SECTION
N
NEEDS EMPHASIS (cont)
TA.1 MANEUVER (cont)
TA.1 Negative Trend 5: Graphic control measures
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 5-1: The organization of the battlefield, or battlefield geometry, often lacks sufficient detail to organize the combined effects of a brigade formation.
1. Graphic control measures selected are not facilitating the control necessary for tactical execution.
2. Many leaders and staff planners are not fluent in the use of graphic control measures to enhance control.
3. There is an overriding desire to allow subordinate units flexibility in execution.
4. The lack of graphic control measures does not allow subordinate units to fight in relation to one another and they rarely achieve mass.
5. When control measures are used, many units are not abiding by the doctrinal definition or intent of the graphic and choose to ignore them.
6. The framework of the battlefield is not understood or enforced.
7. Use of checkpoints, contact points, coordinating points, and boundaries are often inappropriate because of a lack of understanding.
8. Graphic control measures, once applied to the operations overlay, are specified tactical tasks. The units do not understand or follow them.
9. Currently, commanders at all levels are allowed to invent or reinvent their own terms and graphics that are often inconsistent with doctrine. The ultimate goal is the flexibility of the combat formation, not individual commanders.
3-4QFY96
PROBLEM 5-2: Brigade schemes of maneuver lack sufficient graphic control measures to provide flexibility during execution.
1. The brigade planning process often fails to provide required graphic control measures for specified tasks (e.g., passage of lines, movement routes/axes, air corridors).
2. Control measures for the shift from the deep fight to the close fight are often not well defined.
3. Reserves, when designated, are often provided the brigade base plan graphics with unclear control measures for commitment. Reserves almost always do not have consolidated graphics.
4. Graphic control measures beyond the objective are often omitted, prohibiting forces to quickly transition.
5. Control measures to protect the force and coordinate the flow of forces from the front to rear are often omitted or done "push-to-talk" during execution.
6. Units designate checkpoints throughout the area of operation, but rarely use them to assist in controlling the force.
1-2QFY97
PROBLEM 5-3: (Repeat of Problem 5-2) Brigade and task force (TF) schemes of maneuver often lack sufficient graphic control measures and detail for coordinating and integrating maneuver to mass firepower.
1. Brigade and TF plans for actions on contact, actions on the objective, and expanding the unit's battle space beyond its initial objective are routinely not developed.
2. The planning process often fails to address required graphic control measures for specified tasks (e.g., passage of lines, direct fire control measures, movement routes/axes, air corridors).
3. Control measures for the shift from the deep fight to the close fight are not well defined.
4. Graphic control measures beyond the objective are often omitted, prohibiting forces to quickly transition.
5. Control measures to protect the force and coordinate the flow of forces from the front to rear are often omitted or done "push-to-talk" during execution.
6. Units designate checkpoints throughout the area of operation, but rarely use them to assist in controlling the force.
7. Brigade SOPs are often not used or are so cumbersome that they play little part in providing the details and control measures required for certain specified tasks in the planning process.
8. Brigade course of action (COA) development and wargaming often stops at the objective; they do little to no "action on the objective" development to assist or define the fight to ensure the commander's intent is met.
9. The detailed planning required to transition forces or commit follow-on forces through and beyond the objective is not well rehearsed or synchronized.
Techniques
1. Use FM-101-5-1 as the prescriptive doctrinal manual for ensuring clarity of our tactical orders through a common language and a common set of operational graphics.
2. Brigade staffs must address all specified tasks and develop the graphic control measures for each task.
3. Staffs should look at implied tasks and plan the control measures necessary to commit follow-on forces.
4. Control measures should be in sufficient detail to meet the commander's intent. They must provide subordinate commanders the tools necessary to protect the force and transition to the close fight and expand the battle space through and beyond the objective.
5. Review of doctrinal terms and graphics control measures by staffs during Home Station training will provide a clear understanding of their meaning and how they affect each BOS. They must provide subordinate commanders the tools necessary to protect the force and transition to the close fight.
6. Units must develop SOPs that facilitate unit actions and be disciplined in using them.
TA.1 Negative Trend 6: Boresighting
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
1-2QFY95
PROBLEM 6-1: MILES boresight and zero during assembly area procedures are routinely conducted, but not to standard. The subsequent inability of BLUFOR to hit with MILES is not necessarily indicative of their gunnery skills, but more likely indicative of a lack of understanding of the MILES system.
3-4QFY96
PROBLEM 6-2: (CSM trend) Maneuver units often fail to boresight their weapon systems before moving to a tactical position.
Techniques
1. Make MILES gunnery a priority during pre-rotation training. In addition to applicable TMs, refer to CALL Handbook 94-5, The Multiple-Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) Combat Review. This reference will assist crew members with techniques and procedures relevant to all aspects of MILES borseight and gunnery.
2. Success against OPFOR depends on correct boresight. Confirm boresight daily.
TA.1 Negative Trend 7: Aviation integration into scheme of maneuver
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
1-2QFY95
PROBLEM 7-1: Most of the time, aviation units do not obtain obstacles and fire plans from the ground brigade.
3-4QFY96
PROBLEM 7-2: Aviation units properly manage their fighter management programs but fail to integrate aviation planning with supported maneuver units. Aviation fighting assets are a critical part of force protection designed to ensure both units and individuals can maximize their combat potential. Units too often fail to integrate aviation assets into their scheme of maneuver for critical periods which require massing of all combat power.
Techniques
1. Aviation units can optimize their air routes and engagement area planning by using obstacles and fire plans developed by the ground task force.
2. Units must identify critical events in the battle and integrate aviation planning to ensure aviation is available to augment their scheme of maneuver.
3. Include examples of integrating aviation planning cycles with supported unit's decision making process in FM-101-5 and other applicable FMs.
TA.1 Negative Trend 8: Actions on the objective
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 8-1: Company/team commanders are not sufficiently planning actions on the objective. The major emphasis of company/team commander planning goes into the move from the assembly area to the final objective.
3-4QFY96
PROBLEM 8-2: Task forces continue to show a weakness in actions on the objective. Units rarely plan or rehearse actions on the objective.
Techniques
1. Use reverse planning from actions on the objective as described in FM 71-2, pg 2-23. Reverse planning from actions on the objective is an excellent method for enhancing synchronization of the attack. It serves to clarify the commander's intent and to prevent over-emphasis on movement.
2. Units must continue planning through the assault.
3. Rehearse actions on the objective.
TA.1
Maneuver, Part II
TA.2
Fire Support
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