Military

PROBLEM 2-2: S2s possess an acceptable conceptual understanding of the IPB process, but there is a breakdown that appears to be rooted in the application of IPB, including what products must be produced, by whom, when, and to what standard. Staff integration of IPB products at task force/squadron level is poor.

PROBLEM 2-3: Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) products and analysis, specifically enemy engineer capabilities and terrain analysis, are not integrated with the S2 products. Task force commanders are not receiving the complete enemy picture.

PROBLEM 2-4: Commanders and staffs fail to conduct a complete IPB. They do not follow processes outlined in FM 34-130. In many cases they do not develop a full understanding of the enemy or weather or terrain. Seldom do intelligence personnel accurately develop the enemy's most likely or most dangerous courses of action.

PROBLEM 2-5: IPB at company/team level is either not done, or not done to the level of detail necessary. Company/team commanders are not templating down to the individual vehicle or dismounted fighting position. When vehicles are templated, the potential dismounted threat is often ignored.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-6:

1. Company/team commanders do not analyze terrain for:

• Intervisibility lines
• Dead space
• Choke points

2. Company/team commanders fail to consider the enemy's:

• Use of terrain
• Weapon system emplacements and their effect on friendly maneuver.

PROBLEM 2-7: (Repeat of Problem 2-2)

1. While the Intelligence School and Center teaches Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) concepts well, the specific application of the IPB process, what products must be produced by whom, when, and to what standard are not clearly articulated anywhere except the Combat Training Centers.

2. The staff planning process at task force/squadron level and specific IPB integration is generally not understood or articulated to the S2 by the commander, executive officer (XO), or the S3.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8: TF S2s frequently do not understand the application of the IPB process, resultant products, and their integration into the TF planning process.

1. IPB process is not clearly articulated:

• Products required
• Who produces IPB products
• When products prepared
• To what standard IPB products are prepared

2. Staff planning process and specific IPB integration at TF level:

• Generally not understood
• Not articulated to S2 by commander, XO, or S3

3. Doctrinal literature more representative of process rather than technique.

• No good example of integrated situational template product with degree of resolution to focus planning at TF level.

PROBLEM 2-9:

1. During Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), S2s continue to omit detail needed to focus course of action (COA) development and their commander's estimate.

2. S2s experience some difficulty in portraying the enemy throughout the Area of Operations (AO).

3. For light infantry operations, the enemy threat during infiltration and/or airborne/air assault operations is frequently not adequately explained or templated.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-10: Task force level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) efforts are not producing usable information for task force staffs and company/team commanders.

1. The results of task force level IPB are not properly focused on information that subordinate commanders need and will use in fighting the enemy.

2. The IPB is overly process-oriented rather than being geared to providing information that will help in the destruction of the enemy force.

PROBLEM 2-11: Air defense staff officers (ADOs) have a tendency to wait until the brigade receives the formal order from Division before their staff estimate process begins. They rarely begin the process with the receipt of the first Warning Order.

PROBLEM 2-12: Task force and squadron S2s frequently do not understand the application of the IPB process, resultant products, and their integration into the planning process.

1. The specific application of the IPB process (i.e., what products result from the process) is not clearly articulated in MIOBC/OAC and 96B MOS instruction.

2. Instructional exercises tend to focus on brigade and higher echelons.

3. The staff planning process and specific IPB product integration at task force level is

• Generally not understood.
• Not articulated to the S2 by the commander, executive officer (XO) or S3.

4. The IPB process and example applications in current field manuals (FMs 34-130, 34-3, 71-123, 34-2-1) are generally vague, nonspecific, and representative of concept process rather than technique.

5. The appendices in FM 34-130 are adequate to illustrate these concepts, but currently there is no good example of a well-integrated (i.e., inclusive of all battlefield operating systems) SITEMP product with the degree of resolution required to focus the task force planning process.

6. Currently, S2s and S2 section personnel are first exposed to process application and integration at the CTCs.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-13: A lack of integration in the air portion of the IPB creates a situation where the TF commander gives the Air Defense Officers (ADOs) very general guidance that does not focus on defeating the threat.

