Military

PROBLEM 6-6: Task force commanders dominate task force nets during the fight. There is a lack of cross talk among subordinates and specialty platoon leaders on the command net. Too often in the OPORD, paragraph 5 fails to establish who has priority on the net during certain events or phases of the battle.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-7: (Repeat of Problem 6-6) Units at all levels fail to "cross talk" adequately during battles.

1. Units do not keep adjacent elements informed of their tactical situation during missions.

2. Little or no mention of "cross talking" in manuals.

PROBLEM 6-8: Task force battalion signal officers (BSOs) are not generally integrated into the task force military decision-making process (MDMP).

1. BSO's relationship with task force battle staff tends to be better when BSO is a captain (CPT) rather than a lieutenant (LT); LTs may be intimidated or fear rejection.

2. There is insufficient integration to consider communications adequately or timely.

3. While there are attempts to consider communications under paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the OPORD, there is rarely a communications annex written.

PROBLEM 6-9: Retransmit (RETRANS) teams are too often looking for the high ground, with no sense of where the enemy is and no clear mission.

1. Brigade signal officers (BSO) tend to give RETRANS teams a brief warning with no route and little guidance.

2. RETRANS teams deploy with a lesson statement but seldom a detailed OPORD.

3. RETRANS teams have no familiarization with the task force plan.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 6-10: Communications plans at the brigade level often lack the flexibility required to support the fluid nature of maneuver operations. Command and control within the maneuver brigade must be reliable and continuous throughout all phases of tactical operations. Brigade signal officers (BSOs) have difficulty designing plans which foresee and provide for all potential disruptions of communications. Factors which influence communications effectiveness include:

• Distance between elements
• Terrain obstacles
• Enemy electronic warfare activity
• Loss of communications assets

Techniques

1. Battalion Signal Officer (BSO) integration.

1. BSOs must be fully integrated into the military decision-making process (MDMP) in order to discern the variables and contingencies which could affect command, control, and communication (C3).

2. Plan and coordinate to use all available means of tactical communications: FM radio, Improved High Frequency Radio (IHFR), tactical satellite (TACSAT), and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE).

3. Back-up systems should be pre-positioned forward so that they are available for instant use if required. Back-up retrans or Radio Access Units (RAU's) are of little use if they are held in the rear during fast-paced combat operations.

4. Assets should be moved forward behind combat forces or with security escort to minimize the danger of destruction by enemy forces.

5. Communications plans should be published and briefed in a clear, concise format to ensure that all elements understand the plan and how contingency communications will support the maneuver.

6. Prepare written/graphical communications annexes for task force OPORDs using examples found in FM 11-43.

7. Integrate the task force BSO into the military decision-making process (MDMP). Use him as the task force communications subject matter expert (SME).

8. Make BSOs CPTs where possible.

2. Deployment of RETRANS Teams.

1. Battalion signal officers (BSOs) must take time to provide the RETRANS team with a clear OPORD. Reference FM 11-43 for a sample RETRANS OPORD.

2. The RETRANS team chief must provide input in the development of the RETRANS mission so that any experiences he/she has is integrated. The RETRANS team chief should also attend the orders brief or rehearsal to get an understanding of the mission they are supporting.

3. The BSO should insure the mission is understood by the team by having them backbrief their mission.

3. Signal unit situation awareness.

1. Signal units should prepare some graphical portrayal of the scheme of maneuver/maneuver graphics in their sector and keep this product updated. Conduct daily briefings at the node centers on current situation with maneuver graphics.

2. Leaders should check to ensure soldiers understand the current situation before departing to remote sites. They will need copies of the maneuver graphics, the OPORD, as well as receive updates during mission preparation and execution.

3. This emphasis on situational awareness will result in fewer personnel casualties from enemy contact. The rate of CSS fratricide from minefields, artillery, and direct fire will also decrease.

4. Unit cross talk during battle.

1. Include cross talk as sub-task for all missions in ARTEP 71-1-MTP. Include techniques and guidelines for cross-talk in doctrinal literature.

