Military

PROBLEM 15-3: Engineer commanders and staffs do not consistently develop decision points with supporting criteria to ensure continued support to the brigade in a fluid environment. In nearly every brigade mission there are both opportunities and requirements to change the task and purpose of engineer units with a corresponding change in task organization and/or change in priorities. While commanders and staffs cannot anticipate all these situations, the tendency is to issue an incomplete and inadequately synchronized fragmentary order during execution vice addressing the most likely contingencies during the initial planning process.

PROBLEM 15-4:

1. Development of decision point criteria (e.g., PIR, NAI, event) is too often not a function of the wargame.

2. Decision point development:

• Lacks specific detail.

• Is often ineffective in providing timely execution of critical decisions during the fight.

• Are often made after line of departure (LD).

• Criteria based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

Techniques

1. Specific criteria must be developed that includes both friendly and enemy considerations. Once the criteria is established it must be disseminated to subordinate units. This dissemination focuses the reporting process to include the criteria necessary to make the decision.

1. The criteria for decision points is developed during the wargaming process and not after the order has been issued. This will ensure all BOS elements are integrated and the DPs are disseminated to subordinate leaders.

2. As critical points in the battle are determined, thought must be put into whether a decision must be made. If a decision must be made, it must pass the yes/no question. If the question is when, then it is a trigger because it will happen without a decision being made.

3. Decision points must be clearly articulated in the order, the orders brief, and all rehearsals.

4. When considering the commitment of the reserve, shifting of the main effort, repositioning forces, or the location for employing special munitions, decision points and triggers must be thought out as part of the wargaming session.

2. The FSB S2/S3 should produce decision support matrix annexes for all possible events; i.e., save plan, dismounted enemy, NBC attacks, artillery, minefields, etc.

1. These matrixes would enhance decision making while the unit is under immense pressure during an attack.

2. Development of a decision support template (DST) uses products developed throughout the entire planning process. It is not something that is exclusively done after the plan is developed. The goal is to use products that were previously developed during the planning process and create a useful tool that can help the commander make decisions at critical points on the battlefield.

3. The decision support matrix supplements the DST (FM 34-3, page 4-32).

3. Commanders and staffs must develop clear decision points with a pre-established plan to accomplish the identified task as part of the brigade decision-making process to allow subordinate units to plan, prepare, and execute the mission to standard.

1. Identify the requirement during planning.

2. Tie the required adjustment to a decision point with both friendly and enemy criteria.

3. Establish a command and control framework to execute.

4. Addressing the following potential situations during brigade level course of action development and synchronize the adjustment with required command and control plan during wargaming:

   • Transition from task force to brigade deliberate breach operations.

   • Culmination of lead task force with follow and assume/support task force becoming the main effort.

   • Loss of engineers in the breach force.

   • Success of lead task force in breaching main defensive belt causing future mobility requirements at the existing breach site to be in support of brigade level maneuver.

   • Adjusting the SCATMINE system allocation based upon success or failure of the conventional effort.

   • Transferring blade assets and platoons from one unit sector to another.

   • Ending brigade level CM/S effort to initiate task force level effort.

   • Disengaging engineer units and assets.

   • Changing type of survivability positions based on progress.

4. Staffs must develop decision point criteria for multiple enemy COAs. This process should be ongoing during the refinement and supervision phases of the planning process. Decision points must be a result of the wargame and based on a comparison of multiple enemy COAs.

TA.4 Negative Trend 16: Planning for deep operations

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 16-1: Brigades rarely plan or execute a deep fight designed to set a specific condition or set of conditions to allow the close fight to be successfully fought.

1. Brigade staffs do not view missions within the battlefield framework -- deep, close, rear, security and reserve. Thus the fire support plan is not designed around the deep, close, rear concept.

2. Plans which do incorporate deep fires, usually executed by COLTs, are written with no specific task, purpose, or endstate.

1-2QFY96 PROBLEM 16-2: (Repeat of Problem 16-1) The brigades rarely plan or execute a deep fight designed to set a specific condition or set of conditions to allow the close fight to be fought with success.

1. Brigade staffs are not viewing the planning and execution of the mission according to the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear, security, and reserve).

2. The fire support plan is not designed around the concept of deep, close, rear. Routinely, the plans contain some amount of deep fires, usually executed by the combat observation lasing teams (COLTs), but with no specific task, purpose, and endstate determined.

Techniques

1. During course of action (COA) development, the brigade staff must array the forces, both friendly and enemy, as they should be at the decisive point. This is the planned endstate for the deep fight. The fire support officer (FSO), S2, and S3 must develop a series of fire support events for each particular COA that will get the brigade to the desired endstate. Wargame each COA and define detailed tasks and purposes in the deep fire support plan.

2. One result of wargaming should be a specific, measurable endstate for deep operations.

EXAMPLE:

TA.4 Negative Trend 17: Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2)

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 17-1: Brigades have no A2C2 procedures established, resulting in ineffective airspace coordination and hazardous situations for rotary wing aircraft.

1. Efforts to execute A2C2 are minimal to nonexistent.

2. Brigade staffs do not have a formal A2C2 cell.

3. Brigade staffs are not well versed in A2C2 procedures.

4. Brigade staffs make little or no effort to coordinate the use of airspace.

5. A2C2 planning and coordination routinely falls to the aviation LNO, with poor results.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 17-2: A2C2 is often neither practiced nor fully understood.

