Military

PROBLEM 8-2: Units lack a disciplined process to produce timely, complete OPORDs and FRAGOs. Overall, battle staff training levels are low, and the roles and responsibilities of each staff officer/NCO are not clearly defined. Although task force staffs have a good understanding of the doctrinal planning process, it is evident that these same staffs are not well drilled and therefore cannot produce detailed plans quickly.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 8-3: CSS units seldom conduct the elements of the doctrinal orders process during the formulation of operations orders (OPORDs). The FSB rarely conducts a full and complete orders process during the development of its OPORDs.

• Failure to properly manage time.
• Lack of familiarity with the doctrinal orders process.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 8-4: The commander's intent is frequently not reflected or embraced in subordinate unit's plans and orders.

1. Subordinate commanders do not understand the commander's intent. Their own orders, graphics, and intent do not reflect the intent of next two higher levels. Plans differ from what the higher commander envisioned.

2. There is no system to ensure subordinates build concepts and plans that will accomplish mission in accordance with higher commander's intent. Staffs rarely check compliance. The higher commander often learns of discrepancies late in the military decision making process (MDMP).

PROBLEM 8-5: Company/teams do not produce operations orders (OPORDs) in sufficient detail to allow them to accomplish their mission.

1. Situation template (SITEMP) refinement, terrain analysis, and threat analysis are not conducted in sufficient detail to portray how the enemy will fight and shape the battlefield.

2. Commanders are weak in articulating how they envision the battle will flow.

3. Paragraph II: Poor understanding of task force/brigade scheme of maneuver.

4. Paragraph III: Often scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to KILL the enemy.

5. Task forces give unclear task and purpose to company/teams which result in confusion on how the company/team fits into the task force's scheme of maneuver.

6. Paragraph IV: Not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver for the company/team.

7. Paragraph V: No "JUMP" plan or signals discussed.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 8-6: Current fire support annexes are inadequate as planning, prep, and execution tools. Fire support annexes contain target lists, controlled supply rates, a location for close air support, organization for combat, high payoff target list, execution matrices, and a variety of other information. All of this data is valuable and necessary, but there is no document that outlines the scheme of fire support for the operation; i.e., what and who will trigger an event and what is the desired outcome for the event. It does not provide "one-stop shopping" to assist in planning, preparation, rehearsal, and execution of the fire support plan.

1. The execution matrix does not give the details required to execute a given fire support event. Execution matrices may only give groups or events that take place during a time period, not specific events that take place at a specific time.

2. Target lists tell us target description, and the high-payoff target list tell us targets, and attack guidance matrices tell us when and how.

PROBLEM 8-7: Company/team commanders do not refine the enemy situation or conduct sufficient terrain analysis to give platoon leaders and vehicle commanders the level of detail required to adequately see the enemy and see the terrain.

1. Frequently, because of inadequate time management at higher levels or at company level, company/team commanders are pressed for time in the preparation of their OPORDs.

2. In order to get a decent order out in a reasonable amount of time, commanders "gloss" over portions of the order, primarily Paragraph 1A (Enemy Forces), by simply presenting this paragraph word for word out of the task force order.

3. The lack of a clear and detailed Paragraph 1A can be attributed directly to company/team commanders not conducting a detailed IPB at their level during the development of the company/team OPORD.

Unrealistic in terms of the scope of assigned responsibilities, as compared with the destruction of the enemy, and

Unexecutable when attempted on terrain which has not been properly analyzed for the military aspects of terrain.

PROBLEM 8-8:

1. Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) at both task force and company/team level do not address changes in the current situation (friendly and enemy).

2. Most FRAGOs only address one unit and are not synchronized across the task force.

PROBLEM 8-9: (Repeat of Problem 8-5) Company/teams do not produce OPORDs in sufficient detail to allow them to accomplish their mission.

1. Situation template (SITEMP) refinement, terrain analysis, and threat analysis are not conducted in sufficient detail to portray how the enemy will fight and shape the battlefield.

2. Commanders are weak in articulating to subordinates how they envision the battle will flow.

3. OPORD Para II: Poor understanding of task force or brigade scheme of maneuver.

4. OPORD Para III: Often scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to kill the enemy.

5. Task force gives unclear task and purpose to company/teams which results in confusion on how the company/team fits into the task force's scheme of maneuver.

6. OPORD Para IV: Not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver for company/teams.

7. Commanders often do not consider the capabilities and limitations of their attachments.

Techniques

1. OPORDs must be produced in sufficient detail to allow company/teams to accomplish their mission. Commanders must read and understand the OPORD example outlined in FM 71-1, Appendix A. Commanders must practice writing and issuing orders. Incorporate and practice OPORD writing and issuing training in all facets of garrison operations and periodic field exercises.