2. Units must practice and train information exchange during all training exercises.

3. Establish priority for cross talk on the net by event or phase during development of the OPORD or rehearsal.

4. Include guidance on the use of nets in paragraph 5 of the OPORD.

5. Communication support of brigade COLTs.

1. Coordinate fully and early with the artillery signal officer so he can adequately plan FM retrans team support to brigade COLTs. Early coordination could result, for example, in the decision for the retrans team to be OPCON to the brigade signal officer with the mission to establish and maintain the FM link from the COLTs to the artillery unit.

2. Provide timely and accurate information and current enemy SITREPs.

3. Arrange for artillery retrans teams to be OPCON to the battalion signal officer (BSO) to establish and maintain the FM link to artillery units supporting brigade COLTs.

6. ALOC/BSOC work environment. Rebuild the back of the truck with a shelter of the approximate dimensions of the old M-109 van.

1. Build in shelves for the communications systems.

2. Use filing cabinets (or drawers) for the personnel and administration center (PAC) and the S4 shop to use for day-to-day field operations.

3. Use cabinets/drawers to store office supplies.

4. Establish some work space for radio telephone operators (RTOs) and officers in charge (OICs) to function.

TA.4 Negative Trend 7: Employ tactical C2W

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 7-1: Electronic surveillance team/platoon leaders are not conducting thorough pre-combat checks (PCCs) or pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Relying on memory rather than using a written checklist.

PROBLEM 7-2: The traffic analysis cell does not maintain a current data base of historical analytical observations, reconstruct radio nets, plot manual direction finding results, or provide feedback to the collection/jamming teams.

PROBLEM 7-3: Timely and accurate jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) are not reaching the platoon operations center (POC) during the conduct of an EA mission to have the desired effect.

PROBLEM 7-4: The platoon operations center (POC) is unable to adequately track the tasking of its EW systems and utilize the collection/jamming assets to their fullest potential. The POC relies heavily on the EW teams to coordinate among themselves with little or no guidance from the POC to accomplish the mission. POCs show lack of knowledge on both the capabilities and limitations of its EW systems and how to effectively run either a collection or jamming mission.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 7-5: (Repeat of Problem 7-2) As a whole, the traffic analysis cells did not maintain a current database of historical analytical observations, consistently plot manual direction finding results, or provide meaningful feedback to the collection/jamming teams. These problems are the result of a lack of time management, apathy, or ignorance by traffic cell members, and lack of emphasis or concern by company team leadership.

PROBLEM 7-6: Company commanders and platoon leaders make decisions from their command post with little understanding of the environment in which electronic warfare (EW) teams are operating.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 7-7: PROBLEM: Too often, the analysis control team (ACT) does not plan any specific EW force protection missions to support the insertion of the scouts and COLTs during the recon/counterrecon phases of the battle. While brigade scouts/COLTs are conducting their mission or are being inserted, brigade electronic surveillance/electronic attack (ES/EA) teams are the only assets that can provide early warning/protection. ES/EA teams do this by listening to and locating via radio direction finding, and consequently jamming, enemy recon commo nets or combat security observation posts out forward on the battlefield. Once intercepted, these nets are exploited to see if any brigade scout assets have been compromised.

PROBLEM 7-8: Traffic analysis cells are often not planning for, nor adequately employing, jump nodes to ensure mission continuity. When forced to jump locations, TA cells tend to transfer control of the entire electronic surveillance/electronic attack (ES/EA) mission to outlying intercept sites rather than dispatch a jump node.

PROBLEM 7-9: (Repeat of Problem 7-3) Timely and accurate jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) are not reaching the traffic analysis (TA) cell during the conduct of an electronic attack (EA) mission to have the desired effect.

PROBLEM 7-10: Traffic analysis (TA) cells generally do not set the proper tone for the rest of the deployed ES/EA assets under their purview.

1. Frequently, the TA cells will put out taskings and then passively wait for the ES/EA teams to report, rather than being proactive by providing feedback to the teams, showing an interest in the mission, and reminding the teams periodically of the current tasking.

