Military

PROBLEM 1-2: Task force staffs/command posts fail to effectively battle track during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of missions. Tactical operations centers (TOCs) usually maintain two battle tracking boards/maps -- the S2's and the S3's. Both boards usually have an assortment of information posted but fail in tracking all enemy and friendly forces in the area of operations (AO).

PROBLEM 1-3: (Repeat of Problem 1-1) Poor battle tracking in the tactical operation center (TOC) interferes with the S2's ability to conduct event analysis and predictive analysis. Information received in the TOC during battle is not integrated and then routinely disseminated. S2s too often fail to develop adequate section SOPs spelling out section members' responsibilities and specifying operating procedures during combat operations.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-4: Most command posts fight the battle in an inadequate tactical operation center (TOC) configuration, with each staff section fighting the battle from inside its own M577. There is no adequate plan to share information with other staff elements.

PROBLEM 1-5: The main command post (CP) is not able to analyze information they receive to provide the commander with a picture of what the enemy will do and make recommendations of what actions should be taken.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-6: (Repeat of Problem 1-5) The main command post (CP) often appears more concerned with reporting to higher headquarters than with tracking the battle and predictive analysis for the commander. The main CP does not consistently analyze information received, provide the commander with an estimate of what the enemy will do next, or recommend future friendly actions.

PROBLEM 1-7: The combat trains command post (CTCP) personnel are not cross-trained to duties such as battle tracking, map posting, combat strength analysis, and situation updates.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-8: Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) signal battalion planning and control elements and their companies often lack adequate awareness of the tactical situation within their supported unit's area of operations. Divisional signal battalions provide area communications to the maneuver brigades and other divisional elements. Communications assets are distributed throughout the division area and into the brigade sectors. MSE systems planning for future operations and the successful execution of current operations requires that the MSE unit be aware of the supported unit's mission, intent, scheme of maneuver, and possible contingencies.

PROBLEM 1-9: Battle tracking in the brigade CP fails to provide the commander the required information before, during, and after the battle to make timely, efficient, and effective decisions.

Brigades are weak in battle tracking of combat power two levels down. The brigade believes that by tracking the task force combat power (one level down) they can stay abreast of the situation enough to monitor the battle. In order for the main CP to become a proactive participant in the fight, it must know what is happening at the co/tm level (two levels down). Additionally, the fighting of the deep fight, not in terms of distance but time, requires the co/tm details.

PROBLEM 1-10: (Repeat of Problem 1-2) Task force staffs and command posts continually fail to effectively battle track during plan, prepare, and execute phases of the mission.

1. The tactical operations center (TOC) does not proactively track the status of the task force during all phases of the mission. The TOC should track:

• Company/team troop leading procedures (critical tasks only).
• All friendly unit locations/activity in their area of interest.
• Front line of own troops (FLOT) down to platoon or section level.
• Combat power (vehicles and ability to adequately man those vehicles).
• Collecting, consolidating/distributing subordinate unit fire plans.
• Task organization completeness.
• Adherence to task force timeline and task force critical tasks.

2. The TOC usually maintains two separate battle tracking boards/maps -- the S2's and the S3's. Both have an assortment of information posted but fail to adequately track all enemy and friendly forces in the area of operations (AO).

PROBLEM 1-11:

1. Aviation units in support of a division poorly track friendly and enemy situations in just one brigade sector. Aviation battalions will support operations throughout a division's or corps' sector/zone.

2. Field manuals reflect static flow, not a dynamic battlefield.

PROBLEM 1-12: Medical company commanders do not have the necessary situational awareness, both tactically and technically, to command the brigade's medical resources.

1. Medical company commanders often do not know what their CP's responsibilities are.

2. Many medical command posts are nothing more than a soldier on radio watch.

PROBLEM 1-13: In almost every case of indirect fire fratricide at task force and company levels, the observers failed to plot no-fire areas (NFAs) or update the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on their maps.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-14:

1. Most TA teams and analysis control teams (ACTs) are unable to share a common picture of events on the battlefield. This lack of situational awareness makes it difficult for the TA team to keep their subordinate electronic warfare teams informed and synchronized with operations.

