TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL: Section N - Needs Emphasis (cont): NTC

SECTION N

NEEDS EMPHASIS (cont)

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL (cont)

Techniques

1. Train the military decision-making process (MDMP) at Home Station. Use CALL Newsletter 95-12 Update, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning" as training reference. Involve battalion commanders and S3s to guide and review MDMP process and products.

2. Mission analysis. Battle staffs must understand that mission analysis is one of the most important steps in the military decision-making process (MDMP).

S2s must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so the process can be completed in a timely fashion.
The Brigade S2 must produce and disseminate products to the task force early to allow parallel planning.

3. Fires synchronization with scheme of maneuver.

In Home Station training, use the methodology for the brigade planning process in Chapter 1 of FM 71-123. Focus targeting team members on following the decide, detect, deliver methodology outlined in FM 6-20-10 to develop a plan that will link lookers to shooters and result in a scheme of fires that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.
During wargaming, the task force FSO and the battle staff must consider OP locations in relation to time and space and identify who has primary and alternate responsibility for the OPs. Together, the FSO and the battle staff must ensure the OPs provide the task force the necessary "eyes" on the critical targets at the required critical time during the battle.
Task force commanders must know what fire support assets are available to support their mission as they go through the military decision-making process (MDMP). Good digital communications during planning and coordination greatly assists efforts to obtain assets-available information. When the fire support officer (FSO) receives this information, he needs to translate it into meaningful information the maneuver commander can use.
Detailed planning considerations, such as actions on contact and actions on the objective, must not be short-circuited. Successful time analysis will allow the inclusion of critical decisionmaking and planning tasks that will result in a more synchronized operation.

4. Target analysis. S2s begin the process before mission analysis and use intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and target value analysis (TVA) to identify HPTs within the enemy formation and why they are important to that formation. In other words, identify enemy vulnerabilities.

The fire support officer (FSO), assistant brigade engineer (ABE), and other battlefield operating systems must assist the S2 in this process.
The brigade commander provides additional guidance and focuses the effort as he gives his intent for fires and maneuver.
The FSO must then sequence available assets to find and attack the HPTs to meet the commander's guidance -- the concept of fires.
The concept of fires is then included into each course of action (COA) and is developed into a detailed scheme of fires during wargaming.

5. Brigade XO roles. The brigade XO must be the right-hand man to the commander with all the authority and responsibilities that position requires to execute. The brigade commander must clearly make the brigade XO the chief-of-staff for the brigade.

The S3 must work for the XO in garrison as well as the field.
During train-up, all elements of BOS must be stressed and integrated into every level of training.
- FCXs designed to stress and exercise logistical consideration must be trained.
- Logistics exercises must be executed by the full battle staff, to include the S3.
The XO needs to be drilled by the brigade commander in the role of chief-of-staff to include heading up the orders process.
The FSB commander, task force XOs, and task force BMOs need to be held responsible for their jobs and should not have the brigade XO as their safety valve. (Part of the task force BMO's responsibility is developing and drilling a system of keeping the task force chief-of-staff informed of maintenance issues.)
Task force XO needs to maintain a system that keeps the brigade XO informed.
The BMOs needs to be trained not to make every meeting with the XO a decision meeting.
When maintenance becomes an issue at the NTC, do not strip the chief-of-staff out of the task force and brigade to try and put a bandage on the problem.
- Give the O/Cs a chance to work with the maintenance staff to get them through the problem areas.
- If the brigade is having that many problems in maintenance that the O/Cs cannot help, the FSB commander needs to be brought forward.
  - The FSB and additional maintenance assets can surge on a task force to get operational readiness (OR) up.
  - Do not strip the front lines to fix the support elements.
Battalion XOs should also fill the role of battalion "chief of staff." They should:
- Direct and control battalion OPORD timeline
- Involve entire staff
- Prevent delays
- Ensure timely OPORD issue

6. Engineer battalion staffs must train and practice the military decision-making process (MDMP) at Home Station with the brigade staff so they are familiar with their orders process and able to parallel plan in conjunction with it. Ensure all staff members understand their roles and responsibilities in the battalion OPORD process and their necessary input to the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) for the brigade OPORD process.

