TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE: Section N - Needs Emphasis: NTC TRENDS, 3rd Qtr

SECTION N

NEEDS EMPHASIS

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE

TA.5 Negative Trend 1: Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	6	2	4	2	4

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: The majority of S2s develop R&S plans without integrating other staff elements.

RESULT: R&S plans partially cover Named Areas of Interest (NAI), but more importantly, the R&S plan is not synchronized with other elements to ensure complete BOS integration.

PROBLEM 1-2: Task force commanders and S3s "delegate" the responsibility for planning, integrating, and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2.

RESULT: Failed reconnaissance effort which hampers the staff's ability to determine threat weakness/strength and then exploit threat weakness.

PROBLEM 1-3:

1. Task force commanders are not giving guidance to scout platoon leaders until after they issue the TF OPORD, but they expect the scout platoon to LD prior to the task force.

2. The task force S2/S3 does not have the R&S plan complete until after the TF OPORD.

PROBLEM 1-4: (Repeat of Problem 1-1) The majority of S2s develop the R&S plan without integrating the other staff elements. This process is not driven by the XO or the S3 in support of the overall plan development.

RESULT: The R&S plan is partially focused on coverage of NAIs and not synchronized with other BOS elements.

PROBLEM 1-5:

1. S2s experience difficulties in developing and using the R&S plan. Brigade S2s rarely receive subordinate unit's R&S plans, which results in poor identification of intelligence gaps.

2. S2s rarely adjust priority intelligence requirements (PIR) during the recon effort or during the main battle.

PROBLEM 1-6:

1. S2s will use the Situation Template (SITEMP) in developing NAIs, but usually fail to consider the exact composition and disposition of the enemy's counterrecon threat.

2. Collection plans consistently lack enough detail to identify the expected time and type of enemy activity at particular NAIs for the tasked asset.

3. S2s have become the sole staff agency responsible for R&S planning. Rarely is there adequate coordination between the S2 and the S3 to integrate the R&S plan with the maneuver plan.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-7: (Repeat of Problems 1-1 and 1-5)

1. Lack of staff integration in development and execution of R&S plan.

2. S2s not receiving subordinate element R&S plans.

3. PIRs not adjusted throughout the reconnaissance effort.

4. NAIs not updated and disseminated to subordinate elements.

PROBLEM 1-8: (Repeat of Problem 1-2) Too many units at task force level delegate the entire responsibility for planning, integrating, and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2.

RESULT: Too often, a failed reconnaissance effort. The staff is unable to determine threat weaknesses and strengths. This hinders the development of courses of action that avoid threat strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-9:

1. Too little staff integration into the R&S planning process.

2. R&S plans too general, failing to focus on gaps in intelligence holdings.

3. Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) is often too general to focus the R&S planning .

4. The scout platoon leader rarely knows the one or two items the commander absolutely needs to know in order to achieve success.

RESULTS:

1. The scout platoon deploys over-tasked, with multiple objectives of supposed equal importance.

2. Scouts fail to accomplish their mission.

PROBLEM 1-10: (Repeat of Problems 1-2 and 1-8) Too many units at TF level "delegate" the entire responsibility for planning, integrating, and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2.

RESULTS: Reconnaissance effort fails.

1. The staff cannot determine threat weaknesses and strengths.

2. Courses of action do not avoid threat strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.

PROBLEM 1-11:

1. Units do not prepare R&S plans until after the TDMP is complete, losing 24-36 hours due to delays in planning between brigade and battalion.

2. Units use R&S matrices as the executing document. This document does not address:

Penetration/infiltration of enemy security forces
CSS
Command and control (C2) (especially long range comms)
Terrain management
Fratricide avoidance
Clearance of fires

3. R&S plans do not have enough operational flexibility:

Insufficient planning in depth
Lack of provisions for redirecting recon assets
No plan to reconstitute destroyed assets

4. Plans do not state missions in terms of task, purpose, objectives, and intent.

5. Commanders do not receive back briefs or use other methods to ensure reconnaissance intent is understood.

RESULT: Reconnaissance plans are often late and lack sufficient detail to support execution; therefore, they often fail.

PROBLEM 1-12: While task force scouts usually succeed in observing tasked Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), there are too many instances where there was no plan to reposition the scouts if the TF scheme of maneuver changes.

RESULT: Scouts are not in position to complete a key portion of their mission.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-13: R&S operations routinely fail. It has become an afterthought and "S2 business" rather than the brigade's initial main effort.

1. No one is put in charge of the R&S effort to track it, adjust it when necessary, and ensure that it answers the commander's PIR.

2. R&S efforts are usually reduced to a matrix in the intel annex (which only the S2s read). The matrix addresses NAIs covering all known or templated enemy locations, but does not adequately address task and purpose for each mission or recon element.

3. R&S operations are often not rehearsed.

RESULTS:

1. The brigade often does not know whether or not task forces are able to execute their assigned missions under the plan.

2. If adjustments are necessary, the S2 does not have the tasking authority to redirect recon assets, and S2s usually have to request that subordinate elements change their plans.

PROBLEM 1-14: (Repeat of Problems 1-2, 1-8, and 1-10) Task force commanders' S3s often neglect their recon planning, synchronizing, and supervising responsibilities by delegating the recon effort to the S2.

RESULTS:

1. Reconnaissance effort fails.

2. Staff is unable to determine threat weaknesses and strengths.

3. No synchronized plan to avoid those strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.

4. The commander, who is ultimately responsible for the supervision of the entire process, usually has as little grasp of the requirements for successful R&S planning as the S3.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-15: (Repeat of Problem 1-13)

1. Reconnaissance operations routinely fail.

2. It has become an afterthought and "S2 business" rather than the brigade's initial main effort.

3. No one is truly in charge of the effort to track it, adjust it when necessary, and ensure that it answers the Commander's PIR.

