Military

PROBLEM 4-2:

1. Most engineers cannot properly arm/disarm a M15 or M21 mine.

2. Engineer platoons are taking three to four times the doctrinal standard to install a (live) fixing minefield.

3. Engineer platoons are taking two to three times the doctrinal standard to install an (inert) fixing/turning minefield.

4. Poor MICLIC drill execution.

5. Poor employment of the AVLB/CEV/DOZER.

6. SOPs that outline the necessary battle drills but a failure to practice the battle drills.

7. Tactical assembly areas:

• Personnel, ammo, fuel status reporting
• Use of M8 alarms
• Range cards/sector sketches
• Platoon/company fire plans
• PCCs/PCIs
• Weapon zeroing
• Graphic control measure disseminations
• Load plans

PROBLEM 4-3: FA battery SOPs do not provide the basic information to make the process organized and efficient. Additionally, the eight-step procedures must be modified for battery operations.

1. Units have no checklists for conducting pre-combat checks for routine, recurring METL-based tasks.

2. Too often commanders do not develop timelines for critical events; i.e., PCI times, rehearsal times, movement times, resupply times, etc.

3. Battery commanders too often include information in the OPORDs that is either not relevant to the operation or sufficiently refined to be useful to subordinates.

4. Supervision is still the weakest step in the procedures: failure to conduct PCIs; no spot checks for standard adherence; not checking range cards, weapon positioning, etc.

PROBLEM 4-4:

1. During engineer company tactical assembly area procedures, leaders are not submitting personnel, ammunition and fuel status reports; M8 alarms are not employed; range cards, sector sketches and fire plans are not developed or submitted.

2. During engineer company and platoon troop-leading procedures, leaders are not conducting pre-combat checks and inspections.

3. Company and platoon OPORDs lack significant details. Leaders do not use graphic control measures and sketches to portray the scheme of maneuver/fires. Scheme of engineer operations are not fully developed, usually including only LD time, formation, generic route, and the TF's objective name and location.

4. Too often engineer leaders do not understand how the enemy will use engineers and the amount of breaching operations a maneuver task force may be required to execute.

5. MICLIC reload plans lack detail; MICLIC reload sites not designated; number of MICLICs required not accurately estimated.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-5: Engineer battalion HHC commanders have not regularly used troop-leading procedures after receiving the engineer battalion operations order(s).

PROBLEM 4-6: Engineer companies must improve their tactical as opposed to their technical planning.

1. Tactical assembly area (TAA) operations

• Not submitting personnel/supply status reports.
• Not deploying M8 alarms.
• Not planning local defense properly or in sufficient depth.

2. Company/platoon troop-leading procedures (TLPs)

• Not conducting pre-command checks/pre-command inspections (PCC/PCIs).

• OPORDs lacked significant details: graphics; TF scheme of maneuver; CSS plan support to company scheme of maneuver.

• Scheme of maneuver/scheme of engineer operations not fully developed; usually only contained: unit LD time; formation; general route; TF objective name/location.

• Enemy use of engineers.

• Amount and type of breaching operations for TF to accomplish.

PROBLEM 4-7:

1. Basic functions of military intelligence units were generally not being executed to standard by MI company teams:

• Getting to places on time.
• Staying at a duty location.
• Uniform and protective gear worn.
• Guard duty not being executed.

2. MI unit leaders apparently enforcing execution selectively or allowing questions or complaints and not identifying problem personnel and dealing with them as appropriate.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-8: Company/team leaders are not regularly conducting pre-combat checks (PCCs), and platoon sergeants and leaders are not conducting pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Most units have SOPs on the conduct of PCCs and PCIs but they are not often followed.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-9:

1. Leaders have difficulty complying with the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule.

2. Leaders often do not follow troop-leading procedures.

3. Leaders often wait to be told what to do rather than using time available to conduct necessary checks, rehearsals, etc.

4. NCOs usually waste valuable training rehearsal time while waiting for OPORD or return of the leader.

PROBLEM 4-10: Medical leaders seldom use established troop-leading procedures and field orders to ensure timely execution of their plans.

PROBLEM 4-11:

1. Battalion Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) do not establish a specified crew drill for the battalion fire direction center (FDC). RESULT: Their tactical fire control is inefficient, leading to excessive mission processing time.