PROBLEM 2-14: Task force and squadron S2s have a poor appreciation for the application of IPB in relation to either "deliberate planning" or "abbreviated planning" processes.

1. MIOBC, MIOAC, and 96B MOS POIs remain unable to cross boundaries from some form of analytical thinking process to predictive analysis in support of the TF's plan or "decisive point."

2. Task force commanders continually fail to provide guidance for the focus of IPB to include commander's decisive point(s).

3. S2s continually fail to correlate "seeing the terrain," "seeing the enemy," and "see themselves" either verbally or graphically (battlefield vision).

4. Task force operational systems remain unsupportive and nonintegrated within the IPB process.

PROBLEM 2-15: S2s routinely show enemy movement, not enemy maneuver plans. The enemy, as we do, uses a methodical system of maneuver to fix a part of our defense to keep it out of the fight while suppressing, breaching, and penetrating another part. S2s often do not do an adequate job in explaining and illustrating how the enemy maneuvers.

Techniques

1. Doctrinal references: FM 34-130, FM 34-80, FM 34-3, FM 34-2-1, FM 17-95/96, and FM 71-123.

2. Use every Home Station training opportunity to integrate S2s into the Military Decision Making Process. Train at Home Station to develop SITEMPS that will facilitate the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), including the staff integration between the S2 section, the S3 section, and all other relevant staff elements at TF/Squadron level.

3. Task force S2 sections must review Home Station training in relation to:

• Battle tracking--enemy situational awareness over a extended period under a continuously changing environment.

• Analytical thinking process and predictive analysis--recognizing and understanding indicators and the task and purpose of battlefield shapers.

• Parallel planning--restructuring internal assets to support current battles while planning future battles.

4. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning," CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 2d Quarter, FY 96, "Battalion S2s: Back to the Basics" for additional techniques and procedures relevant to staff integration.

5. FM 34-130 appendices give an adequate illustration of IPB concepts. These procedures must be followed and incorporated into unit standing operating procedures (SOPs). Incorporate in the SOP specific timelines for the orders process, including products and time limits associated with their completion.

6. Use training exercises without troops (TEWTs) as an effective means of training terrain analysis, and use the results of the analysis to more effectively plan offensive and defensive operations.

7. Develop usable guidelines for task force S2s that focus them on obtaining and refining information which will have a direct impact on fighting the enemy.

8. Refine IPB manuals to concentrate less on the process and more on the information required to fight combined arms teams.

9. Using the task force SITEMP, terrain analysis, weather data, intelligence annex, PIRs, etc., the commander further breaks down the terrain and the enemy to determine their collective effects on the company/team mission. This analysis should result in the determination of intervisibility lines, dead space, and choke points, etc. These direct the building of viable engagement areas for defensive operations or help determine the best axis of advance to follow for an offensive mission.

10. Since S2s are not schooled in maneuver, they should ask S3 battle captains for help or read 71 series FMs to become familiar with maneuver. Use "snapshot" sketches that show enemy maneuvering in the close fight at critical places on the battlefield.

11. Integrating engineer companies into the task force's training plan will increase engineer participation in task force battle staff training. The engineer company XO should be integrated into the maneuver task force battle staff.

12. Company/team commanders should learn more about threat dismounted infantry tactics and incorporate this into company/team IPB. The concept of operations/scheme of maneuver must include plans to defeat both the mounted and dismounted threat.

13. Integrate MPs into the reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) plan for the rear area so they can focus their reconnaissance effort. The MPs must also be informed of any threat to the rear area.

14. TF S2 and ADO must work closely together to refine/conduct the air IPB and ensure its integration into the SITEMP. Use Home Station training to integrate the ADO into all aspects of planning and the Military Decision Making Process. The ADO's development of the aerial portion of the IPB must begin immediately following receipt of the Division's Warning Order. The aerial IPB results in a predictive analysis of when and where the brigade will most likely see enemy air.