4. R&S operations are often not rehearsed.

5. In some instances, the brigade does not know whether the task forces are able to execute their assigned missions under the plan.

RESULTS:

1. R&S efforts are usually reduced to a matrix in the Intelligence Annex (which only the S2s read).

2. The matrix addresses NAIs covering all known or templated enemy locations, but does not adequately address task and purpose for each mission or recon element.

3. If mission adjustments are necessary, the S2 does not have the tasking authority to redirect recon assets and usually must request subordinate elements to change their plans.

PROBLEM 1-16:

1. Task force and squadron S2s, S3s, and commanders continue to inadequately plan and supervise R&S operations.

2. Task force staffs do not convey an appreciation for technical abilities of R&S assets, required force protection (CS), or sustainment (CSS) operations.

RESULTS:

1. R&S assets are overtasked by superimposing repetitive and redundant collection requirements.

2. Failure to coordinate R&S efforts with staff to include adjacent and higher headquarters often leads to the loss of lives and poorly executed or unsuccessful plans.

PROBLEM 1-17:

1. The Task Force S2s are often the only ones developing the R&S effort.

2. The scouts usually leave for a mission with only an execution matrix, minus the details needed for fire integration or CASEVAC. At times they even leave without an enemy SITEMP and with weak, non-prioritized PIRs which are not linked to NAIs.

RESULTS:

1. Plan is developed late.

2. Orders produced are not integrated products with input from each of the staff elements and are therefore incomplete.

3. R&S products generated lack critical pieces of information.

4. Scouts prepare for mission without details necessary for success. Because the details are incomplete, time used to prepare for mission is wasted and troop-leading procedures suffer.

PROBLEM 1-18:

1. SITEMPS are often not available during the R&S planning.

2. TFs are not able to distinguish between when infiltration is possible and when penetration is necessary to achieve the recon objective.

3. A lack of understanding of planning factors for recon.

RESULTS:

1. Scouts selecting or being given routes through enemy security zone positions.

2. The only method of infiltration that provides a reasonable probability of success is dismounted. Dismounted operations are very limited in their scope and sustain ability.

3. TFs repeatedly underestimate the enemy's commitment to counterrecon, resulting in unrealistic expectations for recon effort.

4. Another consideration is the ability of these scouts to target engineer assets and harass the enemy with indirect fires.

Techniques

1. Brigade must take the major responsibility for reconnaissance operations and must plan and manage all aspects of a reconnaissance mission.

2. Appoint a chief of R&S at brigade level. Give the chief of R&S a small, part-time planning staff and the equipment and authority to task and receive reports from all elements of the brigade for R&S missions.

3. Refer to FM 34-2-1 for an explanation of each staff officer's role in the integration of IPB products, including the R&S plan. Development and use of event templates and a decision support template will drive the R&S effort designed to focus NAI observation.

4. Train at Home Station to integrate the reconnaissance effort IAW the following command and staff responsibilities:

TF commander: While ultimately responsible for the entire process, the coordination and staff integration is best executed by the S2 in conjunction with the S3. The TF Commander, working with his S2, must focus his PIR.; the focused PIR should determine subsequent R&S plan development.

S2:

Identification of collection requirements derived from the IPB process.

Identification of reconnaissance and surveillance assets available.

Integration of R&S assets into a collection plan that matches collection requirements against collector capabilities and is focused on threat course of action determination.

S3:

Tasking assets to support the collection.

Synchronizing the reconnaissance plan with combat multipliers; i.e., engineers, retrans, fire support, CSS, etc.

Ensure the R&S plan is as well integrated, synchronized, and supported as the operations plan.

5. The XO or S3 should drive the R&S plan development in conjunction with the S2.

6. Mission analysis products must be part of the R&S planning in order to determine the required composition of the recon force.

7. S3s must assume an active role in R&S planning in order to synchronize the effort and to allow the S2 time to analyze reconnaissance results. This then allows the S2 to subsequently redirect, as necessary, collection assets.

8. If task force S2s are on the blame line for planning and supervising R&S, then it is essential they receive the necessary CS and CSS support and authority required for success. Task force commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. This will allow TF and squadron S2s time to analyze recon data and recommend redirection of collection efforts.

9. Have the scout platoon leader accompany the TF commander to the brigade OPORD. After the OPORD, the commander gives guidance to his scout platoon leader. The TF staff then places a priority on completing the R&S plan before the TF OPORD. This would give the TF scouts time to plan their mission.

10. Establish scouting reposition triggers so they can be in place to support branches and sequels of the base plan. This implies at least a map rehearsal for these contingencies.

11. Other staff elements must be involved in the detailed planning of R&S to provide sufficient support, tactically and logistically, for the scout platoon.

12. Develop the plan similarly to an OPORD; this will help foster staff integration. When approached as an order, staff integration becomes more likely because of the procedures inherent in the orders development process.

Plan reconnaissance as a combat operation, using the five paragraph orders format; include method(s) for penetrating the enemy's security forces and CSS and C2 for the recon effort.
Make prioritization of R&S effort a joint process among Commander/S3/S2 during planning. Commander should identify 1-2 PIRs for success.
Use the R&S matrix only for internal command post (CP) planning of R&S operations.
Include the same level of detail control measures for reconnaissance operations as are afforded any other combat operation.

13. Issue the reconnaissance "order" immediately after the brigade commander has issued his planning guidance; use fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to provide information or modify the reconnaissance order afterwards.

14. Availability and positioning of mortars and artillery must be a consideration in targeting enemy engineer and artillery assets.

Section P: Positive Performance, Part II

TA.5 Intelligence, Part II

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SECTION N

NEEDS EMPHASIS