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Military

INTELLIGENCE BOS (cont)

TREND 8: Task Force S2 understanding of IPB process, products and integration. Task force and squadron S2s have a poor appreciation for the application of IPB in relation to either "deliberate planning" or "abbreviated planning" processes.

PROBLEMS:

  1. MIOBC, MIOAC, and 96B MOS POIs remain unable to cross boundaries from some form of analytical thinking process to predictive analysis in support of the TF's plan or "decisive point".
  2. Task force commanders continually fail to provide guidance for the focus of IPB to include commander's decisive point (s).
  3. S2s continually fail to correlate "seeing the terrain", "seeing the enemy", and "see themselves" either verbally or graphically (battlefield vision).
  4. Task force operational systems remain unsupportive and nonintegrated within the IPB process.

Procedures:

  1. Doctrinal references: FM 34-130, FM 34-80, FM 34-3, FM 34-2-1, FM 17-95/96, and FM 71-123.

Techniques:

  1. Task force S2 sections must review Home Station training in relation to:
    • Battle tracking--enemy situational awareness over a extended period under a continuously changing environment.
    • Analytical thinking process and predictive analysis--recognizing and understanding indicators and the task and purpose of battlefield shapers.
    • Parallel planning--restructuring internal assets to support current battles while planning future battles.
  2. Training institutions must ensure placement of the best and brightest intelligence officers by allowing field observer controllers the opportunity to directly influence these officers' warfighting skills at MIOBC and MIAOBC.

(TA.5.3 Process Information)

TREND 9: Event templates and matrices in the planning process.

PROBLEMS:

  1. S2s do not understand the use of event templates or event matrix and their importance to the planning process.
  2. Enemy decision points and NAIs are not clearly defined to planners or commander.

RESULTS:

  1. The friendly COAs developed in the planning process and essential to success are seriously flawed.
  2. All the products necessary for a thorough planning process are not available.

Techniques:

  1. S2s need to familiarize themselves with FM 34-130 and the need for time phase lines NAIs and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.
  2. A review should be conducted on the importance of the event template and the event matrix (the companion to the template) to the planning process and how these products contribute to distinguishing the different enemy COAs.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 10: Situation Templates (SITEMPS) for use in R&S Planning.

PROBLEMS:

  1. SITEMPS are often not available during the R&S planning.
  2. TFs are not able to distinguish between when infiltration is possible and when penetration is necessary to achieve the recon objective.
  3. A lack of understanding of planning factors for recon.

RESULTS:

  1. Scouts selecting or being given routes through enemy security zone positions.
  2. The only method of infiltration that provides a reasonable probability of success is dismounted. Dismounted operations are very limited in their scope and sustain ability.
  3. TFs repeatedly underestimate the enemies commitment to counterrecon resulting in unrealistic expectations for recon effort.
  4. Another consideration is the ability of these scouts to target engineer assets and harass the enemy with indirect fires.

Techniques:

  1. Mission analysis products must be part of the R&S planning in order to determine the required composition of the recon force.
  2. Availability and positioning of mortars and artillery must be a consideration in targeting enemy engineer and artillery assets.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 11: S2 depiction of Brigade Support Area (BSA) decision points.

PROBLEMS:

  1. S2s do not depict decision points or target areas of interest keyed to significant events forward and to the rear of the BSA.
  2. There is no established time/space relationship to prepare the commander to make tactical decisions relative to battlefield events.
  3. S2s do not correlate the enemy operational timetable and friendly operational timetable while identifying decision points, target areas of interest, and time phase lines.
  4. Commanders are not making tactical decisions when required relative to battlefield events in and around the BSA.
  5. Commanders have not established a decision to time/space relationship which correlates the enemy's operational timetable or friendly timetable.

RESULT: The BSA gets overrun by the enemy or does not execute its save plan in time as the enemy strikes the BSA, destroying all the key logistics that are required to support the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in its fight.

Technique: The FSB S2/S3 should produce decision support matrix annexes for all possible events, i.e., save plan, dismounted enemy, NBC attacks, artillery, mine fields, etc.

  1. These matrixes would enhance decision making while the unit is under immense pressure during an attack.
  2. Development of a Decision Support Template (DST) uses products developed throughout the entire planning process. It is not something that is exclusively done after the plan is developed. The goal is to use products that were previously developed during the planning process and create a useful tool that can help the commander make decisions at critical points on the battlefield.
  3. The decision support matrix supplements the DST (FM 34-3, page 4-32).

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 12: IPB and how the enemy fights. S2s routinely show enemy movement, not enemy maneuver plans.

PROBLEM: The enemy, as we do, uses a methodical system of maneuver to fix a part of our defense to keep it out of the fight, while suppressing, breaching, and penetrating another part. S2s often do not do an adequate job in explaining and illustrating how the enemy maneuvers.

EXAMPLE: When the enemy attacks, the S2 shows how the enemy will move its units in, for example, advance guard formation. The S2 does not show how this dynamic force will fix, breach, and penetrate defensive battle positions.

Techniques:

  1. Since S2s are not schooled in maneuver, they should ask S3 battle captains for help or read 71 series FMs to become familiar with maneuver.
  2. Use "snapshot" sketches that show enemy maneuvering in the close fight at critical places on the battlefield.

(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)

TREND 13: Use of SITEMPs to confirm or deny enemy courses of action (COAs). S2 Sections too often fail to use their own SITEMPs as analytical products. They routinely produce SITEMPs of varying quality and utility, but often throw them in a corner and fail to use them once the planning has stopped and execution has begun.

RESULT: Information received is not compared with the SITEMP to confirm or deny particular enemy COAs.

Techniques:

  1. S2 Sections should post and use their SITEMPS for reporting enemy COAs.
  2. S2 Sections should ensure that the SITEMP or other analytic product is not confused with "hard" intelligence received by using two maps: one analytical map, and one for posting only "hard data".

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)

TREND 14: Terrain Analysis Briefing. The Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE), rather than the S2, often briefs terrain analysis during the mission analysis and OPORD briefs.

Technique: The ABE should continue to assist the S2 in terrain analysis, however we recommend the S2 brief the terrain and its significance.

(TA.5.4.5 Convey Intelligence)

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