Military

PROBLEM 5-5: Units tend to have inadequate religious support for rear elements; i.e., the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) and the hospital. Units deploying to combat training centers do not configure their unit ministry teams (UMTs) IAW FM 16-1 and, therefore, are not able to support all elements of the battlefield.

PROBLEM 5-6: Unit ministry teams (UMTs) often do not understand their role

• In reception, staging, onward movement, integration (RSOI) operations
• During Other than Military Operations (OMO)
• When relating to civilians on the battlefield
• When advising the commander
• When dealing with the media

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 5-7:

1. Brigade level chaplain assistants do not understand the breadth and depth of their position as manager of the unit ministry team. Most have a current operations mentality when it comes to assisting the chaplain.

2. Brigade level chaplain assistants are not skilled in battle tracking, safety/risk assessment, and implementation of the religious support plan.

PROBLEM 5-8: Unit ministry teams are frequently unable to communicate with subordinate unit ministry teams on the battlefield.

1. Unit ministry teams are often unskilled in the area of radio communications.

2. Their methods for communicating in the field are often untested prior to deployments.

3. They lack depth in "battle drills" for alternative types of communication.

4. Most unit ministry teams know the basics of radio communication but lack any fall back plans if their "Plan A" does not work.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 5-9: Chaplain assistants are not often employed to the fullest extent possible.

1. The work of the chaplain assistant covers a broad range of tasks in security, logistics, administration and, in lieu of the chaplain, ministry. Chaplain assistants frequently receive inadequate guidance from chaplains and are, therefore, limited in the scope of their activities.

2. Unit ministry team (UMT) battle drills seldom occur, limiting the effectiveness of a chaplain assistant.

3. UMTs often arrive at the NTC with religious support plans that are not tailored specifically for current missions. This forces both chaplain and assistant to play "catch up" rather than allowing them to immediately get into the mission planning process.

PROBLEM 5-10: Brigade level unit ministry teams are not well integrated into the orders process.

1. Chaplains and chaplain assistants are frequently left out of the planning cycle. This is due to an inadequate understanding of the orders process as a continuous cycle that involves the integration of simultaneous staff activities towards focusing of combat power on the decisive point.

2. Chaplains do not effectively integrate religious support input into the warning order/staff estimate/OPORD annex process.

3. Unit ministry teams (UMTs) frequently do not brief at maneuver or CSS rehearsal and do not get a religious support annex into the OPORD.

PROBLEM 5-11: Brigade unit ministry teams (UMTs) do not fully coordinate with medical casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planners for coverage of wounded soldiers.

1. Often the relationship between the brigade combat team (BCT) UMT, forward support battalion (FSB) UMT, and CASEVAC planners is not well defined or developed. These groups are critical in coordinating religious support to wounded soldiers.

2. BCT UMTs do not take the time to fully understand the overall concept for medical support.

3. The FSB chaplain is usually not consulted as the religious support plan for casualties is developed, resulting in a uncoordinated integrated plan of execution.

4. CASEVAC planners do not appreciate the dimension that UMTs bring when they work with medical assets to bring religious support to casualties.

Techniques

1. Regular participation in unit field training will go far in integrating chaplains into the warfighting aspect of unit life. Inclusion of chaplains as key staff members involved in unit training and preparation for deployment will help integrate chaplaincy functions and result in the elimination of many or all problems.

2. Battle drills help UMTs organize specific tasks into logical sequences that utilize time and resources wisely.

1. Chaplains must assist their chaplain assistants by providing them with clear and regular guidance.

2. Chaplains and assistants must be conversant with their supported units' METL. Periodic and pre-deployment review of the METL will assist the chaplain in formulating guidance for the chaplain assistant. The chaplain assistant then can be empowered to develop battle drills (or UMT drills) which will assist both chaplain and assistant in providing comprehensive ministry to their supported unit.