2. FDCs do not issue doctrinal fire commands.

3. FDCs do not effectively battle track and therefore lose situational awareness during the battle.

4. FDCs develop and assign responsibilities to crew members during the rotation but not to all crew members.

PROBLEM 4-12:

1. When time available is limited, it is critical at the battery level to issue an OPORD to section chiefs and above that focuses on the accomplishment of the unit's critical field artillery tasks (CFATs.) Battery commanders and platoon leaders fail to focus their unit's efforts on the tasks required to accomplish the mission.

2. Battery commanders often issue unclear orders and make poor use of available time.

3. In most cases, battery commanders use battalion-directed pre-combat checks (PCCs) but often fail to identify their own pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and rehearsals.

4. When the commander does specify PCCs/PCIs, leaders often do not adequately check to see if they have been accomplished.

PROBLEM 4-13: Company fire support teams (FISTs) generally conduct inadequate PCCs/PCIs.

1. Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLD) batteries fail when dismounted.

2. Protective masks do not seal during a chemical attack.

3. Machine guns do not fire because they are dirty.

4. Radios will not hold a crypto fill.

PROBLEM 4-14:

PROBLEMS:

1. Small arms weapons are not properly maintained and cleaned.

2. Sleep plans are not enforced; SGMs and NCO are biggest offenders.

3. Noise and light discipline is not maintained:

• White and chem lights used in tactical operating centers (TOCs)
• Hatches slamming

4. Field sanitation standards not enforced:

• Wire left on roads
• Trash bags falling out of trucks
• Trash being burned or buried in the field

5. No pre-combat inspections (PCIs) at Home Station to ensure MOPP gear is packed:

• Soldiers without gloves, masks
• Soldiers without MOPP uniform

6. Load plans not enforced.

7. Unit discipline regarding soldier hygiene, uniforms, vehicles, and equipment not enforced.

8. Speed limits in the brigade support area (BSA) and along the main supply route (MSR) not enforced.

9. Proper use of ground guides not enforced.

10. Use of proper eye protection not enforced.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 4-15: (Repeat of Problem 4-10) Medical leaders seldom use established troop-leading procedures and field orders to ensure timely execution of their plans.

PROBLEM 4-16: Troop-leading procedures are not used effectively in the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).

1. No mission analysis conducted.

2. No effective or timely OPORDs issued.

3. No timelines established.

PROBLEM 4-17:

1. Typically, no one in command knows the location of the BSA commander during battle days because that information was lacking in the OPORD.

2. The BSA commander does not understand where the critical logistical points on the battlefield are where his presence is needed.

PROBLEM 4-18: (Repeat of Problem 4-13) Company fire support teams (FISTs) generally conduct inadequate pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).

1. Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLD) batteries fail when dismounted.

2. Protective masks do not seal during a chemical attack.

3. M-60 machine guns do not fire because they are dirty.

4. Radios will not hold a crypto fill.

5. Cables are missing.

Techniques

1. Pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCS/PCIs). Units should review their pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) SOPs to ensure they are adequate, and leaders should ensure these SOPs are used.

1. Company/team leaders should perform thorough PCCs with a checklist before every mission.

2. Platoon sergeants or leaders should then follow-up by conducting PCI spot-checks.

2. Time management. Supervising and inspecting are almost exclusively an NCO function. NCOs must be trained to proficiency in their leadership and time management skills.

3. Unit discipline. NCOs must ensure 100% accountability of soldiers at all times. During convoy operations, reduce speeds to appropriate for conditions. Maintain unit discipline.

4. Engineer tactical discipline. Engineer individual tasks and tactical discipline problems can all be solved with disciplined adherence to existing SOPs and standards. Engineer units must work during Home Station training to develop and refine their collective skill in basic tasks and procedures.

1. Engineer battalion HHC commanders must use TLPs, with estimate of situation, METT-T, and IPB to coordinate, plan, direct, and control the execution of CSS missions for every battalion mission.

2. HHC commanders should formally issue an OPORD, even orally and abbreviated, to his subordinate elements.

3. Engineer companies should develop and train SOPs that address normal tactical operations and planning in the field in addition to technical training and planning.