7. Military police integration. Conduct training events, such as CPXs and STAFFEXs, which allow the MP platoon leader to interact with the brigade staff during MDMP and assert his capabilities and recommendations in a systemic manner. This interaction will cause brigade planners to analyze MP employment as a response to a specific threat or a solution to a particular mission need instead of an afterthought tasking. MPs should conduct training at Home Station with engineers, chemical units, scouts, etc., so that commanders may see the way MPs can be integrated into the full spectrum of brigade operations.

8. Aviation Liaison Officer (ALO) integration. The ALO is a critical staff member who can have a decisive impact on the ground maneuver unit's success or failure. Commanders and staffs must involve the ALO during the decision-making process to ensure the planned employment is within aviation capabilities with the assets available.

9. NCO integration. NCO subject matter experts must be integrated into the decision-making process. NCOs must assert their expertise during planning.

10. Chemical staff and NCO integration. Train the chemical staff to conduct the detailed planning and participation in MDMP to support the maneuver plan. Train chemical NCOs in the MDMP; moreover, have them attend the Battle Staff course. Do not overburden the chemical staff with additional duties that distract them from their primary duties.

11. Forward Support Battalions.

During Home Station training, both in the field and in garrison, the FSB S2/S3 should seek opportunities to train in the intelligence officer's staff functions with the DISCOM S2.
During Home Station training, the FSB S2/S3 must clearly define the FSB's intelligence requirements to the brigade S2.
Train the FSB staff with its authorized 96B, not a borrowed asset from another organization that will not be available when the FSB deploys.
XOs must become knowledgeable of the MDMP using the following guides:
- ST 101-5
- FM 101-5
- CALL Newsletter 95-12.
XOs should inculcate the MDMP process in all training events to include CPX, FTX, and battle simulation exercises. Only by religiously using the MDMP will they develop the proficiency and expertise required to successfully execute this portion of their duties as an XO.

12. Chaplain integration. FM 16-1 is very clear that the chaplain is to be part of the orders process and submit an annex. What is missing is a more complete discussion and possible timeline for mission analysis and product development. Recommend a vignette in FM 16-1 that walks a chaplain through the orders process.

TA.4 Negative Trend 3: Course of Action development and wargaming

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY94	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96
	4	5	3	2	4

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Integration of the task force staff is a problem for wargaming and course of action (COA) development.

1. Staffs do not organize efficiently at the outset of wargaming.

2. Staffs use the belt technique which takes a long time.

3. COAs are not developed in sufficient detail.

4. COAs are usually developed during the wargame process.

5. Critical events and known decision points are not initially identified and briefed to the staff.

6. The selected COA is never wargamed sufficiently to achieve effective synchronization.

RESULT: The lack of sufficient detail resulting from the staff's integrated efforts results in subsequent refinement being done in relative isolation by individual staff members. This negatively impacts on synchronization during mission execution.

PROBLEM 3-2: Task force staff's wargaming either gets too detailed and never finished, or is extremely superficial.

RESULT: Products derived from wargaming are rarely usable, doing little to synchronize the plan or to key the commander to critical tactical decisions during mission execution.

2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-3: Units routinely experience significant problems with both COA development and then wargaming of COAs.

1. Brigade staffs seldom use the five step methodology to develop COAs described in FM 101-5, ST 101-5, or CALL Newsletter 93-3, The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff.

2. Commanders either dictate most COAs or one or two key staff officers develop them without other staff input.

3. In shortcutting the five step process, most staffs do not examine force ratios by arraying the forces available.

4. Most staffs fail also to develop all parts of the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear).

5. By not using a doctrinal COA development methodology, staffs fail to develop a critical events list because they have not fully developed a scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEM 3-4: Task force staffs are not well trained in wargaming, frequently getting bogged down in small details, or just doing a superficial job. Too often, staffs do not list critical enemy and friendly events. In some cases, units fail to wargame COAs at all and begin OPORD development. Some commanders see no use in decision support templates/matrix products and rely on their "feel" of the battle to make their tactical decisions.