3. Chaplain and assistant represent a "duet," not two soloists. Regular guidance from the chaplain must include an overall vision (which will reflect the commander's intent for a given mission) which is communicated to the chaplain assistant. The chaplain and assistant should review the guidance together to ensure that both understand it.

3. Chaplains and assistants should develop "battle drills" for the employment of basic communication techniques in the field. These drills must include fall-back plans and be practiced to perfection at Home Station.

4. Supervisory chaplains need to be involved in the training of subordinate unit ministry teams. Use the information given in the previous version of FM 16-1 (prior to the 1995 rewrite).

5. Chaplain assistants, at all levels, must be made aware of both current and future operations. They also must be able to battle track.

1. While doctrinal lists may be helpful in broadening a chaplain assistant's perspective, it would be better to utilize monthly training opportunities at Home Station to develop programs whereby chaplain assistants can learn to better assist the chaplain.

2. Provide training for the chaplain assistant consistent with FM 16-1, which states ". . . The chaplain assistant is a combatant, carries a weapon, and is essential for the survival of the team on the battlefield."

6. Chaplains need to involve themselves in the TDMP process in their role as a contributing staff officer. This will enhance their tactical and warfighting visibility within the command. The increased visibility and credibility should generate more and adequate support from the command. When division chaplains were actively involved in supporting the activities of subordinate chaplains, the entire unit ministry team (UMT) process functioned more efficiently and effectively.

7. UMTs must think seriously about how religious support impacts on a given mission. This will focus them as they get involved in the staff estimate process.

1. Dramatically increase the cross-talk between UMTs and S2/S3 sections. If chaplains and assistants are more aggressive in providing input into the estimate process, then the religious support annex will take on an important dimension in the overall OPORD. With religious support included in the OPORD, chaplains and assistants would have something of substance to brief at a CSS rehearsal.

2. It is imperative for both chaplain and chaplain assistant to rehearse their involvement in these processes during train-ups for CTC rotations or other deployments.

3. Plan for the chaplain to attend LTP. If LTP attendance is not possible, chaplains and assistants can review all of the LTP material at Home Station and gain a comprehensive understanding of the types of missions and religious support challenges they might encounter.

8. Chaplains and assistants must coordinate early on with medical planners to ensure everyone fully understands the medical concept of support.

1. UMTs must find ways to integrate into the medical evacuation team so that when UMT members are not around, for instance, they are missed.

2. The BCT UMT should enlist the support of the FSB chaplain. The FSB chaplain has the habitual relationship with the medical assets and can provide the BCT UMT with valuable information on the concepts and personalities that are present in the FSB medical evacuation section.

3. UMTs should be conversant with MEDEVAC doctrine and its employment on the battlefield.

9. FM 16-1 should be expanded into three FMs:

• FM 16-1-1, dealing with religious support at the battalion level.

• FM 16-1-2, dealing with religious support at brigade and regimental level.

• FM 16-1-3, religious support at the division, installation and above level.

TA.7 Negative Trend 6: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-1: Casualty evacuation of Stinger teams proves to be a serious problem, particularly during offensive operations. Air defense officers tend to want to evacuate the Stinger teams through the company/team to which they were attached. Too often, however, poor planning and coordination hinder evacuation efforts.

2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-2: (Repeat of Problem 6-1) Casualty evacuation of Stinger teams is particularly a problem during offensive operations. Many air defense officers intend to evacuate Stinger teams through the company/team or troop they are supporting. Often poor planning and coordination result in less than satisfactory CASEVAC for the Stinger teams.

PROBLEM 6-3: Signal units (Retrans, RAU, and relay teams) tend to be among the most forward deployed assets. They also have the highest died of wounds (DOW) rate.

PROBLEM 6-4: The engineer battalion's CASEVAC process suffers from a lack of organic medical assets as well as a lack of engineer CASEVAC integration into the task force CASEVAC plan. The died of wounds (DOW) rate for units has increased because engineer companies do not understand the workings of the task force BAS, the AXPs, and not knowing where to evacuate patients. An increasing number of wounded soldiers are being incorrectly evacuated directly to C/MED in the FSB because that is what is trained at Home Station.

