Military

No adequate contingency plans or decision support products to react to other possible enemy COAs.
Inadequate graphic control measures to maneuver their company/teams.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 12-3: S2s do not regularly receive enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy courses of action (ECOAs).

1. Units attempt to conduct military decision-making process (MDMP) rapidly and limit time devoted to mission analysis.

2. S2 does not complete realistic, detailed ECOAs until COA analysis/wargaming or even until rehearsal.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 12-4: Brigade plans are normally based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

1. Brigade staffs often plan their scheme of maneuver against a single anticipated enemy rather than branch planning to develop a flexible scheme that would be effective against a range of enemy options.

2. Brigades that do some branch planning often do not include the same staff as for the base plan.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 12-5: (Repeat of Problem 12-4) Brigade plans are normally based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

1. Brigade staffs often plan their scheme of maneuver against a single anticipated enemy rather than branch planning to develop a flexible scheme that would be effective against a range of enemy options.

2. Brigades that do some branch planning often do not include the same staff as for the base plan.

Techniques

1. S2s must have enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy COAs. Brief mission analysis only when S2 has completed enemy COA development.

2. Task force S2s must develop at least two possible enemy COAs and identify the most likely. The S2 should identify the possible enemy branches from the most likely COA and include those on the task force SITEMP. Task forces should develop a primary plan to defeat the enemy a most likely COA but also have built-in contingency plans to defeat other possible enemy branches. As many possible enemy branches as feasible must be wargamed and a decision support template (DST) developed to assist the commander with decision making during the battle. Wargaming must be focused, with product outcomes of the wargame clearly identified.

3. The staff must consider multiple options available to the enemy commander when developing the brigade's scheme of maneuver and the branch plans to defeat the enemy regardless of the enemy COA. Potential enemy options include:

• Variations in the type of formation
• The axis or axes of advance
• Location of the enemy's main effort

Staffs must become proficient in wargaming in order to be able to quickly wargame the most likely enemy COA and leave sufficient time to adequately wargame contingencies.

4. Address multiple enemy COAs early in the planning process to allow each BOS to synchronize and plan to support the development of decision points and triggers to defeat an uncooperative enemy.

1. Although the result of branch planning is not often a written product (CONPLAN), it should result in graphic control measures to facilitate its rapid execution based on the commander's decision.

2. Brigade plans must be flexible and address multiple enemy COAs.

3. Develop standard "plays" at Home Station that are well rehearsed by subordinate units to provide a foundation for execution of base plans. Time during the planning process can then be spent on development of branches and sequels of the base plan.

4. Develop decision points, including friendly and enemy criteria, for execution that support against multiple enemy options, and refine them during Home Station training. Use the analogy of a quarterback looking over the defense. Either he (the commander) executes the called play (base plan) or he calls an audible (branch plan) against a varied defense.

TA.4 Negative Trend 13: Employment and integration of a reserve

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 13-1: Brigades often do not designate a reserve.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 13-2: Brigades often do not designate a reserve in COAs, and when one is designated, it often has no clear mission or commitment criteria.

1. Reserve is not designated, especially on operations where there is sufficient combat power to do so.

2. When reserves are designated, they often are given little or no guidance.

3. Reserve positions and route of probable deployment are not reconned.

4. Specific criteria tied to a clear trigger and designated in a decision support template (DST) are not formulated.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 13-3: Reserve operations need refinement in planning and integration.

1. There is a lack of positioning guidance and triggers for commitment for reserve during planning.

• Reserve commander does not participate fully in planning.

• Positioning guidance, priority for commitment, and clear communication procedures not given to reserve.

2. Reserve commander seldom gives brigade commander briefback.

• Does not participate in brigade rehearsal.

• Must deduce mission.

Reserve commander does not understand his role in brigade plan.
Reserve follows designated task force.

Reserve reinforces failure or a dilemma rather than success.
Reserve attached to main effort or task force in contact.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 13-4: Brigade combat teams (BCTs) continually exercise poor planning in the development/employment of reserve forces in operations.

1. BCT staffs do not fully consider the criteria involved in planning for and committing the reserve into the current operation.

2. Decision points for commitment of the force are not fully developed, and, therefore, are difficult to track.

3. Once the reserve is committed, there is usually no thought as to re-designation of another reserve force.

Techniques

1. FM 71-3 states that a reserve gives the commander the flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. In future operations, brigades should plan for and designate a reserve, ensuring that reserve missions are sufficiently detailed to provide the reserve commander a clear understanding of the brigade commander's intent and commitment criteria for its employment. Plan and execute commitment of a reserve for decisive action to achieve a goal rather than to prevent failure or solve a problem.

2. The brigade staff must establish commitment criteria, and then rehearse time/distance factors to ensure the reserve can maneuver to be at the right place at the right time to positively influence the battle.

