Military

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 10-3: (Repeat of Problem 10-2) Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated battle staff function.

1. The battle staff does not conduct parallel planning:

• Battle staff assembles at task force command post while task force commander, S3, and fire support officer (FSO) receive brigade order at brigade.

• Battle staff does not conduct mission analysis of respective BOSs.

2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 10-4:

1. Mission analysis often does not include accurate planning estimates.

• Brigade staffs do not include current on-hand/assigned data when conducting mission analysis.

• The rear CP normally has the information posted; however, the planners at the main CP are unaware of limitations based on current status.

2. Planning estimates used during COA development (such as casualty estimate) are not provided by the planners to the executors (such as the forward medical company commander).

PROBLEM 10-5: Brigade engineers routinely allow habitual associations, not engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) and mission analysis, to drive task organization.

1. Brigade engineers too often do not recommend organization of engineers with clear task and purpose and delineate clearly command/support relationships to best support the brigade combat team (BCT) mission.

• No detailed analysis of engineer actions throughout the depth of the BCT battlefield using some type of standard methodology.

• No methodology for analysis; for example, reverse breach planning for offensive operations.

• No identication of all engineer tasks required to accomplish the mission.

2. Engineer battalions do not fully analyze the "why" when deciding upon the command/support relationship nor do they clearly specify this relationship in orders once decided upon.

3. Units often significantly deviate from doctrinal command/support relationships by performing non-standard CSS roles during execution.

4. Engineer battalions routinely "attach" sapper companies to habitually associated task forces without regard to mission analysis. This appears to provide the "easy" answer by shifting C2 and CSS responsibility to the supported task force.

Non-standard combat service support requirements.
Degrading CSS responsiveness, logistics reporting, and accountability.

4. The engineer battalion is best suited with expertise and resources to provide support in Class III, V, IX and maintenance.

5. Forces are not adequately allocated.

6. Command/support relationships are not effectively established.

7. The main effort is not weighed.

8. The impact of the engineer force is not maximized at the decisive point on the battlefield.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 10-6: (Repeat of Problems 10-2 and 10-3) Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated battle staff function.

1. Battle staff does not conduct parallel planning.

• Battle staff assembles at task force (TF) command post (CP) while TF commander, S3, and FSO receive brigade order at brigade.

• Battle staff does not conduct mission analysis of respective BOSs.

2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.

Techniques

1. The battle staff needs to conduct mission analysis integrating all of the key players as outlined in CGSC ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Process. See also CALL Newsletter 95-12 Update, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning". Conduct mission analysis while others are at brigade CP; refine analysis upon their return.

2. In order to provide the commander the most useful information (i.e., number and type of obstacles that can be built, rather than mine and wire quantities), units should follow a standard agenda for mission analysis briefs and situation updates.

EXAMPLE:

• Higher HQ situation
• Enemy situation
• Mission
• Task organization/forces available
• Operations/maneuver
  • Tasks (specified, implied, essential)
  • Significant events
  • Scheme of maneuver
• Other BOS
• Commander's guidance

3. The receipt of a division order by brigade staffs should trigger transmission of status updates to the main CP. Estimates used during COA development must be reviewed by support LNOs early to assure attainability.

4. Engineer commanders, who also support maneuver commanders and have special staff responsibility, should heed doctrinal guidance of Chapter 2, FM 5-100, Engineer Operations, with regard to organizing engineer forces and recommending command and support relationships. Engineer leaders should check themselves by asking:

• Why was a particular engineer force task organized to a maneuver commander?

• How did he wargame employment and what were the results?

• Is the command and support relationship proper for the envisioned employment?

TA.4 Negative Trend 11: Timelines and time management

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 11-1: Task force timelines normally contain basic items and are not effectively disseminated; frequently they are not even posted.

PROBLEM 11-2: Most units do not effectively manage time, and often produce inadequate timelines. Despite unit commanders and staffs acknowledging the importance of time management and adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, the majority of units fail to properly manage their time.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 11-3:

1. Company commanders usually use 90% to 100% of available planning time.

2. Platoon/team level briefs are rarely attempted and even more rarely completed to standard.

3. Most companies/troops start detailed mission planning after receipt of a battalion OPORD.

PROBLEM 11-4: Platoon Leaders are not issuing OPORDS or disseminating critical information in a timely manner. Platoon leaders are waiting unnecessarily to give OPORDs to subordinates. Many times finds himself too deeply involved in the planning and coordinating process for multiple operations.

