Military

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-3: Artillery batteries continue to show demonstrated weaknesses in the area of defensive planning and execution.

1. Too often units fail to prepare to defend themselves even when adequate time is available.

2. Junior leaders and section chiefs lack basic defensive skills such as

• Use of Killer Junior
• Use of TRPs
• Range card preparation
• Construction of fighting positions
• Placement of observation points

PROBLEM 1-4: CSS units consistently have difficulty planning and providing for their own defense. Development and execution of coherent base cluster defense plans, to include fire support and ADA planning/coordination and executing alternate Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operations, continues to be difficult for CSS units.

1. Base cluster defenses often are founded on poor quality fighting positions, an absence of sector sketches, and weak coordination between supporting elements.

2. Reconnaissance and surveillance planning is improving but the execution of these plans remains a problem.

3. Fire support, mobility/survivability, and air defense planning and execution is not coordinated or complete.

4. Alternate TOC operations are either not conducted or are not fully prepared to function as the primary TOC.

5. Hasty displacement planning and execution needs improvement.

6. Other areas needing improvement are:

• Planning of preparation and execution triggers.
• Site selection based on current Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
• Development of lists of priority equipment to be saved.
• Development of routes, reporting posts, and priority of movement.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-5:

1. Signal company site defense plans/measures are often inadequate to defend against a Level II ground threat.

2. MSE units deploy in various sized elements ranging from 2-man retrans teams to 30-man node centers. These elements are frequently not trained or proficient in basic site defense measures. This leaves them vulnerable to destruction by hostile elements.

3. Commanders tend to place emphasis upon the installation, operation, and maintenance of signal systems and tend to disregard the requirement to establish and improve site defense measures.

PROBLEM 1-6:

1. Assembly area security is the first "fight" to be concerned with. However, force protection for aviation assembly areas continually needs improvement, specifically:

• Passive air defense measures
• R&S planning/execution
• Fire support planning/execution
• Obstacle emplacement
• Actions on contact
• Individual soldier skills

2. Aviation units either anticipate attached units to aid in security (i.e., Avenger Team or MP Squad) or consider themselves positioned too far in the division's rear sector to plan threat contingencies.

PROBLEM 1-7: Aviation units seldom develop a good assembly area security plan capable of successfully repelling a Level I threat.

1. Aviation assembly areas (AAs) are usually widespread with no pre-planned occupation plan to ensure aviation personnel and equipment are protected from the enemy.

2. Fighting positions built to standard, overlapping fields of fire, correct emplacement of crew served weapons, etc., are not planned for or emplaced before occupation of the assembly area.

3. Seldom is one person made responsible for the AA security; it is usually a collection of individual efforts in hopes of securing the AA.

PROBLEM 1-8: BSFV squads often construct inadequate fighting positions. They often construct overhead cover by building an outer ring of sandbags 18" deep and fill the interior with a minimum of 18" of loose sand and dirt. This does not provide adequate protection to survive a 152mm artillery round at 50 feet since loose dirt is not as protective as layers of dirt in sandbags.

PROBLEM 1-9: The medical company is seldom given a clear task and purpose for their defense and the defense of the BSA.

1. Medical companies often dig a number of hasty fighting positions in a 360 degree circle around the company area but have no ability to concentrate fires and no understanding of the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach.

2. Medical companies deploy without enough Class IV barrier supplies.

PROBLEM 1-10: Preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions is substandard.

1. Maneuver unit leaders tend to place responsibility for proper preparation of their fighting positions on the engineers.

2. Dismounts exhibit weakness in basic battlefield survivability/site preparation skills.

PROBLEM 1-11: Firing batteries lack coordinated defense plans.

1. Basic defensive skills in the firing batteries are either disregarded or poorly planned and executed.

2. Battery commanders fail to conduct IPB of their positions and, with the battalion S2, fail to identify and disseminate the most likely threat to their batteries.

3. LP/OPs are usually in poor locations to provide early warning, and soldiers are not well briefed or equipped to perform the mission to standard.

4. Often batteries do not coordinate with adjacent units; when they do coordinate, it is often incomplete.

5. Range cards are either inaccurate or not completed at all.

6. Maintenance of crew-served weapons is often neglected and causes weapons to malfunction at critical times during battles.

