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Military

SECTION N

NEEDS EMPHASIS (cont)


TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT

TA.2 Negative Trend 1: Jump TOC operations

Observation frequency:1-2QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY963-4QFY961-2QFY97
12110

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: Regardless of whether TACFIRE moves with the Jump TOC or TOC main body, once the shelter or FDO releases control of battalion fires, the Jump FDC or controlling platoon FDC does not have the required information to control and mass fires.

RESULT: The piecemealing of artillery with reduced effects on targets and delays in the delivery of fires.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-2: (Repeat of Problem 1-1) There is a significant degradation in the field artillery battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires when the battalion conducts Jump TOC operations during combat operations.

1. Once the FDC or the FDO releases control of battalion fires, the Jump FDC or the controlling platoon FDC do not have the required information or precise procedures to control and mass fires.

2. The problems controlling and massing fires occurs whether the battalion FDC moves with the Jump TOC or the TOC main body.

3. The FDC does not have the personnel or equipment to maintain both a fully digital and manual back-up system.

RESULTS:

1. Artillery is piecemealed.
2. Reduced effects on targets.
3. Delays in the delivery of fires.

PROBLEM 1-3: TOCs are still ill-prepared to conduct jump operations.

1. There are no standard packages or procedures on J-TOC operations and hand-off between the main TOC and J-TOC.

2. There are no formal procedures nor supplies to support jump TOC operations.

RESULT: The intelligence, battle tracking, reporting, and tactical fire control efforts all suffer.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-4: Most artillery units do not plan in detail to control fires while the field artillery (FA) battalion TOC moves.

1. Efforts to use the single station IFSAS-equipped vehicle as the jump TOC (J-TOC) hamper efficient fires due to poor information transfer.

2. Some units transferring to mutually supporting units (MSU) simply tell the other unit to take over their guns and then relinquish control without also transferring information.

RESULTS:

1. Significant degradation in FA battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires when battalion performs J-TOC operations during combat operations.

2. The transition between MSU is often awkward and causes animosity between the two units.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-5: TOCs are either reluctant to move or move too often during the course of a battle.

1. There is often little or no deliberate planning for when and how the TOC moves to maintain its ability to coordinate and synchronize operations during execution.

2. Split section TOC operations are not very well understood or executed in most TOCs.

RESULT: The TOC is often on the move or out of contact during critical points in the battle.

Techniques

1. If the battalion selects or is forced to use Jump TOC FDC, the availability of the below listed tools will facilitate the successful Jump FDC take-over of operations. NOTE: Even with these tools available, the Jump FDC operation must be carefully planned and prepared. The Jump TOC operation must be trained at Home Station prior to deployment.

Tools to have on hand:
  • Current written fire order standard: Established prior to the operation and disseminated to the platoon FDCs, this establishes and streamlines voice order procedures.

  • Written attack guidance: Establishes the volume of fire necessary to achieve the desired effects on a target.

  • High Payoff Target List: This helps determine the order in which targets are attacked. The HPTL is critical when several fire missions are requested at once or fire missions start to get backed up.

  • Current ammunition count: The Jump FDC must know the ammunition count by battery or platoon, particularly for ammunition critical to a given mission. EXAMPLE: For defensive operations it is more critical to track DPICM, RAP, FASCAM, Copperhead, red bag and white bag powders. For offensive operations: DPICM HE, smoke, red bag and white bag. For night operations: add illumination.

  • Written/Printed Target List: This includes refined targets and known point, if established.

  • Current SITMAP: The FA battalion S3 should have a back-up map for jump operations. The map should have all maneuver graphics and targets posted. Prior to executing a jump operation, the map should be updated with firing unit location, fire support coordination measures, FLOT, and observer locations. A range protractor should be available to add and update range limitations.

  • Fire Support Execution Matrix: The FDO is often required to develop his own matrix based on the addition of the task force's scheme of fires. If the battalion passes control to a platoon FDC, that element must have the same or similar tool as well as an understanding of the overall scheme of fires.

  • TC 6-40: This is the most important manual for use in the Jump FDC: for computation of smoke and FASCAM data. Although the platoon FDC could require a platoon FDC to determine this data, it may not always be possible or desirable.

NOTE: The Jump FDC can only control battalion fires for a limited period of time. The longer the Jump FDC is required to control fires, the more tools will be needed to perform the mission.

2. For the transfer of gun control, develop a checklist of steps and information that must be transferred to the new controlling element. Establish a clear endstate for transfer of control.

3. In the MSU technique, the subordinate unit must use the same checklist as the transferring unit.

4. Establish TTPs for each of the critical functions of the J-TOC:

  • Intelligence hand-off
  • Battle tracking
  • Analyzing combat information (maneuver/radar acquisition)
  • Producing combat intel and reporting

5. Resource the J-TOC:

  • Map board with map which mirrors that of TOC
  • S2 charts similar to those in TOC S2 Main
  • Event/situation templates on map board
  • Create J-TOC log/folder with copies of last INTSUM and RAG/DAG locations
  • J-TOC with radio nets which mirror those in TOC
  • Box with required office supplies.