RESULT: Execution matrices and decision support products developed during the planning process are generally inadequate and not integrated with the higher headquarter's concept of operations/scheme of maneuver.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-5: Task force S-3s and commanders struggle through course of action development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S-3s do not know where or how to start COA development.

2. Task forces normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact or actions on the objective but never get to the details of what it is they want their company/teams to really accomplish.

3. Task and purpose are rarely assigned to company/teams.

PROBLEM 3-6: Most brigade staffs do not understand course of action development.

1. Courses of action are not fully developed prior to starting wargaming.

2. The five-step methodology for developing COAs described in CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning," and CGSC ST 100-9, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decisionmaking, are not followed.

3. Most COAs are dictated by the commander or developed by one or two officers without staff input.

4. Staffs often get in such a hurry to begin wargaming that they do not fully formulate each BOS's role in the approved COA.

RESULT: BOS reps are still trying to figure out what their role in the COA is during the wargame.

PROBLEM 3-7: Task force commanders and staffs do not understand how to develop a course of action (COA).

1. COAs are not developed based on the commander's decisive point.

2. COAs do not define in doctrinal terms what the company/teams are to do.

3. COAs are not in enough detail.

4. COAs are frequently not developed with the S-2's SITEMP.

5. COAs are frequently not developed on a map when the terrain can be taken into account.

RESULTS:

1. Lack of optimum synchronization in the scheme of maneuver.

2. Broad concepts of operation rather than detailed, fully-developed COAs.

3. Wargaming tends to be COA development rather than an exercise to synchronize the operation.

PROBLEM 3-8: Fire support integration during the wargame is still not to standard.

1. Fire support integration during wargaming of branch plans is usually not done.

2. The S-3 usually focuses strictly on maneuver.

3. Fire support officers (FSOs) and air liaison officers (ALOs) are expected to participate in the wargame only as observers.

4. Integration of radar zones with the maneuver plan is forgotten.

5. Integration of mortar priority targets and mortar positioning is seldom accomplished.

6. Integration of the reconnaissance and surveillance plan with the fire support plan is never done.

7. Prioritizing or focusing fires for different phases of the operation is not done.

8. Integrating CAS targets into the plan is not done.

RESULT: The lack of fire support integration into the wargaming process leads to a disjointed use of fire support assets with an end result being a loss in ability to mass on the enemy and an overall inability to protect the force.

PROBLEM 3-9: Wargaming is not focused and does not synchronize the task force plan.

1. During the wargame, the task force executive officer (XO) does not facilitate the process, and the battle staff loses its focus on the critical events that need to be wargamed and the relationship between events and the decisive point.

2. The wargame ends up taking all day or night with only the most aggressive participants providing input and the rest of the staff writing their annex without fully synchronizing their BOS.

3. Task forces routinely conduct wargaming without:

Refined SITEMP.
Event template.
Fully-developed and integrated COA.
Having identified enemy and friendly critical events.

RESULTS:

1. The lack of a refined SITEMP and event template makes it hard for the commander and staff to visualize the enemy. Plans are not focused on killing the enemy and protecting the force.

2. We do not understand the enemy's use of combat multipliers. This prevents us from anticipating their use and developing our actions for the various forms of contact.

3. The lack of a developed and integrated COA before the wargame results in the wargaming process becoming a COA development session.

4. Without having identified both the enemy and friendly critical events, we cannot properly scope our wargaming process, make assumptions about events that will not be wargamed, or identify contingencies/branch plans that must be developed.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-10: COA development often fails to produce plans with sufficient detail and precision for successful execution.

1. Most brigades fail to conduct a COA development session as part of their tactical decision-making process (TDMP).

2. While most brigades use an abbreviated form of TDMP in which the commander dictates a course of action, staffs fail to develop the COA fully into a draft plan with sufficient detail to synchronize the BOS. Not until wargaming is the COA developed, thus failing to produce synchronization, precision, and detail needed for successful execution.