2. The TA team misses triggers for planned electronic attack missions and fails to trigger electronic support (ES) operations to answer PIRs. This condition is more pronounced in ACTs that are unsure of their role and responsibilities vice the TA team.

PROBLEM 1-15: Military Police (MP) teams are victims of an excessive number of near fratricide situations. MP teams are encountering near fratricide situations involving MP contact with other brigade combat team (BCT) units and even MP internal situations. These encounters normally occur during low-visibility conditions and are a direct result of poor information dissemination during orders issue and information updates.

PROBLEM 1-16: (Repeat of Problem 1-9) Battle tracking in the brigade command post too often fails to function in terms of how they perform actions, make decisions, and provide recommendations to the commander.

Brigades are weak in battle tracking of combat power two levels down. The brigade believes that by tracking the task force combat power (one level down) they can stay abreast of the situation enough to monitor the battle. In order for the main CP to become a proactive participant in the fight, it must know what is happening at the company/team level (two levels down). Additionally, the fighting of the deep fight, not in terms of distance but time, requires the company/team details.

PROBLEM 1-17:

1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively battle track during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

2. TF TOCs setup during the plan and prep for combat do not have a central nerve cell or an established tracking system to ensure critical tasks, events, or information are tracked.

PROBLEM 1-18: (Repeat of Problem 1-12) Medical company commanders do not have the necessary situational awareness, both tactically and technically, to command the brigade's medical resources.

1. Medical company commanders often do not know what their CP's responsibilities are.

2. Many medical command posts are nothing more than a soldier on radio watch.

PROBLEM 1-19: (Repeat of Problem 1-13) In almost every case of indirect fire fratricide at task force and company levels, the observers failed to plot no-fire areas (NFAs) or update the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on their maps.

PROBLEM 1-20: The main CP is often not able to provide the TF commander with a predictive analysis during the fight. The main CP does not consistently:

1. Analyze information received.

2. Provide the commander with an estimate of what the enemy will do next.

3. Recommend future friendly actions.

Techniques

1. Task force TOC battle tracking.

1. Develop and exercise a task force (TF) SOP at Home Station to ensure information dissemination system functions properly, including a means of verifying receipt of information by various battle staff members. Implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), which contains excellent techniques and procedures covering the full spectrum of TOC operations as well as an example TOC exercise. Effective battle tracking begins with the establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis and the development of CCIR that must be tracked.

2. The chief of staff must identify what information to track, establish how it will be tracked, and monitor his staff sections. The commander should be able to go to one source inside the TOC and quickly visualize the status of his TF in preparation for combat operations.

3. One battle tracking board/map in the TOC is the standard. Appoint one battle captain to update the main battle board/map. All battle staff officers provide input to the battle captain.

4. The TOC should track at least the following information:

   • Company/team troop-leading procedures (critical tasks only).
   • All friendly unit locations/activity within the AOI.
   • FLOT, down to platoon level, or section level for scouts.
   • Combat power, both vehicles and the manning capability.
   • Collection, consolidation, and distribution of subordinate unit fire plans.
   • Timeline.
   • TF critical tasks list identified prior to or during the planning process.

5. The S2 must develop an adequate section SOP that spells out section members' responsibilities and specifies operating procedures during combat operations. The S2 section SOP should, at a minimum, address the following:

   • SPOTREP logging procedures
   • SITEMP refinement procedures
   • Individual section responsibilities

6. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) personnel need to be trained and competent in battle tracking skills in the event they must serve as an alternate tactical operations center (TOC).

2. Brigade main CP battle tracking.

1. The brigade main CP must know the situation at the front

   • Who is in contact
   • How much combat power remains
   • Status of ammunition
   • Who needs to come out of the fight to refuel, etc.
   • Who gets priority of fires
   • Where to commit the reserve
   • Where to put CAS
   • What critical CSS assets need to be moving and where

2. FM 71-3 identifies 11 tasks for the brigade main CP to perform. Seven of these require detailed levels of information.

