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Military

SECTION N

NEEDS EMPHASIS (cont)


TA.3 AIR DEFENSE

TA.3 Negative Trend 1: Early warning dissemination and reaction

Observation frequency:1-2QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY963-4QFY961-2QFY97
21232

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: In too many cases early warning was not pushed through the task force/squadron via the command net. Instead, the O/I net was used.

RESULT: Untimely early warning and sporadic AAFADs.

PROBLEM 1-2: Units incorrectly use the air defense warning system to control the level of readiness of ADA fire units. Either all ADA fire units are at the highest level of alert or they are at the lowest. Individual fire units must specify their own readiness level during those periods when the level is not specified from higher headquarters. Too often the readiness level is too high for the situation.

RESULT: Fire units lower their readiness levels based on fatigue, not the air threat.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-3: While air defense units arrive with a plan to disseminate early warning, there are too many instances where supported maneuver elements fail to sufficiently disseminate the warnings. These dissemination problems most often result from a failure to exercise the procedure during Home Station training; the air defense early warning plan works for the air defense battalion, but breakdowns occur within the supported maneuver elements.

RESULT: Too many instances where maneuver company teams have insufficient warning to execute the appropriate air attack drill.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-4: Air defense units give evidence of not understanding local air defense warnings (LADWs). They base their states of readiness on the air defense warning (ADW) of the overall area of operations rather than on what it is in their sector.

RESULTS:

1. AD teams search and scan for non-existent threats.

2. AD fire units get left behind by the protected unit.

3. AD protection is not adequate to the threat to the supported unit.

PROBLEM 1-5: Task forces generally do not understand the early warning system. Understanding of various air attack warnings is limited, specifically local air defense warnings (LADWs). Warnings are usually not tied to, nor do they trigger any specified air attack drill.

RESULTS:

1. Confusion at the company/team level to what the actual threat is.

2. Overall poor reaction to directed early warning.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-6: (Repeat of Problem 1-2) ADA units do not routinely use or understand states of alert (SOAs). Units incorrectly use the air defense warning system to control the level of readiness of ADA fire units. Either all ADA fire units are at the highest state of alert or they are at the lowest. If at the highest alert, fire units individually lower their readiness not based on the air threat but because of fatigue.

PROBLEM 1-7: Too many brigades still perceive that directed early warning (received on the FM DEW net) is for air defense forces only.

1. Majority of brigades have effective air attack early warning dissemination procedures, but lack drills associated with the early warning/change in ADW/WCS.

2. Some units still do not use local air defense (LADWs) IAW current FMs.

3. There is never enough air defense to cover every critical asset in a BCT's sector. Therefore, CAFADs must be employed to enhance the air defense coverage.

PROBLEM 1-8: BSFV platoons have inadequate SOPs for receiving early warning information. Some platoon SOPs for communication plans direct that no BSFV platoon elements monitor the Division Early Warning (DEW) net. Instead, platoons monitor the ADA battery command net which is tasked to monitor and retransmit all early warning information. This system is inadequate because:

  • The ADA battery cannot always maintain communications with all subordinate elements due to terrain/distance.

  • Lack of redundancy.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-9:

1. Directed early warning is not being re-broadcast in a timely manner to soldier/crew levels.

2. This warning should be transmitted in a language for all soldiers to understand.

RESULTS:

1. At TF level there is normally a breakdown because there is no ADA representative in the TF TOC during the battle (the ADO fights from his BSFV).

2. The TF normally reacts poorly to air attack.

PROBLEM 1-10: (Repeat of Problem 1-8) BSFV platoons have inadequate SOPs for receiving early warning information. Some platoon SOPs for communication plans direct that no BSFV platoon elements monitor the Division Early Warning (DEW) net. Instead, platoons monitor the ADA battery command net which is tasked to monitor and retransmit all early warning information. This system is inadequate because:

  • The ADA battery cannot always maintain communications with all subordinate elements due to terrain/distance.

  • Lack of redundancy.

Techniques

1. Use the command net for dissemination of early warning, stressed by key leaders. BSFV platoon communications plans should have at least one squad per section monitor the DEW net. The ADA platoon leader and the platoon sergeant/squad leader should monitor the battery net (FM 44-43, Chapter 2).

2. The early warning system must be fully understood and practiced by all elements within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Procedures for air defense elements and maneuver/support elements must be clearly defined within unit SOPs and then practiced during training exercises. Warning plans must have necessary redundancy and establish clear and effective triggers based on different threats.

3. Units should practice air attack drills at all echelons (particularly platoon and company/team) as part of routine training. Air defenders should take the lead on teaching current air defense doctrine so maneuver units can "help themselves" when under air attack.

4. ADA units need to learn to use SOAs linked to the IPB and air defense warning system to strike a balance between readiness and sustained operations. Develop SOPs and SOAs that reflect the required level of readiness based on IPB and air defense warning system.

5. Incorporate explanation and discussion of local air defense warnings (LADWs) in Home Station training.

  1. Directed early warning defines the local air defense warning (LADW) and states whether the aircraft is friendly, hostile or unknown, a cardinal direction, and, if known, the most likely affected asset within the force.

  2. Directed early warning is designated to alert a particular unit, units, or area of the battlefield of an immediate or possible threat. It is passed over unit command net or nets designated by the unit as flash precedents traffic.

6. Reaction to early warnings should be incorporated into Home Station training events. Unit SOPs should clearly identify air attack drills for Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs), offensive, and defensive operations. The trigger to implement these drills should be based on local air defense warnings (Snowman, Look Out, Dynamite) which more accurately identify the threat to the task force.

7. Do not use the air defense warning system to control the level of readiness of ADA fire units. Develop a readiness status operating procedure that balances readiness requirements, based on IPB and the air defense warning system, and the requirements to conduct sustained operations.


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