RESULTS:

1. Brigades either fail to have a COA development session or wargaming or both.

2. The plan lacks details and precision necessary for successful execution.

PROBLEM 3-11: (Repeat of Problem 3-9) Wargaming rarely synchronizes the task Force plan. Task force Executive Officers (XOs) do not facilitate the process. The staff loses focus on critical events and the relationship between events wargamed and decisive point.

RESULTS:

1. The wargame takes too long.

2. Only the most aggressive participants provide input.

3. Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.

PROBLEM 3-12: (Repeat of Problem 3-5) Most task force S-3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S-3s do not know where or how to start COA development.

2. Task forces normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact. They rarely provide details on what they want company/teams to accomplish and rarely assign task(s) and/or purpose to company/teams.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 3-13: (Repeat of Problems 3-5 and 3-12) Task force S3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S3s do not know how to start COA development.

2. Task forces normally develop COAs that only provide an axis, a formation, and a simple plan for actions on the objective.

3. COAs normally do not include branches that provide flexibility to the plan based upon various possible situations.

4. COAs normally do not address details for actions on contact, actions on the objective, or continuous reconnaissance.

5. Clear tasks and purposes for subordinate units are not usually provided.

6. COAs are seldom refined during wargaming.

PROBLEM 3-14: Wargaming at task force level rarely results in a synchronized plan at the conclusion of the wargaming process.

1. Task force planners habitually arrive at the wargaming table unprepared to use the wargaming process as a synchronization tool. Rather, the wargame usually degenerates into an additional course of action (COA) development session for task force planners.

2. Planners often do not know what must be accomplished during COA development to facilitate wargaming.

3. Planners do not understand what the results of a wargaming session should be.

RESULT: The efforts put into wargaming are generally wasted and the task force crosses the line of departure (LD) without a synchronized plan.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-15: (Repeat of Problems 3-5, 3-12 and 3-13) Task force S3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S3s do not know how to start COA development.

2. Task forces normally develop COAs that only provide an axis, a formation, and a simple plan for actions on the objective.

3. COAs normally do not include branches that provide flexibility to the plan based upon various possible situations.

4. COAs normally do not address details for actions on contact, actions on the objective, or continuous reconnaissance.

5. Clear tasks and purposes for subordinate units are not usually provided.

6. COAs are seldom refined during wargaming.

PROBLEM 3-16:

1. Task force S3s often do not develop COAs based on the commanders decisive point and are not able to define in doctrinal terms what they want the company/teams to do.

2. COAs are frequently not developed with the S2's SITEMP or on a map where the terrain can be visualized.

PROBLEM 3-17: The CSS concept of support most often focuses on maneuver unit COAs that begin with actions beyond the LD and culminate with action on objective. It seldom addresses support requirements for before and after the battle.

PROBLEMS:

1. During preparation for combat, the CSS concept of support seldom addresses such things as:

Where the aid stations are located.
How much fuel/ammo will be consumed during rehearsals.
A description of replenishment or services for operations before the LD if the brigade combat team (BCT) is moving.

2. As the brigade enters the after-combat phase, the CSS annex once again does not outline a concept of support.

RESULTS:

1. With regard to the after-combat phase, specific replenishment and services tasks are not addressed in respect to transitioning to future operations.

2. The brigade's ability to identify a culminating point is diminished. For example, if the future planners determine a minimum of 80% combat power in order to defend against a counter attack, specific criteria must be addressed in the CSS annex to ensure rapid regeneration as well as keeping the commander informed if the combat team begins to approach 80%.

PROBLEM 18: (Repeat of Problem 3-9 and 3-11) Wargaming rarely synchronizes the task force (TF) plan.

1. Task force executive officers (TF XOs) do not facilitate the process:

Staff loses focus on critical events.
Relationship between events wargamed and decisive point.

2. Wargame takes too long.

RESULTS:

1. Only most aggressive participants provide input.

2. Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.

TA.4 Command and Control, Part II

TA.4, Part IV

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