4. Train/prove/refine in local training area or even next to unit motor pool.

5. FA battery troop-leading procedures.

1. Create standard pre-combat checklists to support routine, recurring, METL-based collective tasks.

2. Create an orders checklist to help focus information gathering and dissemination to section chiefs and soldiers.

3. Use a fill-in-the-blank OPORD but add a timeline of critical events.

4. Focus on leader supervision of critical tasks.

5. Conduct rehearsals to standard every time.

6. The battalion fire direction center (FDC) must develop a crew drill that clearly fixes responsibility to each member for critical tasks during the conduct of operations. The end result will yield standardized mission processing in a lock-step fashion with minimum processing times. This crew drill must be clearly established in the TACSOP. Sample crew drill for a voice call for fire executed digitally:

   RTO	Announce the call for fire and record it on the mission log.
   FDO/FDNCO	Plots the target on the situation map and announces any FSCM violations. Analyze units and ammunition available, commander's criteria/attack guidance. Announces fire order.
   Computer Operator	Inputs the mission data and generates the appropriate FM;CFF and back the target number, grid, altitude, units and method of fire
   FDO/FDNCO	Verifies the fire commands and authorizes transmission to the firing unit.
   Computer Operator	Transmits the fire commands to the platoon FDCs and verifies acknowledgment.
   RTO	Transmits voice fire commands to any platoon not receiving the data digitally.
   RTO	Records ready, shot, rounds complete on the mission log.

7. Leaders must focus on accomplishment of their CFATs by executing troop-leading procedures (TLPs) to standard. FM 71-123 provides TTPs, in detail, to address this issue. The TLPs provide a mental framework to ensure complete preparation, dissemination, and execution of both the battery and platoon mission. The steps are not sequential and can occur either out of order or simultaneously after the receipt of the mission.

   1. Receive the mission.

      • The commander must analyze the mission to define his battery's restated mission and CFATs.

      • He must define the task, purpose, method, and endstate for each critical task to determine logistics and Class V requirements.

      • He must also identify PCCs for the sections.

   2. Issue a warning order.

      • The commander issues as much information and detail as he can based upon METT-T. He may do this by FM, or if time is available, issue a WARNO in written form.

      • There is no doctrinal format for the WARNO. However, a five paragraph field order works best.

   3. Make a tentative plan.

      • The commander must focus on battery/platoon IPB and METT-T.

      • He must be concerned with positioning, movement, logistics, rehearsals, and defense as he develops his plan.

   4. Initiate movement. If the mission requires and the time is available, initiate movement or repositioning as soon as possible.

   5. Conduct reconnaissance.

      • This recon can be a map recon or ground as time available allows.

      • The commander should coordinate with adjacent units, survey, engineer support, and route security as needed.

   6. Complete the plan.

      • The commander must now take all the information and produce a coherent order.

      • The plan must be executable by the unit based on METT-T and satisfy all CFATs.

   7. Issue the order.

      • The audience for the order is METT-T driven; however, down to section chief level is best since there is less room for individual interpretation of the plan and intent. The key players must be present.

      • A terrain board or cartoon sketch of the battery's area of operations is a technique that is clear and easily understood by the audience.

      • Clear delivery of the order is critical to the TLP process.

      • Once complete, use a backbrief to ensure complete understanding of the OPORD and commander's intent.

   8. Supervise.

      • This is the most important yet most neglected step of the TLP.

      • Leaders must conduct the PCCs/PCIs that the commander established. The requirements for effective PCCs/PCIs are outlined in FM 71-123, pages 2-33 through 2-35.

8. Company fire support teams (FISTs) must develop detailed PCC/PCI checklists prior to execution. Make checklists mission specific; e.g.:

   • Dismounted operations
   • Copperhead shoots
   • Offensive operations, etc.

6. Medical company troop-leading procedures. Use FM 71-1 and FM 7-8 as references to train and implement established procedures at Home Station. This will improve leaders' ability to manage their time and provide subordinates with the information needed prior to start of mission. Use of established procedures will facilitate the early movement of ambulance platoons when the company commanders have not completed their orders.

7. MI company discipline. MI company/team leaders must demand and expect that soldiers perform basic soldier functions to standard without questions, complaints, or selective enforcement. Identify problem personnel and take appropriate action.

8. Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) troop-leading. The BMO must consciously train himself and subordinate leaders in the application of the troop-leading procedures. Focus Home Station training on what happens in the UMCP when the mission is received, when and how OPORDs are issued, and how time is managed.

9. Location of Brigade Support Area (BSA) commander.

1. If the brigade commander's intent is to have 90% of combat power at LD, a critical point for the BSA commander should be the UMCPs prior to battle. Then the commander may move to the TOC once the brigade commander's intent has been met or update the brigade commander from the action point on why his intent was not met.

2. FSB commanders must map out the critical points prior to conducting the mission:

   • List them by time, phase, or event.

   • Incorporate the critical points into the order, thus reinforcing to subordinate commanders what is critical to the FSB commander.

TA.4 Command and Control, Part III

TA.4, Part V