   • Assist the brigade and task force commanders.
   • Plan future operations.
   • Coordinate operations throughout the depth of the AO.
   • Synchronize CS and CSS assets.
   • Monitor the close fight.
   • Maintain continuous operations for extended periods.
   • Assume command and control if the TAC is destroyed.

3. The building and tracking of combat power must be a unit's SOP for training as well as for deployment.

4. JANIS exercises must stress brigade main CP to track this level of detail and demand that they become an active player in employment of CAS, artillery, reserve forces, to include tracking and informing the commander of impending decision points, critical friendly and enemy events, and the movement and priority of CS and CSS support throughout the brigade sector.

5. Brigade mains need standard tracking charts and SOP reports that include subordinate leaders using proper spot reports, commander SITREPs, BDA, and current combat power. With an established SOP for use of the command and O/I frequencies, this level of information can be passed quickly without tying up the nets during the fight.

6. Predictive analysis. At the main CP, the battle staff XO, S2, S3, S3 Air, and FSE need to track the battle at the map board and "think one step ahead of friendly/enemy forces." Battle staff regularly provides the commander with predictive analysis products and recommendation(s) based upon the event matrix, updated SITEMP, and decision support matrix. Delegate routine administrative duties to others in their sections as much as possible. Eliminate unnecessary functions from their sections and even the CP itself.

3. Fire support battle tracking. Ensure that accurate battle tracking is maintained before and during the battle.

1. Implement an all-station net call prior to execution to exchange information and verify NFAs.

2. During the battle, company/team fire support teams (FISTs) need to come up on the net to update the FSO so everyone else can hear what is going on and track unit locations.

4. Military Police battle tracking. Platoon leaders must provide detailed information to subordinates on friendly unit locations.

1. MP squad and team leaders must seek information and report unit locations/movements when conducting patrol operations.

2. Train these techniques to standard at Home Station to increase situational awareness and improve force protection:

   • Ensure subordinate leaders maintain updated graphics on overlays.

   • Ensure that MP teams are aware of all missions that the platoon is conducting.

   • Follow/establish far and near recognition (commo, visual) signals to be used when approaching units.

   • When appropriate, use established challenging procedures.

   • Establish engagement criteria for hostile situations.

   • Know the air defense warning and weapons control status.

   • Ensure soldiers are trained on threat vehicle and aircraft recognition.

   • When feasible, use pre-announcement procedures when making contact with units.

5. Signal units battle tracking. Signal units must employ S2 or S3 personnel to maintain close contact with brigade and division intelligence and operations cells in order to receive periodic situational updates.

1. Maneuver force's command or O/I nets should be monitored.

2. A current operations map should be maintained at the signal battalion and company command posts which depicts the

   • Maneuver plan
   • Disposition of friendly and enemy forces
   • Projected communications asset movements

6. Electronic warfare team battle tracking. The ACT and the TA team need to get together and develop a thorough SOP that clearly identifies roles and responsibilities of each element.

1. Identify what type of information the TA team requires and how often information is required to keep EW teams adequately informed.

2. Use a battle tracking checklist as a guide in this process.

3. Include the exchange of battle tracking information as part of staff battle drills in CPXs at Home Station. This will require that the TA team participate in exercises with the ACT and the brigade that it supports at Home Station.

7. Medical company battle tracking. The medical company commander should develop a system to capture the critical information that needs to be available to him regularly.

1. The information to track may include:

   • Maintenance status of the company's vehicles and those of supported units.

   • Critical medical equipment readiness.

   • On-hand balance of critical Class VIII items for the company and for supported units.

   • Status of critical general supplies and orders for supplies that are due in.

   • Current tactical situation.

2. Place the information on boards that are hung along the walls of the CP to facilitate quick visual reference.

3. Tracking the medical company's resources and the tactical situation are essential for situational awareness and accurate decisions on the placement of medical assets in the brigade area.

8. Aviation unit battle tracking. Include examples in aviation FMs on the art and science of battle tracking. What information is required up front, prior to launch, and during execution.

TA.7 Combat Service Support, Part VI

TA.4 Command and Control, Part II