2. Units need a disciplined process to produce timely, complete OPORDs and FRAGOs. Establish a solid doctrinal foundation for an abbreviated, time-constrained military decision-making process applicable to task force level.

3. Task force commanders must develop and implement rigorous Home Station battle staff training programs. These programs must first establish proficiency in the deliberate process and then progress to more time constrained execution of the military decision-making process (MDMP).

4. Commander's intent must be reflected in subordinates' orders. Establish systems for ensuring understanding and compliance with commander's intent early the MDMP.

• Confirmation briefs immediately following issue of orders for understanding.

• Backbriefs later for compliance and inclusion in subordinates' plans.

• Staff visits and direct communication with counterparts on use of BOS by subordinates.

5. Future versions of FM 71-1/2 should better address the format for fragmentary orders.

6. The initial brigade scheme of fires must be developed and published with the brigade OPORD. The scheme of fires can either be written in paragraph format or outlined on a worksheet.

1. The scheme of fires should be initiated during the course of action development. A list of critical fire support tasks (CFST) must be identified.

   • Each CFST must be defined by task, purpose, method, and endstate.

   • Normally every maneuver critical task will require a CFST.

2. Initially the fire support events determined during course of action development will be very general.

   EXAMPLE: When the combined arms reserve (CAR) is committed, the brigade will employ close air support (CAS) in engagement area (EA) RED to destroy one MRP consisting of 1XT80 and 2XBMPs to allow task force 3/75 30 additional minutes to defeat the MRC on OBJ COWBOYS to establish attack by fire positions north of Granite Pass (an additional CFST for employing CAS will be suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).

3. The bulk of the scheme of fires should be developed during the wargaming session.

   • The FSO and the targeting team should wargame the effects desired and the timing of each event to include a refined trigger, grid, target number, task, purpose, method, munitions, observer plan, implementation of fire support control measures, IEW jamming, priority of fires, movement plan for the artillery, and radar cueing/radar zones.

   • This process continues until the entire plan, all fire support events, with branches and sequels, have been wargamed.

   • The end result is a scheme of fires which is ready for "bottom-up" refinement for the task forces to refine the plan to meet subordinate task force plans.

   • Remember, this is a brigade fight, not an assortment of task force fire plans. Each task force FSO will refine his part of the scheme of fires to support his task force commander. This refinement will refine the brigade's scheme of fires that will be briefed by the FSCOORD or brigade FSO at the combined arms rehearsal.

4. Immediately upon receipt of the brigade's OPORD, the DS battalion will conduct a technical rehearsal to determine gunnery solutions for each target in the scheme of fires and determine what type of munitions and quantity to achieve the desired effects. The ES battalion S3 will brief the brigade FSO on the result of the technical rehearsal.

5. After the combined arms rehearsal, the FM rehearsal should be conducted. The end result is a rehearsed and refined scheme of fires with technical gunnery solutions to support the brigade's scheme of maneuver.

6. At a minimum, each event must list the following:

   • Event. The actual fire support event that will be executed. Examples include "fire AE0001", activate close air support target box 1, activate critical friendly zone (CFZ) 1, or change priority of fires.

   • Observer/Executor. The individual or unit charged with executing the fire support event.

   • Task. Specify the formation of the enemy we want to attack, the function of that formation that we want to influence, and the targeting effects.

   • Purpose. Focused on friendly maneuver and sets parameters of when and how long we must delay in terms of friendly maneuver, what we must destroy, and where we must limit.

   • Attack means/Method. The weapon system attacking the target.

   • Endstate/Effects. Quantifiable in terms that allow the fire support team to determine volume of fires, munition, and duration.

7. For Para 1A of the company/team OPORD (Enemy Forces):

1. Get the most detailed terrain products available for the assigned AOs (not a 1:50,000 map), maps of 1:24,000 scale or larger. Satellite or recon photos may be available through the S2 and should be requested.

2. A completed MCOO done at Home Station or the night prior to the prep day of a battle will save much time during the orders preparation.

3. Have enemy doctrinal manuals and orders of battle on hand, tabbed and broken down to what a doctrinal enemy would do given the anticipated mission.

4. Place responsibility on company XO or platoon leaders to assist in developing blown-up sketches of enemy positions and key terrain in the AO.

