Military

PROBLEM 1-2: Company/teams are still not developing offensive direct fire plans. Company/team commanders do not plan how to kill the enemy. Typically, platoons are told to occupy an attack by fire position, orient on a specific platoon, and kill it. Commanders fail to divide enemy vehicles among the platoons; platoons are not given adequate task and purpose.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-3: Company/teams generally lack understanding of the fundamentals of direct fire planning.

PROBLEM 1-4: Battalions routinely fail to achieve lethality in direct fires from the support by fire position, during the breach, and during the assault of the objective.

1. Units lack understanding of procedures governing

• Distribution
• Mass focus
• Shifting of fires

2. There is seldom an effective plan or SOP understood at the crew level by which leaders control fires.

3. Leaders fail to adequately address actions on the objective in their orders and rehearsals.

PROBLEM 1-5: Both heavy and light infantry companies/teams have experienced difficulty in direct fire planning in offensive or defensive operations.

1. Heavy infantry:

• Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs) or objectives without target overkill.
• Distributing and shifting of fires not explained.

• Company level planning rarely includes the following essential control measures: target reference points (TRPs), maximum engagement lines, direct (and indirect) fire triggers, and engagement criteria.

• Commanders do not adjust these control measures to the terrain.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-6:

1. Leaders do not execute a surveillance plan to support direct fire execution and actions on contact.

2. The imperative of gaining visual contact early through effective recon and surveillance does not seem to be understood.

3. Tactical units usually move before looking.

PROBLEM 1-7: (Repeat of Problem 1-3) Company/teams generally lack understanding of the fundamentals of direct fire planning.

PROBLEM 1-8: Too many units are not preparing weapon system range cards and sector sketches to standard, if at all.

PROBLEM 1-9: (Repeat of Problem 1-5) Infantry teams have difficulty in direct fire planning and execution in both offensive and defensive operations.

1. Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs).

2. Unable to focus, distribute, and shift fires in a manner that is understood by the soldiers that are to execute the plan.

3. During preparations for defensive operations, teams have difficulty siting obstacles so that they exploit terrain conditions and the effects of direct fire weapons.

PROBLEM 1-10: Inadequate fire control within the company/team direct fire plan results in ineffective placement and synchronization of fires on the enemy.

1. Company/team direct fire planning continues to be in a state of disarray.

2. Company/teams are not achieving effective, overwhelming fires on enemy formations in either defensive or offensive operations.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-11: (Repeat of Problem 1-5 and 1-9) Infantry teams have difficulty in direct fire planning and execution in both offensive and defensive operations.

1. Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs).

2. Unable to focus, distribute, and shift fires in a manner that is understood by the soldiers that are to execute the plan.

3. During preparations for defensive operations, teams have difficulty siting obstacles so that they exploit terrain conditions and the effects of direct fire weapons.

Techniques

1. Home Station training must include the principals of direct fire planning and must be understood down to platoon level. Include direct fire planning in the task force OPD/NCOPD program. Reference guides include Armor Magazine article, "Direct Fire Planning," Nov 93 and Jan 94; FM 23-1, FM 7-7j, FM 17-12-1-1, FM 17-15. FM 17-12-1 and FM 23-1 provide clear discussions on the target acquisition process.

2. FM 17-98 provides a superb discussion of how target acquisition supports the tactical requirements of actions on contact.

3. Obtain and use Infantry School student handout on direct fire planning, SH 7-45.

4. At Home Station, in training for defensive operations, practice the steps necessary to build an engagement area so that adequate weapon systems are available to execute the direct fire plan and achieve the desired results. For offensive operations, practice direct fire planning appropriate to the mission; i.e., actions on contact for a movement to contact and the fire and maneuver inherent in a deliberate attack.

5. Company level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) must clearly identify where the enemy will come as result of the terrain and friendly action and the best places to place effective fires on his formations.

6. Detailed direct fire planning must be done for offensive operations. Start planning with actions on the objective and then conduct detailed "backward planning" of the balance of the operations. The direct fire planning must be done in conjunction with the scheme of maneuver and with the plan for supporting fires. This level of detail company/team synchronization must be practiced at Home Station prior to deployment.

7. Commanders must become more responsible in siting and supervising the integration of combat multipliers into the direct fire plan.

8. Develop, as a priority of work, rehearsing the direct fire plan during the preparation phase to help ensure the validity of the plan. Immediately start engagement area (EA) development on receipt of the task force warning order (WARNO).

9. Units must better manage their time in order to accomplish all the work required prior to mission execution.

10. Company/team commanders should personally site or approve each vehicle fighting position to ensure an integrated fire plan.

11. Subordinate leaders at platoon level should link squad/section fire plans, then link platoon fire plans -- all in an effort to integrate the company/team plan in accordance with the commander's guidance. Platoon and section sergeants must ensure range cards and sector sketches are completed to standard IAW the applicable FM for the weapon system.

12. Incorporate direct fire planning into:

• Armor and Infantry basic and advanced course instruction.
• CSC tactics programs of instruction (POI).

14. Stress direct fire planning as a focus point for NTC Operations Group trend reversal efforts.

15. Develop a TRADOC Direct Fire Planning FM in the short term.

16. Emphasize direct fire planning, including "Tactical Exercise Without Troops" (TEWT), at the Infantry School.

17. Include in future editions of FM 17-12-1 and FM 71-1 discussions on offensive surveillance planning and how it links to our existing doctrine about target acquisition, direct fire planning, formations, movement techniques, and decision making.