7. Usually sectors of fire are prescribed by the section chief, not by the platoon leader or platoon sergeant.

8. Leaders too often fail to explain target reference points (TRPs).

9. Little thought is put into establishing battery indirect fire targets and the computation of data for self illumination.

10. Rehearsals of reaction forces and tank killer junior are planned but generally not conducted due to poor time management.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-12: Units that identify contaminated areas are continuing to have problems keeping follow-on forces out of the contamination.

1. Units will usually put out the NBC-1 Report over O/I net even though most tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) say to put it out over command nets.

2. M93 FOX vehicles that conduct NBC recon will mark the contaminated area, but the markers used by FOX crews are often not seen and other vehicles run right over them.

3. Units coming into the contamination have the NBC-1 Report plotted on their maps, but their situational awareness is so poor, they do not realize where they are.

PROBLEM 1-13:

1. Electronic Warfare teams are too often not taking the appropriate actions to ensure their system's survivability.

2. They are failing to pull security during site reconnaissance and occupation.

3. They are not locating their OP/LPS where they have good 360 degree visibility of the area around their system.

4. They fail to ensure that they have a communications link (either a TA-312 or PRC-119) between the OP/LP and the system hut.

5. They do not employ an M8 chemical agent detector and alarm, or they employ the M8 in the wrong location.

6. They are not using camouflage netting to conceal their Electronic Warfare systems.

7. They are not cleaning or maintaining their individual and crew-served weapons to ensure that they are prepared to defend themselves, if required.

PROBLEM 1-14: (Repeat of Problem 1-9) The medical company is seldom given a clear task and purpose for their defense and the defense of the BSA.

1. Medical companies often dig a number of hasty fighting positions in a 360 degree circle around the company area but have no ability to concentrate fires and no understanding of the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach.

2. Medical companies deploy without enough Class IV barrier supplies.

PROBLEM 1-15: (Repeat of Problem 1-8) BSFV squads often construct inadequate fighting positions. They often construct overhead cover by building an outer ring of sandbags 18" deep and fill the interior with a minimum of 18" of loose sand and dirt. This does not provide adequate protection to survive a 152mm artillery round at 50 feet since loose dirt is not as protective as layers of dirt in sandbags.

PROBLEM 1-16: Logistics units experience difficulty in balancing their CSS missions with defensive operations.

1. Most logistics leaders do not understand how to conduct a defense by squad, an essential building block to a cohesive defensive plan, and one of the Army's FY97 Common Task Testing (CTT) requirements.

• During the past two quarters, out of 70 logistics NCOs questioned, 65% did not know how to conduct a squad defense.

• Most of these NCOs stated they did not take common task tests.

2. Forward Support Battalions' (FSBs) defenses have no depth to them and are not actively supervised by the officers or NCOs at battalion and company level.

3. Soldiers lack needed competency to succeed in defending the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

Techniques

1. Firing batteries need to focus more effort on defensive planning and execution at all levels during Home Station training.

1. A unit defensive checklist is an outstanding base when planning a defense of a position, but METT-T considerations must be used to prioritize and focus the tasks to the situation.

2. The battery commander must work with the S2 and his 1SG to decide how he can best defend his unit's position.

   • The battery commander and first sergeant must then establish a defensive priority of work to focus the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants.

   • If the defensive checklist is developed using a priority of work sequence, it will suffice for either a hasty or deliberate defense.

3. Range cards for all of the platoon's weapons systems must be prepared IAW the appropriate FM or ST.

4. Survivability/fighting positions must be constructed where and when METT-T dictates. These positions must be built to standard IAW FM 5-103.

5. The platoon leadership must establish sectors of fire for all weapons and TRPs and disseminate them to the lowest levels.

6. LP/OPs must be placed on the enemy's most likely avenue of approach and where a trigger point can be seen to give the battery time to prepare for a direct fire engagement.

   • They must have the necessary equipment to perform their mission.

   • Leaders must brief the soldiers manning these positions and ensure that they understand their mission:

     • What they are looking for
     • Where they look for it
     • What they do when they see it

7. FDCs should always be prepared to fire adjacent self-defense targets as well as their own.

8. Self-illumination data must be computed for each position and sent to the howitzer or howitzers that are designated to fire the illumination.

