Military

PROBLEM 3-2: Scout sections are not conducting dismounted observation posts (OPs) to standard.

1. The selection of OP sites are not well thought out; generally placed on top of significant terrain features.

2. No consideration is given to OP sites which have good fields of observation and make use of terrain.

3. Routes from vehicle locations and the OP often provide no cover or concealment.

4. Discipline of the scouts occupying the OP is poor.

5. The observers often do not have the proper equipment, situational briefing, or graphics on their maps.

6. The scouts usually do not identify or conduct a reconnaissance of their alternate OP sites.

PROBLEM 3-3: The lack of employment of dismounted infantry during offensive operations is a continuing long-term trend.

1. Dismounted infantry actions are seldom planned at task force or company/team level.

2. Mounted-dismounted coordination is not planned or rehearsed.

3. Dismounted squads rarely conduct anything more than very generalized rehearsals.

4. When called upon to dismount, dismount leaders and soldiers are generally unprepared.

5. Soldiers dismount with minimal orientation or guidance about the tactical situation.

6. Dismounts are often unequipped to accomplish their mission; they dismount without radios, maps, AT weapons, and other mission essential equipment.

7. Mounted-dismounted coordination during mission execution is ineffective; dismounted squads, therefore, operate independent of the mounted force.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-4: (Repeat of Problem 3-1)

1. Task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.

2. Infantry soldiers are often not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.

3. Because of a lack of clear task and purpose, too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission:

• They leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons).
• They are unfamiliar with the tactical situation.
• They are unsure of what they are supposed to accomplish.

5. Most infantry squads are untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

PROBLEM 3-5: Company/teams are not planning for the use of dismounted infantry in the attack. Because of improper enemy analysis, commanders do not anticipate the enemy use of dug-in infantry in MRC positions.

RESULTS:

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-6: (Repeat of Problems 3-1 and 3-4)

1. Task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.

2. Infantry soldiers are often not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.

3. Because of a lack of clear task and purpose, too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission:

• They leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons).
• They are unfamiliar with the tactical situation.
• They are unsure of what they are supposed to accomplish.

5. Most infantry squads are untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

PROBLEM 3-7: Units do not plan for dismounted operations on the objective. Dismounts typically ride in the back of vehicles and contribute to the operation by exercising the casualty evacuation plan.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-8: (Repeat of Problems 3-1, 3-4 and 3-6)

1. Task forces do not effectively use their dismounted infantry.

2. Infantry soldiers are often not integrated into the scheme of maneuver.

3. Because of a lack of clear task and purpose, too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission.

• They leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons, etc.) behind.
• They are unfamiliar with the tactical situation.
• They are unsure of what they are to accomplish.

5. Most infantry squads are untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill, as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

Techniques

1. Units must develop training plans that emphasize the tasks and purpose associated with dismounted operations. At Home Station, dismounted drills should routinely be trained in conjunction with BFV crews, not as a separate unit.

• Use the techniques discussed in FM 7-7.

• Dismounts must be briefed on their mission for each operation.

• The appropriate dismounted drills must be rehearsed.

• Based on mission requirements, the pre-combat inspection (PCI) prior to rehearsal should ensure that dismounts will employ the proper equipment.

2. At Home Station, train scouts in selecting, occupying, and improving dismounted observation posts (OP) sites. Enforce standards for OP occupation; squad and section sergeants must supervise. Set up OP bags with the proper equipment, as outlined in FM 17-98. Ensure that unit SOPs designate procedures and standards for OP occupation.

3. Commanders should do a detailed enemy analysis to determine the possibility of enemy infantry in the objective. Commanders should then plan and rehearse for the possibility of dismounting the infantry to eliminate the enemy threat. The commander determines if, when, and where infantry dismounts based on his analysis of the factors of METT-T and the degree of risk he is willing to accept (FM 71-2, pg 3-37).