EXAMPLE: MP elements have been placed OPCON to the different task forces for specific missions. In his zeal to get the most up-to-date information possible, the platoon leader will wait extremely long periods of time in order to provide a detailed OPORD to the platoon. This hampers subordinate leaders in the time available to conduct reconnaissance, develop their own OPORDs, and in rehearsing/preparing for the operation.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 11-5:

1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively manage a TF timeline.

2. The inability to manage a written timeline combined with staff sections completing required products in a timely manner.

Techniques

1. The development of realistic timelines for critical events in the planning process is a skill that must be developed and practiced at Home Station. The numerous tasks which must concurrently occur during the planning phase of an operation require significant practice in order for a battle staff to be able to proficiently execute the military decision-making process. Effective time management is a logical byproduct of decision-making proficiency.

2. The TF timeline should be developed early in the planning process and then continually updated throughout the process.

1. The initial timeline should include the staff's planning cycle, critical R&S activities, and company/team troop-leading procedures (e.g., boresighting, initial movement times, etc.).

2. As the planning process continues, additional operational critical events are also added to the timeline and continued throughout the wargame process.

3. Key events off of the synchronization matrix should also be incorporated into the timeline. This allows critical tasks to be tracked throughout the battle and provides a valuable tool.

4. Upon completion of the planning process the staff should collate the data onto a butcher board and briefed as part of the TF OPORD.

5. The timeline the staff briefs should include critical TLPs to be conducted at the company/team level. These should include company/team OPORD times, rehearsals, boresight, and LOGPAC.

6. These requirements are not intended to micro-manage co/tms but rather provide them a common base to begin their planning and preparation. If changes are required at the TF level, the TF commander can then make an informed decision on what events he will impact.

3. Time available should be analyzed to determine how much is available, how it should be allocated, and how it will affect the battle command cycle.

4. The commander, using reverse planning, constructs a timeline to accomplish troop-leading tasks. Plan conservatively. Produce a schedule of activities that must occur; events scheduled by higher headquarters (backbriefs, rehearsals, etc.) must be included. Prepared shells that include expected events are useful.

5. The approved schedule is incorporated into staff battle drills. Establish a tracking system to ensure critical task accomplishment IAW the schedule. Include the following events, at a minimum:

• HHQ commitments by the command group
• OPORD times
• Rehearsal times
• CSS events

Schedule development should always be done in the context of the 4 "Ss"; i.e., sunlight, subordinates, supervise, simplicity.

6. Timelines must be included in WARNOs and FRAGOs, and must be updated continuously.

7. Post timelines in CPs and annotate them as events occur or change.

8. At Home Station, company planning cells should be centered around subject matter experts (intelligence, fire support, maneuver, EW, logistics, etc.) who routinely coordinate with their counterparts on the battalion staff during battalion level planning. Close coordination of this nature will provide the company early access to battalion staff products and allow concurrent planning on the company's part.

1. Companies should develop rigorous planning timelines that include platoon/team briefs and practice them regularly in garrison and in the field.

2. Crucial products such as the SITEMP, target list, course of action sketch, narrative, and base graphics should be provided to the companies as soon as they are completed by the battalion. Early receipt of these products allows company commanders to plan concurrently, thus ensuring an earlier company OPORD and leaving sufficient time for platoon/team leaders to plan their segment of the mission in detail.

3. Individual crews and small unit leaders must be given the opportunity to analyze their segment of the company mission. This must be trained and practiced at Home Station. Planning at this level must include:

   • Detailed analysis of the terrain and how to maneuver over it.
   • Potential enemy positions and how to deal with them.
   • When and how reliefs on station will occur.
   • How to engage anticipated targets (direct or indirect fires), etc.

9. Platoon leaders can provide maximum time to their subordinates if they use WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs to transmit critical information. The key is to use backwards planning and then stick to the timeline.

1. Transmit changes and updates by FRAGOs or supplementary combat battle instructions.

2. Delegate to subordinate mission leaders the authority to coordinate with the different task forces. Most missions at the NTC are physically led by squad leaders, and they, therefore, must be empowered to make the decisions needed to get the mission accomplished.

3. Platoon leaders can maintain C2 by getting backbriefs and confirmation briefs by their squad leaders as coordination develops.

TA.4 Command and Control, Part VII

TA.4, Part IX