2. TA cells are displaying a "check the block" mindset and are not following up to ensure taskings are understood or being followed.

Techniques

1. The platoon operations center (POC) crew should receive initial/refresher training at Home Station on the capabilities and limitations of its electronic warfare (EW) systems to enable them to properly plan for coordination and synchronization of their EW assets. Both the POC and EW teams should develop SOPs that present a clearer definition of each other's role and responsibilities.

2. The electronic warfare (EW) platoon leaders and sergeant must take a more active role and interest in the traffic analysis cell function. Hold the cell accountable for what is does and does not accomplish, ensuring basic standards taught at the schoolhouse are maintained. NOTE: A motivated TA cell that shows an active interest in the mission will be reflected by the ES/EA teams. Likewise, an apathetic TA cell will be reflected in kind by the ES/EA teams.

3. Electronic surveillance (ES) teams need to include thorough, written pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) checklists in their SOPs, and team leaders should use these before every mission. Company commanders and platoon leaders must go forward on the battlefield on a regular basis to see the terrain, conduct pre-combat inspections, and gauge the morale and performance of their soldiers.

4. Jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) must be timely and accurate to have the desired effect. The electronic support (ES) system tasked with monitoring the enemy frequency to determine the effectiveness of the jamming mission against it must be sitting on that frequency during the conduct of the EA mission and must provide timely and accurate jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) to the TA cell.

1. Provide JERs frequently to the TA cell, especially if:

   • The jamming is not effective. The TA cell must then direct the subordinate EA team to take immediate action to correct the problem. Among the steps to be taken are:

     • Increase the jammer's power output,
     • Reorient its antenna, or
     • Switch this particular EA mission over to another EA system, if available.

   • The jamming is effective. If the targeted net jumps frequencies, the TA cell can then direct reacquisition efforts as quickly as possible.

2. Place an EW system with hearability to the target area, not colocated with the EA system or between it and the target area. Task it to monitor the target net to determine the effectiveness of the mission. The monitoring system should assign an approximate effectiveness rating to provide timely and well understood input to the TA cell. One method follows:

   EFFORT	JAMMING EFFECTIVENESS RATING
   No interference heard on net	0
   Weak interference, no garbled or repeated traffic	1
   Interference, garbled or repeated traffic being worked through	2
   Interference, garbled or repeated traffic not being heard by some stations/callsigns.	3
   Strong interference, no ability to work through	4

3. Standardize the issuing of JERs. A two to three minute interval during a jamming mission would help enforce the timeliness and importance of these reports and ultimately lead to a more effective EA mission.

5. The ACT must plan detailed force protection missions in their EW execution matrix during the recon/counterrecon phases of the battle. The ACT should work closely with the fire support officer (FSO) to coordinate force protection missions during the insertion of the scouts/COLTs. The FSO must provide specifics of where and when these scout/COLTs are being inserted. This information can then be given to the ES/EA teams listening to the targeted nets to see if the teams were compromised while being inserted. If so, the FSO can warn these teams and take appropriate action. Concurrently, per the EW execution matrix, the recon net(s) would be exploited to protect the rest of the force by reporting any compromised OPs, assembly areas, TOC sites, etc.

6. When the TA cell is forced to jump, either to maintain communications with deployed EW teams or prevent itself from being overrun, it should dispatch a jump vehicle with adequate files, maps, secure communications, etc., to maintain control of the battle.

1. Once the jump vehicle is in position with good comms to all outlying sites and the ACT, it should then assume control of the tasking and reporting net.

2. The main TA cell body then tears down and redeploys to the jump vehicle's location. Once reunited and operational, the main TA cell body will resume control of the net, and the jump vehicle will be absorbed back into the TA cell.

3. If the TA cell does not possess a jump vehicle or it gets destroyed, an EW team should be designated as the net control until the TA cell relocates or gets reconstituted. However, this is the least favorite option because mission continuity is lost and it deters from the EW team's mission.

TA.4, Part V

TA.4, Part VII