Military

PROBLEM 4-2: (Repeat of Problem 4-1) In an effort to shorten the deliberate planning process, S2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COAs). The S2 shortens enemy COA development by failing to depict the enemy's most dangerous COAs or threat models that would assist the staff in engagement areas (EA).

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-3: (Repeat of Problems 4-1 and 4-2)

1. Task force S2 SITEMPS lack sufficient detail to assist the commander and battle staff to visualize how the enemy will fight at the critical point.

2. S2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COA) and possible enemy branch plans from the selected enemy COA.

3. S2 SITEMPs do not account for all the enemy combat multipliers.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-4: (Repeat of Problems 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3) S2's situation templates (SITEMPs) frequently lack sufficient detail to assist the staff and commanders to visualize how the enemy will fight at the critical point.

1. S2s are not depicting multiple enemy COAs (ECOAs).

2. The S2 fails to depict the enemy's most dangerous COAs.

3. S2s do not prepare threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy would fight.

4. S2s do not show the staff how the enemy would look entering potential engagement areas (EAs).

PROBLEM 4-5: Task force S2 sections frequently do not use combat information to update their situation template in a timely manner.

1. S2 sections do not have a sequential system in place to receive reports, analyze reports, and confirm or deny the situation template.

2. They do not update the situation template after the OPORD briefing.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-6: Most engineer company executive officers (XOs) do not understand how to analyze threat engineer capabilities.

Techniques

1. S2s must, at Home Station, practice their wargaming responsibility to serve as a thinking, uncooperative enemy.

2. S2s should prepare enemy SITEMPs and threat models for the enemy's most dangerous and most probable COAs. FM 34-130 discusses development of a SITEMP, although the manual does not address the level of detail necessary to adequately support the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).

3. Brigade S2s should produce at least two SITEMPs which show all critical enemy BOSs for every staff planning effort. SITEMPs should depict what the enemy will look like at selected "critical points."

4. Task force S2s must develop multiple enemy COAs and possible branch plans.

5. S2 sections should practice IPB as a continuous process. Organize the S2 section to receive and analyze reports in a timely manner, including implications for the situation template.

6. Engineer company commanders must better train their XOs. Provide them with appropriate doctrinal manuals on engineer equipment, capabilities, and organizations. XOs must seek out the task force S2's guidance on their input to the task force SITEMP.

TA.5 Negative Trend 5: S2 analysis and reporting

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 5-1: Too often in field artillery (FA) battalions, by the time S2s report "current" information, the information is outdated. Intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREPs) are designed to show where the enemy is now and predict the impact on future operations. The failure to either use these formats or to graphically depict these events will result in the S2 failing to see critical enemy events and their impact on the battalion.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 5-2: (Repeat of Problem 5-1) Too many field artillery (FA) battalions fail to use intelligence summaries (INTSUM) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREP) to show where the enemy is now and to predict the impact the enemy will have on future operations.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 5-3: S2s often mix analytic products and current situation products to the commander and staff. They routinely use one map overlay for both "template" and situation map. They do not routinely identify one source in brigade CP for current situation assessments.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 5-4: S2 sections too often fail to use their own SITEMPs as analytical products. They routinely produce SITEMPs of varying quality and utility, but often throw them in a corner and fail to use them once the planning has stopped and execution has begun.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 5-5: (Repeat of Problem 5-4) S2 Sections too often fail to use their own SITEMPs as analytical products. They routinely produce SITEMPs of varying quality and utility, but often throw them in a corner and fail to use them once the planning has stopped and execution has begun.

Techniques

1. Develop an Enemy Critical Events Matrix per the sample below. This matrix synchronizes enemy events with critical fire support tasks (CFSTs), priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and force protection measures.

When the battle tracking of enemy actions triggers events in a location you anticipated, execute the appropriate action/report. This matrix will focus on those critical enemy events battery commanders, the S3, and FSCOORD need to be aware of in making critical decisions. This allows you to produce predictive analysis rather than reactive analysis.

2. Provide separate work areas for current and analytical work. Use Analysis Control Team (ACT) for analytic product(s) and S2 section for current assessments. Specifically task one person or element to maintain the current situation.

3. S2 sections should post and use their SITEMPs for reporting enemy COAs. Ensure that the SITEMP or other analytic product is not confused with "hard" intel received by using two maps: one analytical map and one for posting only "hard data."

TA.5 Negative Trend 6: Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) operations

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-1: GSR teams tend to have a low level of proficiency in several areas:

• Ability to call for fire
• NBC skills (unmasking procedures and M256 kit use)
• Battlefield survival (security and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM))
• Range cards for the radar and crew-served weapons

PROBLEM 6-2: When GSR leadership is not involved with task force S2s and scout platoon leaders, the GSRs are rarely effective.

RESULT: Lack of GSR team involvement means:

• GSR teams are given missions too late to complete troop-leading procedures (TLPs).
• GSR teams are not incorporated into R&S plans.
• Lost intelligence due to lack of established reporting procedures.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 6-3:

1. Task force S2s do not have a clear understanding of how to utilize GSR teams at the TF level and below.

2. They are not including GSR teams in the TF OPORD or R&S plan.

3. When they give a mission to GSR teams, there is no clear task and purpose.

4. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures continue to be a problem between the TF and GSR teams.

Techniques

1. Establish habitual relationships at Home Station so that GSR teams become familiar with the supported unit's SOPs and become integrated as a member of the bigger team.

2. Develop training scenarios at Home Station to train the TF S2s on how to utilize GSR teams.

3. Do not re-task-organize after every mission to ensure GSRs are always on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). GSR teams that are shuffled around do not have time to conduct TLPs, to rest, and to refit.