1. Too often, the brigade combat team (BCT) staff relies on the aviation LNO for airspace management. Airspace management in the BCT sector is the responsibility of the brigade commander. The S3 air manages A2C2 at the brigade level; the G3 air manages A2C2 at the division level. Airspace management applies to all uses of airspace in the BCT sector, to include Air Force fixed wing, Army rotary wing, UAV, indirect fires, and air defense assets.

2. A2C2 plans are often not disseminated to maneuver task forces, FA, ADA, and Air Force elements to synchronize the brigade's efforts.

Techniques

1. Begin staff planning concurrent with identification of the need for Army airspace.

1. Once identified, the S3 allocates initial airspace for the insertion (air corridors, LZs, PZs, etc.).

2. Aviation LNO: Works with the S3 developing air corridors based on the mission, aircraft type, enemy situation, etc.

3. S2: Identifies threats to the aircraft and recommends, as necessary, modifications to the air corridors.

4. FSO: Identifies airspace control measures effect on fire support and then recommends necessary changes.

5. ADA LNO: Plans changes to WCS based on the insertion.

6. ALO: Plans for coordinating altitude and separation distances.

2. S3 Air finalizes coordination with the A2C2 team and ensures all graphic control measures are included on the brigade graphics and the necessary coordinating instructions are in the brigade OPORD. S3 Air coordinates with higher headquarters and adjacent units for A2C2. S3 Air continues to coordinate airspace throughout the preparation phase for the mission. Coordinates with the A2C2 team as changes or refinements occur.

3. A2C2 is rehearsed during the combined arms rehearsal. A2C2 is also rehearsed at all subordinate rehearsals, as required.

4. Open and close air corridors only while aircraft are transiting the corridor. Leaving the corridor in effect continuously needlessly restricts fire support.

1. Plan aerial OPs and air BPs off of the air corridor.

2. Only open section (between aerial check points) of air corridors as the aircraft transit that section.

3. Plan air corridors behind or to the flanks of artillery batteries and mortar platoons/sections.

4. Consider TF mortar platoons/sections when planning A2C2.

5. Include air corridors on brigade graphics.

6. Ensure indirect fire support elements are aware of the coordinating altitude in air corridors.

7. Establish NFAs on aerial OPs.

8. Require aircraft to report aerial checkpoints (ACPs) when transiting air corridors.

5. Read and review FM 100-103.

6. Develop Home Station training to enhance techniques for unit airspace management and incorporate A2C2 procedures in unit TACSOPs.

7. Ground maneuver units must assume responsibility for and take ownership of their airspace. Fixed wing, rotary wing, UAV, artillery, and air defense are merely temporary users of airspace.

TA.4 Negative Trend 18: Planning for COLT operations

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 18-1: Planning for COLT operations at the brigade level remains an overall weakness.

1. While the brigade assigns COLTs R&S responsibilities, the brigade planning does not address in detail their mission, infiltration, and extraction.

2. Instead of a staff effort, the planning for COLT operations to plan these critical areas are left to the COLT platoon leader and the R&S planner to plan, prepare, and execute.

NOTE: Individual skills of combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) have improved during this quarter. Teams continue to improve their survival skills (fieldcraft) and tactical knowledge in movement techniques, camouflage, reporting, and knowledge of the enemy.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 18-2: (Repeat of Problem 18-1) Planning for COLT operations at the brigade level remains an overall weakness.

1. While the brigade assigns COLTs R&S responsibilities, the brigade planning does not address in detail their mission, infiltration, and extraction.

2. Instead of a staff effort, the planning for COLT operations to plan these critical areas are left to the COLT platoon leader and the R&S planner to plan, prepare, and execute.

NOTE: Individual skills of combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) have improved during this quarter. Teams continue to improve their survival skills (fieldcraft) and tactical knowledge in movement techniques, camouflage, reporting, and knowledge of the enemy.

Techniques

1. Brigade staff planning must include:

• How the COLTs will conduct a forward passage of lines
• Routes
• Resupply operations
• Communication requirements for retrans operations
• Insertion operations by ground and air
• Casualty evacuation

2. The COLTs exist to support the brigade's fight, and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff.

3. Planning for COLT operations begins as early as high-value targets are identified and refined as course of action is developed and finalized during the wargaming. Suggested areas for staff planning:

• S2. Determine the requirements for COLTs. Identify target areas of interest and named areas of interest for the purpose of providing intel and destroying high-payoff targets.

• S2/Engineer. Conduct a terrain analysis to identify possible observation posts by using Terrabase and the expertise of the staff.

• S3. Allocate resources for the mission (Air Force ETACs/SAPPERs/IEW personnel/aircraft/scout augmentees for security/additional communications equipment/UAV, etc.). Plan for the insertion/extraction. Plan like any other operation to include determining infiltration methods, plan routes, checkpoints, pickup, landing zones, false insertions, forward and rearward passage of lines, and emergency resupply. Make coordination for aircraft, retrans vehicles, and terrain management.

• S4. Support the infiltration/extraction. Plan resupply, casualty evacuation, and, if applicable, caches.

• FSO/COLT platoon leader. Prepare order, backbriefs to the commander, conduct PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals.

• S2/S3/FSO. Execution -- provide staff supervision until the mission is complete.

TA.4 Command and Control, Part IX