6. Develop J-TOC battle drills:

  • Duties and responsibilities
  • Information exchange and update procedures with TOC
  • Pre-command checks (PCCs) of vehicles and equipment
  • Procedures for transfer of control and/or command

7. TOCs must consistently rehearse split TOC operations to ensure the ability to function fully while displacing on the battlefield. TOC moves should be rehearsed until each person knows his function and can execute in the least amount of time possible.

8. TOCs must thoroughly plan, based on METT-T, when to move during a battle to ensure they can maintain contact and control at all critical junctures.

9. Unit SOPs must include procedures for split TOC operations which ensure all BOS remain covered and synchronization/coordination between sections is maintained.

10. TOC operations manuals, or sections in FMs, must include TTP for moving TOCs and planning TTP that will assist leaders in developing viable movement plans.


TA.2 Negative Trend 2: Triggers versus target location

Observation frequency:1-2QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY963-4QFY961-2QFY97
21011

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: During defensive operations, task forces emplace triggers for targets that do not work because the time/distance factors are incorrect.

PROBLEM 2-2: (Repeat of Problems 2-1) During defensive operations, the primary observer for each target orders the firing of each target as the enemy crosses the trigger. However, this distance does not correspond to the enemy's movement rate plus time of flight.

RESULT: The enemy is not engaged by indirect fire when crossing the target area.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-3: Personnel do not understand the various techniques for establishing triggers and the advantages of each.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-4: Fire support officers (FSOs) do not clearly define task and purpose for targets.

1. Task force FSOs usually do not adequately define what the task and purpose is for each task force target.

2. During the wargame, the FSO does not require the S3 to clearly state the intent for each target.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-5: (Repeat of Problem 2-4) Fire support officers (FSOs) do not clearly define task and purpose for targets.

1. Task force FSOs usually do not adequately define what the task and purpose is for each task force target.

2. During the wargame, the FSO does not require the S3 to clearly state the intent for each target.

Techniques

1. This technique is for use by ground maneuver leaders to see if triggers are in the "ballpark."

(NOTE: Certain factors can impact the effectiveness of the following technique. The examples used assume having priority of fires and that when the call is made to fire the target, the guns are not displacing or engaged in firing counter-battery, etc. This technique is solely designed as a check for ground maneuver leaders and fire supporters to use during planning and preparation for combat operations.)

Given: 1) a target (fixed ground location), 2) a rate of enemy movement and 3) fixed gun locations.

Problem: Determine a point on the ground, or trigger, that when reached by the enemy formation, triggers the observer to initiate the call to fire the target which will result in the round impacting on the enemy formation when it is in the target area.

Solution:

First, you must solve for time. You want the time it takes the enemy to move from the trigger to the target area to equal the time it takes for Time of Flight (TOF) of the rounds plus the mission processing time or transmission time (TT).

Next, you must convert that time to distance so you can establish a point on the ground to serve as your trigger.

Step 1: TOF + TT = T1, where TOF is time of flight (a fixed time), and TT is transmission time (a time with a slight variable). Express T1 as a % of 60 minutes; i.e., 9 minutes = .15 hours.

Step 2: D (distance) = T1 x R, where T1 = TOF + TT, and R = expected enemy rate of movement.

Example: assume TOF + TT = 9 min. or .15 hours, and R = 20 kmph.

D = .15 x 20
D = 3 km

Therefore, your trigger would be a distance of 3 km from the target area.

What if there is no point on the ground 3 km from the target that is easily or reliably identifiable by an observer? It is preferable to use an easily identifiable natural terrain feature.

Problem: Given a trigger 3 km from the target area and a natural terrain feature an additional 2 km from the trigger, how can you use the natural terrain feature as the trigger?

Solution: Now you calculate T2, or the time it would take the enemy to move from the natural terrain feature to you previously calculated trigger.

Example: T2 = D/R

T2 = 2km/20kmph
T2 = .10 hour
T2 = 6 minutes

Therefore, when the enemy formation gets to the natural terrain feature, you clock 6 minutes. At that point the enemy has reached your trigger, and now the observer makes the call to fire the target.

2. For standard day/night triggers, develop a trigger kit that has a variety of triggers for various conditions:

  • Mix sand and diesel fuel in an empty 5 gallon anti-freeze can for use as long-range thermal trigger (5 km +).

  • Mount 3 x 3 foot reverse polarity paper on plywood for a medium-range thermal trigger (inside 5 km).

  • Use infrared chemlights inside cut-open soda cans for short-range night trigger (not more than 3 km).

3. Task force FSOs must emphasize the importance of assigning each target a defined task and purpose. If the maneuver commander/S3 cannot provide this, the target is probably not valid and usually not executable. Consider other factors during the planning process, to include:

  • Observers
  • Artillery we expect available to service a target
  • What maneuver event will trigger the firing of this target

btn_tabl.gif 1.21 K
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