3. Treat the reserve commander as separate maneuver commander in planning.

• Include him in rehearsals.
• Require him to briefback brigade commander on plan(s).

4. Give reserve a mission to include:

• Positioning guidance
• Priority of commitment
• Communications procedures

5. Develop, designate, and plan for the commitment of the reserve force early in the beginning of course of action development, not as an afterthought in the process of arraying forces. This will avoid the tendency to reinforce failure versus reinforcing success.

• Once the force is completely integrated in the scheme of maneuver with a clear task, purpose, and commitment criteria, consider the positioning and command and control structure.

• In the wargaming session, determine the criteria to commit the reserve, synchronize its commitment with the scheme of maneuver, and show the need for reconstituting a reserve force.

TA.4 Negative Trend 14: Parallell planning

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 14-1: Military Intelligence (MI) company teams do not use parallel planning procedures to assist in conducting continuous operations.

PROBLEM 14-2: Engineer battalion staffs are not prepared to conduct a structured parallel planning process.

1. The battalion staff's wealth of knowledge and experience is not integrated into the assistant brigade engineer's participation in the brigade planning process.

2. Lack of integration precludes commander's guidance and decisions being received by the assistant brigade engineer.

3. Battalion staffs lack understanding that their planning cannot begin after the brigade issues its order.

4. Task force engineers are unable to integrate enemy and friendly engineer capabilities and terrain analysis prior to the task force commander's guidance and course of action development.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 14-3: Engineer battalion staffs do not regularly plan in parallel with brigade staffs.

1. Engineer battalion staffs do not use their proximity to the brigade staff:

• To expedite their own planning

• To influence the brigade staff through immediate input to the assistant brigade engineer (ABE).

2. Engineer staffs do not seek out information/OPORDs received by brigade.

3. Reduced engineer input to brigade military decision making process (MDMP).

• Terrain analysis
• Enemy abilities templating
• Friendly capabilities input
• Minimal resourcing and timelining of assets

4. Engineer OPORD does not give staff information to TF engineers to allow use in TF MDMP.

• Parallel planning with TF
• Engineer company OPORD not synchronized with TF plan

Incomplete, delayed, not synchronized with brigade plan.
Needs FRAGOs to correct.

5. TF engineer's OPORD not synchronized with TF plan.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 14-4:

1. Task force and brigade S3s have no formal system that dictates what and when products will be available throughout the brigade orders process.

2. Most units have established WARNO systems; however, they often lack critical information that will assist the task force planning process.

3. Parallel planning is a must for the entire staff but is especially critical for the S2 because 80% of his products are needed for COA development.

4. Task force LNOs are usually newly assigned 2LTs or 1LTs waiting to attend the advanced course and lack the experience/training required to make significant contributions to the unit by way of LNO responsibilities. This shortfall is not due to lack of effort, rather a lack of training and understanding of task and purpose.

Techniques

1. MI company teams should use the electronic warfare (EW) platoon leader as a planner, leaving the POC chief as executor. The EW PL can then track on the supported unit planning process and develop the company order and graphics while the current battle is being fought. The IEWSO should ensure he is providing constant updates during the brigade's planning process to facilitate parallel planning.

2. Engineer battalion staffs must practice the military decision making process (MDMP) at Home Station with the brigade staff so they are familiar with their orders process and able to parallel plan in conjunction with it.

1. Train engineer battalion staffs in MDMP and procedures of their supported brigade and practice OPORD processes in field training at Home Station.

   • Ensure all staff members understand their roles and responsibilities in the battalion OPORD process.

   • Staff members understand their input to the ABE for brigade OPORD process.

2. Battalion XOs fill role of "chief of staff":

   • Direct and control battalion OPORD timeline
   • Involve entire staff
   • Prevent delays
   • Ensure timely OPORD issue

3. Involve battalion commanders and S-3s to guide and review MDMP process and products.

3. Liaison officers (LNOs) can be especially effective in producing a timely conduit for information. Information that can assist the battle staff throughout the planning process may include a list of facts and assumptions made by the HHQ staff during their planning. This information, provided by the LNO, might assist the task force in understanding why a certain COA was chosen by the HHQ.

1. The task force LNO should be an integrated staff officer who aggressively pursues needed information for all BOS elements within the task force to facilitate parallel planning.

2. Task force commanders must ensure the LNO clearly understands his duties and responsibilities and has a clear understanding of the planning and orders process.

3. Task force and brigade S3s should establish a formal planning process.

4. Establish a commo network that allows quick dissemination of information to the task force as the brigade executes its orders process. These products, coupled with detailed WARNOs, will greatly assist the task force in their effort to parallel plan.

TA.4 Command and Control, Part VIII

TA.4, Part X