Military

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-7: The brigade NBC NCO rarely participates in all phases of the military decision-making process (MDMP).

1. While brigade chemical officers are involved in all phases of MDMP, they generally do not possess the knowledge to plan for chemical assets to support the maneuver plan.

2. Brigades attach chemical assets to TFs with little or no guidance to TF chemical officers or NCOs on how to use them.

3. Chemical NCOs do not receive training in MDMP.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8: Brigade chaplains normally do very well at providing direct religious support. However, they often are not included in the mission analysis or orders development process.

PROBLEM 2-9: Military Police (MP) platoon leaders are not integrated well into the brigade staff planning process.

1. Military Police are frequently given vague missions which do not make full use of the platoon's capabilities in supporting offensive and defensive operations.

2. Platoon leaders are sometimes not aware of their staff responsibility in the planning process and have a tendency to present themselves primarily at the orders issue.

3. Key staff members, such as the S2 or S3, are often not aware of what MPs do on the battlefield; many associate MPs exclusively with enemy prisoner of war and traffic control operations.

4. Many commanders see rear area combat operations as the primary domain of MPs and further limit their flexibility by assigning MPs to static defense duties within the brigade support area.

PROBLEM 2-10: The brigade XO is a dysfunctional participant of the brigade battle staff.

1. Before deployment to NTC: During train-up at Home Station, brigade commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the brigade XO and how he is to work with the brigade S3.

1. Brigade XOs tend not to be involved in the training of the orders process until a major training event occurs (FCX, JANIS).

2. The orders process train-up does not stress synchronization and execution of all BOS elements.

3. No chief-of-staff is required to track brigade execution from the initiation of mission analysis to mission completion.

4. Although the S3 assumes some of this function, he is never required to truly synchronize logistics with fire and maneuver during most JANIS and FCX training events.

2. After deployment to NTC: The XO begins to execute his responsibility as chief-of-staff for the commander without a clear working relationship with the S3 and no clear areas of responsibility other than "the XO keeps the time clock and worries about CSS."

1. As the orders process progresses, the S3 and commander get involved with the maneuver and wargaming and do not sufficiently integrate the BOS elements into a cohesive and functional plan.

2. The XO is caught up with:

   • Moving and sustaining a real force in a hostile environment.

   • Working with TOC personnel who mostly work for the S3.

   • Trying to observe and integrate what he can of the BOS into an order that the S3 and the commander are doing, on their own, in the plans tent.

3. Any attempt by the XO to maintain a time clock is seen as abrasive and resisted by both the S3 and the commander.

3. Around the time of the third orders process: The commander finally understands that somebody has to be the chief-of-staff for the orders process.

1. The commander is too busy and the S3 is only focused on maneuver and cannot step back to see the big picture.

2. The XO begins to find his niche. With all the staff reporting to him as the center of the brigade operations, he can begin to integrate all BOS elements into the plan.

3. The S3 is now free to concentrate on his parts of the operation and the commander can get out of the TOC and see his troops.

4. Response to lower operational readiness (OR) rate: Unfortunately, as the learning curve for the brigade XO and the battle staff begins a steady climb, the brigade OR rate heads in the other direction.

1. Right at the time when the orders process has a chance to jell, the brigade XO is pulled out and sent to the BSA to become an overgrown BMO.

2. The battle staff, now under control of the S3, drops all concepts of integration and logistical synchronization.

3. The commander, feeling the pressure of maintenance, increased tempo of the rotation, and the lack of a chief-of-staff, turns off any growth in the orders process and conducts self preservation. The commander says, "No new ideas on how to do orders. We do just what we trained at Home Station -- S3 get me an order out as fast as possible -- We will work the details at the rehearsal."

4. The XO is now living in the BSA. Whatever growth the maintenance management system has been through over the last few days is terminated. The XO says, "No new ideas on how we do maintenance. We do just what we trained at Home Station -- Task force XOs give me your deadline report; we are going to start cross leveling, circle-xing, and scrounging parts."

Learning the orders process.
Developing and training a maintenance system that works.
Using the XO as the executive officer to the commander and performing his chief-of-staff function.

5. The XO is depicted as the commander's personal troubleshooter. He is in the way as a player in the orders process and best kept at the BSA.

PROBLEM 2-11: Ground maneuver brigade commanders and staffs seldom integrate the aviation liaison officer (ALO) in the decision making process.

PROBLEM 2-12: Engineer planning and planning products are not in accordance with FM 5-71-3.

1. Engineer staffs are prepared to conduct horizontal planning to a certain degree. However, the vertical planning process remains unstructured, leading to publication of engineer orders which lack sufficient detail and specificity to conduct successful operations.

2. The engineer battalion XO too often fails to establish any type of battalion planning timeline.

3. The Bn S3, S2, and the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) participate together in brigade mission analysis, receive the brigade commander's guidance, and participate in the brigade wargaming process. However, critical steps in the development of the engineer estimate, which supports the brigade's MDMP, are usually missing because the engineer battalion is not planning concurrently.

