.

• Have a corresponding reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan with assigned primary and alternate observers to trigger execution.

TA.6 Negative Trend 3: Use of chemical detection equipment

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Units fail to perform pre-combat checks on M8A1 alarms prior to deployment. Many units fail to properly employ the alarms:

• Alarms not connected to the battery
• Alarms not positioned upwind
• Alarms not connected to the M42
• Omission of other critical steps

Many units simply fail to emplace the alarm at all.

RESULT: Too many units receive no warning about enemy employment of chemical agents.

PROBLEM 3-2: Units consistently fail to properly utilize the M9 paper on MOPP suits and vehicles IAW FM 3-4, NBC Protection. Units often attempt to simulate M9 paper with green tape rather than conduct realistic training. Leaders fail to conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections to correct M9 paper deficiencies.

PROBLEM 3-3: (Repeat of Problem 3-1)

1. Units fail to perform PCCs of M8A1 alarms prior to deployment and therefore arrive with some unserviceable equipment.

2. Units fail to properly employ the alarms:

• Not connected to the battery
• Not positioned upwind
• Not connected to the M42

3. Many units fail to use the chemical agent alarm.

4. Many units are not complying with the annual wipe tests requirement.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-4: Too many units do not deploy their M8A1s IAW their TACSOP for FM 3-4.

1. Units do not identify threat level.

2. Units are afraid that the alarms may be damaged by vehicles.

3. Units do not have adequate supply of WD-1 wire.

4. Units tend to have battery shortages.

5. Units often place M8A1 inside the unit's perimeter and not IAW TM 3-6665-12-12.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 3-5: Units do not use the M256 kit or M9 chemical paper correctly.

PROBLEM 3-6: (Repeat of Problem 3-4) Too many units do not deploy their M8A1s IAW their tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) or FM 3-4.

1. Alarms are often placed inside the unit's perimeter and not IAW correct procedure.

2. Units are afraid that the alarms may be damaged by vehicles running over them.

3. Units are afraid someone might steal the alarm if placed outside the perimeter.

4. The medical company, which has one of three authorized M8A1 alarms, often does not place the alarm IAW the latest downwind message. When in place,

• power source is not hooked up
• no wire is run to the alarm

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-7: M8A1 alarms are seldom employed to standard.

1. Soldiers who are signed for and responsible for the M8A1 alarm are often not proficient in its employment, maintenance, and operation.

• They are not placed upwind.

• They are not placed at the proper distance that would provide the unit early warning of chemical attack.

• They do not put them out at all; they are more concerned about someone driving over it than providing early warning.

• They do not know how to put the alarm into operation.

• They do not deploy with enough batteries, maintenance kits, or wire to run the alarm.

2. Units often deploy to the training area with up to 25% of the alarms deadlined.

PROBLEM 3-8:

1. The medical company has one of three authorized M8A1 alarms but they do not often place it out in accordance with the latest downwind message.

2. When the alarm is placed properly, the power source is usually not hooked up and wire is not run to the alarm.

Techniques

1. Units must make the effort during Home Station training to properly employ M8A1 chemical agent alarms during their field training IAW TM 3-6665-12-12 and to maintain the equipment in serviceable condition.

2. Refer to GTA 3-5-14 and chapter 3 of FM 3-3.

3. Develop standard operating procedures for marking M8A1s to prevent loss of an alarm. Maintain proper stockage of deployable supplies (to include batteries) IAW higher guidance, and ensure that supplies are rotated.

4. Justify additional WD-1 wire for M8A1s using the unit MTOE and TM 3-6665-12-12 as references.

5. "Green tape" cannot be a substitute for M9 chemical paper. M256 kits detect only vapor; M9 papers detect liquid contamination. Routinely incorporate NBC training into every possible Home Station training event. Proper wearing of gloves must be stressed.

6. Develop a training plan for M8A1 operators. Require units to certify their operators by attending a course that is given by the battalion chemical NCO.

• Once certified, operators will be issued a training certificate.

• The certification program will be part of the inspection program.

7. For those units that do have certification programs in place and do not train NBC on a frequent basis, develop a sustainment training program. This program should be quarterly and also added to the inspection program.

TA.6 Mobility/Survivability/NBC, Part I

TA.6, Part III