4. Make it the GSR Platoon Leader's and PSG's responsibility to ensure that their teams are included in OPORDs at all levels.

5. GSR Platoon Leaders and PSGs should have more input in mission planning.

6. Team leaders should have input in the development of the R&S plan to be sure that the team can accomplish the mission.

7. The TF S2 must make sure that the task and purpose is clear and understood by the team before deployment.

8. Train at all levels to develop effective CASEVAC plans.

9. Train the following skills at Home Station:

• Ability to call for fire
• NBC skills (unmasking procedures and M256 kit use)
• Battlefield survival (security and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM))
• Range cards for the radar and crew-served weapons

TA.5 Negative Trend 7: Terrain analysis

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 7-1:

1. Enemy avenues of approach depicted into friendly sectors do not identify potential engagement areas, fire sacks, defensible terrain, and specific system or equipment positions.

2. Terrain analysis fails to identify where maneuver forces are most vulnerable to enemy observation and fires.

3. Terrain analysis is not considered by the S2 or the S3 when developing threat and friendly COAs.

4. S3s develop friendly COAs without considering terrain's impact of weapon system effects and/or enemy COAs.

5. There is little staff integration between the S2 and the supporting engineer.

2QFY95

PROBLEM 7-2: S2s rarely use the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) developed at Home Station to assist terrain analysis.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 7-3: The Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE), rather than the S2, often briefs terrain analysis during the mission analysis and OPORD briefs.

Techniques

1. S2s should incorporate in the IPB process sufficient time and analytical methods to produce a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) in a timely fashion.

2. S2s should work closely with engineers, and using TERRA BASE, if available, conduct detailed terrain analysis that meets the commander's needs. The terrain analysis should identify the following, as a minimum:

• Enemy avenues of approach
• Intervisibility lines
• Potential engagement areas
• Enemy fire sacks
• Weapon system firing lines
• Potential lines of communication

3. Task force engineers, working with the S2, can provide additional detailed terrain based information.

• Restrictive terrain analysis (go/no-go)

• Line of sight/intervisibility lines

• Geological analysis (from division/corps) for soil conditions, hydrology, off limits, or no dig/restricted dig limitations.

4. The ABE should continue to assist the S2 in terrain analysis; however, the S2 should brief the terrain and its significance.

TA.5 Negative Trend 8: S2 section organization

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 8-1: S2 shops too often are not organized to delegate task completion. S2s produce all IPB products themselves. Most staff sections are not organized to divide the labor necessary to produce products in a timely manner.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 8-2: S2 sections do not work efficiently or as a team, particularly when they transition from planning to current operations.

1. S2 sections often operate on a 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Based on the time available and the work required to be done, this is a waste of precious personnel resources.

2. The shift schedule reinforces an "I'm not on shift" attitude and tends to inhibit teamwork, setting up a "we/they" relationship between the two shifts.

3. Most S2 sections set up an internal plans section (which is a good idea), but fail to fully brief the plan to the rest of the section working current operations.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 8-3: (Repeat of Problem 8-2) S2 sections do not work efficiently or as a team, particularly when they transition from planning to current operations.

1. S2 sections often operate on a 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Based on the time available and the work required to be done, this is a waste of precious personnel resources.

2. The shift schedule reinforces the "I'm not on shift" attitude and tends to inhibit teamwork, setting up a "we/they" relationship between the two shifts.

3. Most S2 sections set up an internal plans section (which is a good idea), but fail to fully brief the plan to the rest of the section working current operations.

Techniques

1. Establish specific responsibilities for each member of the section in the production of S2 "products." Make full use of NCOs and soldiers assigned; minimize their assignment to additional duties during those periods when their specialized skills are needed to quickly develop the necessary products. Train each section member at Home Station to perform their assigned tasks and cross-train them to do each other's job.

2. Phase soldiers into work schedules rather than have massive turnover twice a day. Rigorously enforce quality shift change briefings.

3. Hold regular "huddles" in which the entire section, together with the ACT, is brought together to share the current enemy situation and the status of recon operations.

4. Avoid the 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Soldiers should get at least six hours of sleep and time for personal hygiene and meals; they do not need (and we cannot afford) 12 hours out of the fight.

5. At the completion of each step of the planning process, and at a minimum when the OPORD is complete, the S2 planners should brief the entire section on the next mission.

TA.5 Negative Trend 9: Event template/event matrix

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 9-1: S2s experience difficulties developing and using an event template and matrix. There are particular problems identifying critical enemy events and then integrating them into an event template and matrix.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 9-2:

1. S2s do not understand the use of event templates or event matrix and their importance to the planning process.

2. Enemy decision points and NAIs are not clearly defined to planners or the commander.

Techniques

1. See FM 34-130, page 3-54, figure 3-2-11, for a good example of an event matrix. S2s need to familiarize themselves with FM 34-130.

2. The intelligence section should develop a separate overlay showing NAIs, TAIs, and Time-Phased Lines (TPLs) to correctly produce an event template. Time phase lines, NAIs, and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.

3. Associated with the event template is an event matrix which ties timing, locations, critical enemy events, and NAIs together (see sample enemy event matrix in techniques for TA.5 Negative Trend 5, above). TPLs should be 15 minutes apart instead of the typical interval of one hour. S2s should develop these products to allow the staff to build a decision-support template. They should also use the event template to track the enemy in zone and focus reconnaissance and surveillance on the NAIs where critical events are anticipated.

TA.5 Intelligence, Part II

TA.1 Maneuver