15. Training institutions must ensure placement of the best and brightest intelligence officers by allowing field observer controllers the opportunity to directly influence these officers' warfighting skills at MIOBC and MIAOBC.

16. Implement a program that sends serving observer/controllers (O/Cs) to Ft Huachuca to observe training and, if possible, give an overview of what we are seeing at the CTCs. The CTCs should conduct VTCs between Ft Huachuca and task force S2 trainers.

TA.5 Negative Trend 3: Threat evaluation and ECOA development

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Brigade S2s rarely deploy to the NTC with complete threat models, particularly missing the description of tactics and options, as well as the identification of High Value Targets (HVT).

PROBLEM 3-2: SITEMPs produced by brigade S2s are rarely complete; seldom will they produce an event template with a matrix.

PROBLEM 3-3: The delegation of the task of threat evaluation within the S2 section needs improvement.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-4: S2s rarely deploy with threat models. Instead they deploy with situational templates tailored to missions they believe they will execute.

PROBLEM 3-5: Too many brigade and battalion/task force S2s are not referencing threat doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques and procedures when trying to determine threat capabilities and actions.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-6:

1. Too often S2s give perfunctory attention to the effects of terrain and weather on enemy COAs. The enemy's use of terrain to build engagement areas and the impact on friendly maneuver is rarely found in development of friendly COAs.

2. S2s do not incorporate terrain from the enemy's perspective when developing the situation template. Similar trends exist in the analysis of weather impact on smoke, air assault, and enemy chemical use.

PROBLEM 3-7: S2s and battle staffs often design enemy COAs (ECOAs) that are scripts, reflecting "smart books" or checklist solutions, not dangerous, dynamic, unified plans.

1. ECOAs do not regularly reflect how the enemy would see friendly forces and COAs.

2. ECOAs do not reflect possible enemy COAs to different friendly COAs, i.e., enemy defense COAs if friendly unit attacks abreast versus in column or in one sector versus another.

Techniques

1. Doctrinal reference: FM 34-130.

2. Use section personnel designated in the unit TSOP for the threat evaluation task. Train at Home Station their ability to complete the identification of threat weapon system capabilities and employment norms. These analysts must also be knowledgeable about threat doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. The key is to have the appropriate information available to the rest of the staff prior to mission analysis.

3. S2s should develop valid threat models, using Steps 1 - 3 of the IPB process, prior to deployment. S2s must deploy with threat models that include high-value targets (HVTs), doctrinal templates, and descriptions of tactics and options. If the threat is well-known, then a doctrinal template and historical data will initially suffice. If the threat is new or less well-known, the S2 may have to develop and update the threat model as information becomes available.

4. An enemy event template will greatly assist in determining when the enemy will be entering our battle space. Event templates should portray all enemy options and concentrate on the differences. This helps to identify which COA the enemy will adopt. Develop an enemy event template on a separate overlay that depicts the following:

• Time Phase Lines (TPL)
• Named Areas of Interest (NAI)
• Avenues of Approach (AA)
• Decision points

5. In addition to referencing doctrinal publications for current threat doctrine and TTP, S2s should also develop a critical events list. This list is actually a flow chart providing a narrative description of enemy tactics and operations for each enemy course of action.

6. ECOAs should be well-grounded in military theory and science, not focused on one or two enemy fighting styles or particular national doctrines.

7. For enemy COA analysis, be able to answer the following questions:

• Who? - which element.

• What? - type of operation.

• When? - time the action will begin.

• Where? - the sectors, zones, axis of advance, avenues of approach, objectives.

• How? - the method the enemy will use to employ his assets; i.e., main effort, effort, scheme of maneuver, fires, and support.

• Why? - the objective or end state the enemy expects to achieve.

8. S2s/analysts should array options open to friendly units and fight each friendly option from the enemy's point of view.

9. Commanders must require detailed analysis of the impact of weather and terrain on friendly and enemy operations and incorporate them into wargaming COA.

10. Continue to highlight the importance and goals of weather and terrain analysis into new manuals and circulars.

TA.5 Intelligence, Part I

TA.5, Part III