5. Do not wait unit the task force order has been issued to begin the IPB process. All things mentioned above can be done the evening/night prior to the preparation for the anticipated mission if the information is aggressively sought out and used to refine pre-existing products brought from Home Station.

6. Drill subordinates during Home Station training on what their responsibilities are in the IPB process.

TA.4 Negative Trend 9: Development and use of tactical SOPs

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 9-1: Most mortar platoons do not have a workable SOP or adhere to the one they have.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 9-2: Most units deploy with a brigade TACSOP, but most of the TACSOPs are recently written documents that have not been distributed and have rarely been used. Most TACSOPs adequately cover standard brigade operations but few have a copy, and few have read it or use it.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 9-3

1. Many air cavalry troops (ACTs) do not have sound tactical SOPs.

2. Troops that do have sound SOPs do not often utilize them, adhere to them, or understand them.

3. SOPs generally do not have sufficient detail for combat operations or when the level of detail is sufficient, crews are not utilizing these procedures.

4. Observed weaknesses in most aviation unit SOPs:

PROBLEM 9-4: Units are often not familiar with their TACSOPs.

1. TACSOPs are not getting down to user level.

2. Too many units have never seen and do not use their TACSOP.

PROBLEM 9-5: Over 90 percent of the medical companies deploying to the NTC do not have a company TACSOP.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 9-6:

1. Units do not have SOPs that establish priority of work during set-up and tear down.

2. Main command posts (CPs) seldom have a REDCON system that helps posture the CP for movement based on mission requirements or increased enemy threat. The main CP consists of two major functional areas:

• The CP and operational support assets

• The life support area (LSA)

PROBLEM 9-7: (Repeat of Problem 9-5) Over 90 percent of the medical companies deploying to the NTC do not have a company TACSOP.

Techniques

1. Brigades must develop and use their TACSOPs well before deploying to theater. If the procedures do not work well at Home Station, refine them until they do work.

1. Ensure the unit TACSOP is distributed down to user level.

2. Leaders must ensure the units are familiar with and use their TACSOP. Issue them to each squad leader, and ensure every soldier knows their SOP.

2. Air Cavalry Troops (ACTs) SOPs.

1. Add SOP development and examples to the Aviation Officers Advance Course.

2. Units should develop, test and refine sound SOPs at Home Station. These SOPs should be developed to reduce the workload during battle planning, preparation, and execution.

3. Standardize battle drills or plays and practice.

3. Main command posts (CP) set-up and tear down.

1. Units should establish a simple REDCON level associated with the level and priority of work required based on the current METT-T of the situation.

   EXAMPLE:

   REDCON 1 - Ready to move / TOC broken down / march columns lined up.

   REDCON 2 - TOC ready to move in 15 Mins / RED TOC configuration / working off vehicle antennas / M-8 alarms out /

   REDCON 3 - TOC ready to move in 1 hr / Green TOC / antennas up / life support area packed up / M8 alarms out / no camouflage up / Quartering party departed to new site.

   REDCON 4 - TOC ready to move in 2 hrs / Green TOC / antennas up / LSA up / camouflage up / M8 Alarms out.

   This system will help establish priority of work when the unit pulls into a new site. The TOC goes from REDCON 1 to REDCON 3 and then based on duration of stay drops to a REDCON 4 status with full LSA up.

   When the situation requires the main to move:

   • The first break is the LSA, which brings you to REDCON 3 and the Quartering Party is ready to or is kicked out to new site. A modification to this is when you drop the main's camouflage net.

   • REDCON 2 is a HOT TOC configuration with all major work completed but TOC is still functional. A course of action could be to kick the LSA vehicles out to the new site and link up with the Q-party.

   • Go to REDCON 1 would mean break and march column. Ready to move.

NOTE: This system was used during Desert Storm and was very effective. The Main CP was able to manage their personnel assets to remain functional until the last minute before jumping, and all personnel understood their priority of work once at the new site. When the division jumped into Iraq, the D-Main never left the REDCON 3 configuration and was ready to move in one hour notice. With the command "Go to REDCON 2," every section had developed their own drills to achieve that level of readiness. With every jump, there was very little decision making required by key leaders as to what needed to be done. Soldiers did not stand around waiting to be told what to do.

4. Medical companies. Develop and distribute a TACSOP that clearly articulates the roles and responsibilities for each leader within the company. Use established medical doctrine and mission training plans as sources for identification of these tasks.

1. Write to the job, not to the personality of the person in the job.

2. Identify each critical task the company must accomplish to be combat ready.

3. Describe how the task is done and include an established time standard for completion.

TA.4 Command and Control, Part VI

TA.4, Part VIII