PROBLEM 6-5: The forward evacuation of scout platoon casualties is normally not considered during the task force planning process. When evacuation is required, the lack of planning results in additional DOWs.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 6-6: There is inadequate casualty evacuation planning at brigade, task force, and company/team level. This includes combat service elements as well. The assets necessary to execute CASEVAC are too often not correctly positioned for timely execution. It is apparent that too many units are inadequately trained in CASEVAC procedures, to include self/buddy aid.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-7: Many units do not know what to do with their chemical casualties and KIAs. During evacuation numerous field litter ambulances (FLA) are needlessly contaminated. Casualties are brought to the decon site or to the clean main aid station/forward aid station (MAS/FAS).

PROBLEM 6-8: Units, specifically the logistics planners, do not sufficiently plan for air casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) assets when they have them available.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 6-9: Maneuver units consistently evacuate their contaminated killed in action (KIA) casualties to clean collection points instead of the designated collection point for contaminated casualties.

Techniques

1. CASEVAC planning is primarily a brigade issue because that is where the assets exist to adequately treat the casualties a task force is likely to sustain. The battalion/task force staff must, through the estimate process, articulate the necessity to push brigade medical assets forward.

2. CASEVAC must be considered as part of the tactical decision-making process (TDMP) by the integrated battle staff. The responsibility for casualty evacuation lies with the S1 and operations officer for planning, and unit 1SGs and the medical platoon for execution. The S1 must do a casualty estimate, including where the casualties will occur and in what numbers. The medical officer should then link medical assets available with the units projected to suffer casualties. (Usually, the medical assets available fall short of the requirements to adequately treat projected casualties. Two aid stations in a battalion/task force are almost always inadequate to support a task force's combat missions. Experience shows that 15 to 20 casualties in one hour overwhelms the treatment capabilities of an aid station, which doctrinally constitutes a MASCAL situation.)

3. Full utilization of available air assets in CASEVAC would significantly reduce a unit's DOW rates. Air evacuation needs to be planned in detail. Areas that need to be addressed are:

• A clear task and purpose
• Enemy ADA threat
• Priority to specific unit and type of casualty
• Pickup zone (PZ) location and set-up responsibilities
• Where the casualties should be evacuated

To help ensure their proper utilization, the aviation LNO or the pilot-in-charge should be available during the planning process.

4. Medical evacuation personnel, both ground and air, must be trained to stay aware of the tactical situation. This will assist in locating evacuation assets where they can best quickly respond for immediate support.

5. Take the time at Home Station to qualify as many soldiers as possible as combat lifesavers.

6. Leaders should check certified aid bags and/or multiple first aid kits as part of pre-combat inspection.

7. Stinger team evacuation in offensive operations works best when the Stinger platoon sergeant travels with the main effort with a dedicated vehicle and personnel and then moves where needed to assist in the evacuation effort.

8. Signal unit remote teams need at least one combat lifesaver qualified soldier. PCIs for the teams should include a certified aid bag or multiple first aid kits. Leaders should wargame solutions for the most exposed systems and pre-position vehicles to support CASEVAC.

9. The engineer battalion staff must provide FRAGOs to the companies on any changes to the brigade combat health support plan based on brigade FRAGOs and/or changes resulting from any CSS rehearsals.

10. Scout platoon evacuation planning must be integral in the task force planning process for any combat operation. Assets must be available to conduct the evacuation as required.

11. For chemical casualties, train medics and company personnel to minimize the spread of contamination of field litter ambulances (FLAs) and clean medical facilities. Train patient decon procedures IAW FM 3-5. Identify clean and dirty FAS/MAS in OPORD and reiterate at rehearsals. Ensure unit leaders are briefed on the designated collection point for NBC casualties.

TA.7 Combat Service Support, Part V

TA.4 Command and Control