2. Defense preparation should be a battle drill designed to establish a basic defense capability as rapidly as possible.

1. Assign sectors of fire already determined by an advance party gunnery sergeant.

2. Establish a couple of hasty target reference points for the battery.

3. Complete range cards and defense diagrams approximately one hour after the platoon is ready to fire.

4. Include a quick rehearsal if time permits.

5. Once hasty defense preparations are established, continue improvements based on METT-T.

3. Battalions should establish battery defensive lanes to assist and set the conditions for commanders to train their units to standard. Consider consolidation of instruction at battalion level to identify the standards to key leaders in batteries. Battalions should acquire and maintain a supply of Class IV to assist leaders in their instruction of fighting position construction techniques. Use OPDs and NCOPDs to teach TTPs on battery defense.

4. Mortar platoons must proactively establish sectors of fire, survivability positions, and OPs. Emplace crew-served weapons along likely enemy avenues of approach. Coordinate with adjacent elements, when applicable. The mortar platoon leader must learn to compete for the limited engineer support assets to enhance survivability positions; the platoon must be able to prepare their own survivability positions under the assumption they will not receive engineer support.

5. Leaders at all levels must understand that the destruction of signal assets due to inadequate defensive measures degrades area communications for an unacceptable reason. Command emphasis must be applied to site defense training within signal units. Specific areas usually found to be weak include:

• Positioning of observation posts
• Command and control of perimeter and quick reaction forces
• Positioning of M60 machine guns
• Site defense drills/rehearsals

6. Aviation units need to train at Home Station to be self-sufficient within their own area. Continue to emphasize the importance of assembly area operations and focus more Home Station training to perfect skills.

1. Develop and rehearse detailed battalion SOPs for assembly area (AA) operations and security.

2. Realistic expectations for defending against the enemy should be planned for and developed to standard.

3. Common soldier tasks must be taught at Home Station and practiced until all soldiers know and can achieve them to standard. Units must identify the person responsible for developing and executing the AA security plan and hold him responsible for AA security.

7. BSFV squads should use interlocking layers of sandbags at least 18" deep. The sandbags increase the density and the stability of overhead cover.

1. Leaders are responsible for proper preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions, not the engineer units.

2. Units must be trained and proficient in site preparation and survivability skills. This should be done at Home Station.

8. The medical company commander obtains from the S2/S3 the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach. Fighting positions are prepared based on this information to enable massing of the fires the commander has available.

1. Develop a standard survivability position for each soldier assigned in the vicinity of their work area. This will ensure each soldier has a protected position in the event of indirect fires.

2. Determine the total Class IV requirement for the company and establish load plans.

9. In contaminated areas, use available assets to assist in the control of the site.

1. Use MPs as traffic control posts (TCPs) to ensure vehicles do not enter the contamination.

2. Make the FOX vehicle the last to go to decon, and assist the MPs to keep vehicles out. Everyone recognizes a FOX and knows what it does. This should be an indicator for any unsuspecting vehicles/soldiers.

3. Ensure the NBC reports go out on the right nets as stated in the unit TACSOP.

4. Use other visual signals, such as purple smoke, to aid in the identification of the contamination. The FOX crews can carry the smoke and use it when vehicles approach.

10. Electronic Warfare (EW) team NCOs must supervise their subordinates and enforce the standards in their units' SOPs.

1. Electronic Warfare team leaders and platoon sergeants should conduct thorough pre-combat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs) to ensure that teams have all the necessary equipment on hand and in a serviceable condition.

   • Use a checklist that includes such items as communications gear, M8 alarm, batteries for all equipment, camouflage netting, and weapons cleaning supplies.

   • Continuously supervise teams to ensure they are taking all appropriate security measures.

   • Use a site occupation and security checklist.

2. Teams should include the above security measures in their crew drills, and they must drill these survivability skills at home station in FTXs and during routine crew drills.

11. Home Station training must fully integrate and exercise all aspects of base defense operations.

1. All officers and NCOs should be required to take CTT and exhibit the basic fundamental soldier skills required of a leader.

2. The S3 should set up a training program at Home Station that produces quality OPs, access control points, and a quick-reaction force. These soldiers need to understand all actions on contact and battle drills of the battalion.

TA.3 Air Defense

TA.6 Mobility/Survivability/NBC, Part II