TA.1 Negative Trend 2: Movement formations and techniques

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: Units are failing to situationally adjust both their movement formation and movement technique.

PROBLEM 2-2: Aviation units too often use formation flying techniques instead of movement techniques to occupy battle positions (BP) and attack by fire positions. Formation flying is appropriate for flying a properly planned route up to the release point (RP). From the RP into the BP or attack by fire position, units must use movement techniques to increase survivability. Formation flying from the RP to the BP increases the likelihood of the unit being spotted or being unable to deal with an unplanned situation in the BP.

PROBLEM 2-3: Mechanized smoke platoons do not execute movement formation and techniques based on METT-T. In most cases the smoke platoon conducts little or no maneuver training with the mechanized units at Home Station.

PROBLEM 2-4: Units fight piecemeal, unable to mass on the OPFOR. On contact with the lead OPFOR element, BLUFOR habitually does not fix or maneuver. A major contributor to this task force problem is the task force's inability to control the march formation. Most units spread out from the assembly area into columns 7 to 10 kms from the advance guard company to the trail element. This lack of mutual support allows the OPFOR to mass individual BLUFOR companies resulting in eventual task force destruction. A lack of detailed rehearsal of actions on contact contributes to this lack of mass.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-5: Task forces and company/teams do not use movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use while they are moving.

PROBLEM 2-6: (Repeat of Problem 2-3) Mechanized smoke platoons do not generally execute movement formations and techniques based on METT-T. Smoke platoons lack the necessary training and rehearsal with the maneuver element they support.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-7: (Repeat of Problem 2-5) Task forces and company/teams do not use movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use while they are moving.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8: Engineers do not understand how to maneuver and employ weapons systems as a unit or as part of a larger maneuver element.

1. The engineer force does not understand mounted or dismounted movement formations and the characteristics associated with each; e.g.:

• When one movement formation is used rather than another.
• What the advantages and disadvantages are of the various techniques.

2. Engineers do not plan for the employment of engineer company direct fire weapons systems as part of the actions on contact plan. Engineer companies have historically left the direct fire fight to the maneuver elements and taken a mobility/countermobility/survivability-only posture during mission planning, preparation, and execution.

3. By not utilizing their own organic weapons systems (M2, MK-19, etc.), the engineer force has not fully taken advantage of all available assets to protect themselves and complete the mission.

4. Engineers do not plan for the direct fire fight because they do not understand its importance, nor have they made it a priority training requirement.

5. Engineers do not understand the elements of calling for fire. Engineers do not plan for the use of observed fires or understand the importance of posting the fire support overlay on their maps. Engineers normally look at observed fires as a maneuver issue that bears no relevance to the mobility/survivability BOS.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-9: (Repeat of Problem 2-8) Combat Engineer Companies do not understand how to maneuver and employ weapons systems as a unit or as part of a larger maneuver element.

1. Although engineer companies possess a significant amount of fire power, they seldom establish fire control measures for M2s, MK19s, AT4s or attached M1A1 tanks (plow or roller tanks).

2. Engineer units lack understanding of mounted or dismounted movement formations both at company and platoon level and do little, if any, actions on contact planning during OPORD development.

3. Engineer Company Commanders are not sufficiently competent to assume the duty as Breach Force Commander, if the supported maneuver commander task organizes Engineers to that role.

PROBLEM 2-10: (Repeat of Problems 2-5 and 2-7)

1. Task forces and company/teams do not use movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques.

2. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use while they are moving.

Techniques

1. FMs 7-7, 71-2, and 71-1 are clear on how to use movement formations and techniques. Units need to train and use the tactics and techniques discussed in these FMs.

2. At Home Station, focus on platoon and company battle drills. Task forces should focus on control of the task force formation and maneuver of the depth companies in order to destroy the enemy. Detailed task force rehearsals and refinement of the task force SOP will improve actions on contact and the subsequent close fight.

3. Integrate smoke platoons into Home Station maneuver training with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) prior to deployment so the smoke platoons can gain the necessary maneuver proficiency to effectively work with the elements they support. DO NOT just use smoke platoons to provide battlefield effects during Home Station training.

4. Plan movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Transition to more secure movement techniques as the likelihood of enemy contact increases. Leader control of formations and the selection and execution of appropriate movement techniques should be the start point for maneuver training.

5. Actions on contact must be drilled repetitively to ensure that reaction is swift and sure.

6. To improve the ability to mass combat power during movement to contact, wargame all combat multipliers. The process must include all of the enemy and friendly critical events so that there are no major unforeseen actions necessary. This best results from starting the planning process at the decisive point and planning backwards to the initial friendly disposition.

7. Units must rehearse a movement to contact, including the transition from traveling to traveling overwatch, or to bounding overwatch as the situation dictates. Rehearsing actions on contact can be done using "walk-thru" drills until all personnel are ready to execute a more sophisticated type of rehearsal.

8. For movement through air, use appropriate movement techniques, i.e., traveling, traveling overwatch, or bounding overwatch, from the RP into a BP or attack by fire position rather than formation flying techniques.

9. Before planning any combat mission, engineer leaders at all levels must understand

• The complexity of movement formations (FM 5-71-2, App E).
• The integration of maneuver and direct fire weapons systems (FM 71-123, Chapters 3 & 4).
• The elements of calling for observed fires (FM 6-30, Chapter 4).

10. Leaders should incorporate force protection training into every training event.

11. Leaders should ensure there is some company collective maneuver training planned and executed each quarter.

TA.5 Intelligence, Part III

TA.1 Maneuver, Part II