4. Consider dismounted elements during the planning process; base dismounted employment on the IPB, specifically, terrain and enemy analysis. Commanders should then provide specific guidance to platoon and dismount squad leaders, which can be incorporated into their troop-leading procedures. Commanders should conduct specific dismounted rehearsals, PCCs, and PCIs for the mission. Mounted-dismounted coordination, as appropriate, should also be rehearsed to the maximum extent possible.

TA.1 Negative Trend 4: Actions on contact

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 4-1: Company/teams rarely execute effective actions on contact. Reaction to enemy contact too often consists of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-2: Platoons and companies need improvement in planning and executing actions on contact. During the planning process, specific actions on contact are neglected. Subsequently, these actions are not discussed during mission briefs or rehearsed.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-3: (Repeat of Problem 4-1) Units do not plan for or rehearse actions on contact before crossing the LD. No execution of effective actions on contact to enemy combat multipliers. Reaction to enemy contact often consists of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges.

PROBLEM 4-4:

1. Commanders do not visualize how the enemy will use combat multipliers to shape the battlefield to his advantage.

2. Companies/teams do not rehearse actions on contact prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).

3. Actions on contact often consist of halting and returning fire

• At targets beyond range.
• Without maneuvering.

4. Units do not train for simultaneous forms of combat with the enemy.

Rarely execute effective actions to enemy combat multipliers on contact.
Do not achieve fire superiority against the enemy.
Fight on the enemy's terms rather than on their own terms.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-5: (Repeat of Problem 4-1 and 4-3) Company/teams rarely execute effective actions on contact.

1. Commanders do not visualize how the enemy will use his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield or attrit the force.

2. Company/teams do not rehearse actions on contact for each operation prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).

3. Reaction to enemy contact often consist of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges.

4. Commanders do not plan for simultaneous forms of contact.

5. Many leaders at team and platoon level do not understand or plan for actions on contact.

6. Because actions on contact planning is nonexistent, target acquisition is not organized or purposely linked to direct fire planning.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 4-6: (Repeat of Problem 4-1, 4-3, and 4-5) Units often do not plan for or rehearse actions on contact.

1. No execution of effective actions on contact to enemy combat multipliers.

2. Reaction to enemy contact often consists of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effect ranges.

Techniques

1. FM 17-98 and FM 17-97 have excellent discussions about actions on contact. These discussions should be modified and incorporated into FM 17- 15, FM 7-7J, and FM 71-1. The definition of contact as outlined in the latest version of FM 17-15 should be universally applied to all platoon, company, troop, task force and squadron doctrine.

2. There are at least seven forms of enemy contact:

• Visual
• Direct fire
• Indirect fire
• Close air support
• Electronic/jamming
• NBC
• Obstacles

Units must plan for the possibility of any or all of these forms of contact throughout the depth of the battlefield and at potentially critical points in the battle. Commanders must be able to "see themselves" at critical points in the battle and anticipate when and where the enemy will employ various forms of contact.

3. Actions on contact are battle drills that should constitute the bulk of a company or platoon level scheme of maneuver. Become familiar with the different types of contact as detailed in FM 17-15, Tank Platoon. List battle drills in reaction to each of the forms of contact. Incorporate the battle drills into the unit SOPs to facilitate subsequent simplification of the orders process and preparation for mission execution.

4. Develop and practice the various battle drills at Home Station. Establish a base of fire and, depending upon the terrain, move aggressively to covered and concealed positions. Establish fire superiority before attempting to maneuver on the enemy. Platoon leaders and company commanders must develop the situation, select a course of action, or at least recommend a course of action to the task force commander. Vehicle commanders must learn to be effective killers and survivors, while reporting correctly and succinctly to their higher headquarters.

5. Learn how the enemy will employ his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield in his favor. Develop SOPs for reactions to contact, including multiple forms of contact, with enemy forces and their use of combat multipliers. Rehearse actions on contact, to include multiple forms of contact, during Home Station training.

TA.1 Maneuver, Part I

TA.1, Part III