4. The brigade engineer (battalion commander) with his staff seldom develops a detailed scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) to support each maneuver course of action (COA) or then integrates the SOEO for the selected COA into brigade wargaming.

5. Since the engineer battalion is not following an established timeline and conducting its own wargame to identify critical vertical tasks, these tasks are usually not identified until after the brigade plan is completed and are not integrated or coordinated.

PROBLEM 2-13:

1. Within the staff structure of a forward support battalion (FSB), a separate intelligence officer is not authorized.

2. The staff function is intended to be executed by the S2/S3 and supported by a 96B.

1. Generally, the officer assigned to the S2/S3 position identifies with the S3 responsibilities but is not trained in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and does not recognize S2 responsibilities.

2. The staff 96B is not normally brought to the Leader Training Program (LTP); consequently, the training opportunity for this skill is lost.

3. Frequently, the FSB borrows an officer from the MI battalion, but the officer they are provided is an equally inexperienced officer, generally a 2d Lieutenant, loaned to the FSB to be trained.

PROBLEM 2-14: The battle staff often conducts the planning process without input from NCOs who are subject matter experts (SMEs).

PROBLEM 2-15: Task force FSOs fail to integrate their observation plan with the task force scheme of maneuver plan. Observation post's (OP's) locations and occupation times are not synchronized with the task force or company/team locations or their movement on the battlefield.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-16: Brigade combat team (BCT) target analysis and synchronization meetings are often not linked to the entire planning process.

PROBLEM 2-17: (Repeat of Problem 2-10) The brigade XO is often a dysfunctional participant of the brigade battle staff.

1. Before deployment to NTC: During train-up at Home Station, brigade commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the brigade XO and how he is to work with the brigade S3.

1. Brigade XOs tend not to be involved in the training of the orders process until a major training event occurs (FCX, JANIS).

2. The orders process train-up does not stress synchronization and execution of all BOS elements.

3. No chief-of-staff is required to track brigade execution from the initiation of mission analysis to mission completion.

4. Although the S3 assumes some of this function, he is never required to truly synchronize logistics with fire and maneuver during most JANIS and FCX training events.

2. After deployment to NTC: The XO begins to execute his responsibility as chief-of-staff for the commander without a clear working relationship with the S3 and no clear areas of responsibility other than "the XO keeps the time clock and worries about CSS."

1. As the orders process progresses, the S3 and commander get involved with the maneuver and wargaming and do not sufficiency integrate the BOS elements into a cohesive and functional plan.

2. The XO is caught up with:

   • Moving and sustaining a real force in a hostile environment.

   • Working with TOC personnel who mostly work for the S3.

   • Trying to observe and integrate what he can of the BOS into an order that the S3 and the commander are doing, on their own, in the plans tent.

3. Any attempt by the XO to maintain a time clock is seen as abrasive and is resisted by both the S3 and the commander.

3. Around the time of the third orders process: The commander finally understands that somebody has to be the chief-of-staff for the orders process.

1. The commander is too busy and the S3 is only focused on maneuver and cannot step back to see the big picture.

2. The XO begins to find his niche. With all the staff reporting to him as the center of the brigade operations, he can begin to integrate all BOS elements into the plan.

3. The S3 is now free to concentrate on his parts of the operation and the commander can get out of the TOC and see his troops.

4. Response to lower operational readiness (OR) rate: Unfortunately, as the learning curve for the brigade XO and the battle staff begins a steady climb, the brigade OR rate heads in the other direction.

1. Right at the time when the orders process has a chance to jell, the brigade XO is pulled out and sent to the BSA to become an overgrown BMO.

2. The battle staff, now under control of the S3, drops all concepts of integration and logistical synchronization.

3. The commander, feeling the pressure of maintenance, increased tempo of the rotation, and the lack of a chief-of-staff, turns off any growth in the orders process and conducts self preservation. The commander says, "No new ideas on how to do orders. We do just what we trained at Home Station -- S3 get me an order out as fast as possible -- We will work the details at the rehearsal."

4. The XO is now living in the BSA. Whatever growth the maintenance management system has been through over the last few days is terminated. The XO says, "No new ideas on how we do maintenance. We do just what we trained at Home Station -- Task force XOs, give me your deadline report; we are going to start cross leveling, circle-xing, and scrounging parts."

Learning the orders process.
Developing and training a maintenance system that works.
Using the XO as the executive officer to the commander and performing his chief-of-staff function.

5. The XO is depicted as the commander's personal troubleshooter. He is in the way as a player in the orders process and best kept at the BSA.

PROBLEM 2-18: Task forces often rush mission analysis, not giving the S2 time to complete his products.

PROBLEM 2-19: FSB XOs do not fully understand or properly implement the MDMP.

1. Many FSB XOs are not aware that there are three methods of the MDMP, based on available planning time.

2. They have difficulty with the orders process because they do not fully understand the components of that process; the least understood area is the estimate of the situation.

3. Mission analysis is not conducted properly.

4. COA development and COA analysis is not conducted properly.