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Military

TRENDS

INTELLIGENCE BOS

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC OCs for 1st and 2nd quarters, FY97. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and techniques and procedures for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with Blueprint of the Battlefield codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Task Force (TF) S-2 terrain analysis. TF S2s now better articulate how the terrain will impact on the threat's available courses of action (COAs) and assist the commander and staff in determining friendly COAs that exploit opportunities the terrain provides.

Techniques:

  1. For terrain analysis, use accurate Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (MCOO) for more accurate depictions of enemy avenues of approach into sectors/zones.
  2. Use the MCOO for improved identification of:
    • enemy kill sacks
    • potential friendly engagements areas
    • defensible terrain
    • specific potential system and equipment locations
  3. Use TERRA BASE products and 1:25000 scale maps.
  4. Coordinate routinely with supporting elements such as engineers.

(TA.5.3.2.3 Develop Impacts)

TREND 2: Transcription and Analysis (TA) team graphic intelligence summary overlays. TA teams are producing periodic graphic intelligence summary overlays from intelligence obtained through radio intercept and direction finding analysis. These overlays are valuable tools for the Brigade S2 in support of the Reconnaissance and Security fight, and to confirm or deny the SITEMP. The best examples of these overlays have included detailed information on enemy reconnaissance vehicles and routes, and enemy defensive dispositions. Most significant is that these overlays consolidate a great deal of information into a succinct, easy to interpret report, for an already busy brigade S2.

Techniques:

  1. The requirement to produce these overlays should be included in unit SOPs.
  2. The TA team should produce these overlays every 12 hours during continuous operations and they should be cumulative in nature.
  3. They should produce a finalized overlay on enemy defenses and get it to the S2 at least eight hours before LD.
  4. The R&S overlay should include recon routes, if possible.
  5. All overlays should include as much analyzed intelligence as possible either in graphic or attached narrative form.

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: S2 section organization. S2 Sections do not work efficiently, or as a team, particularly when they transition from planning to current operations.

PROBLEMS:

  1. S2 Sections often operate on a 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Based on the time available and the work required to be done, this is a waste of precious personnel resources.
  2. The shift schedule reinforces the "I'm not on shift" attitude, and tends to inhibit teamwork, setting up a "we/they" relationship between the two shifts.
  3. Most S2 sections set up an internal plans section (which is a good idea), but fail to fully brief the plan to the rest of the section working current operations.

Procedures:

  1. Phase soldiers into work schedules, rather than have massive turnover twice a day.
  2. Rigorously enforce quality shift change briefings.
  3. Hold regular "huddles", in which the entire section, together with the ACT, is brought together to share the current enemy situation, and the status of reconnaissance operations.
  4. Avoid the 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Soldiers should get at least six hours of sleep and time for personal hygiene and meals; they do not need (and we cannot afford) 12 hours out of the fight.
  5. At the completion of each step of the planning process, and at a minimum when the OPORD is complete, the S2 planners should brief the entire section on the next mission.

(TA.5 Intelligence)

TREND 2: Reconnaissance.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Reconnaissance operations routinely fail.
  2. It has become an afterthought, and "S2 business", rather than the brigade's initial main effort.
  3. No one is truly in charge of the effort, tracks it, adjusts it when necessary, and ensures that it answers the Commander's PIR.
  4. R&S operations are often not rehearsed.
  5. In some instances, the brigade does not know whether the task forces are able to execute their assigned missions under the plan.

RESULTS:

  1. R&S efforts are usually reduced to a matrix in the Intelligence Annex (which only the S2s read).
  2. The matrix addresses NAIs covering all known or templated enemy locations, but does not adequately address task and purpose for each mission or recon element.
  3. If mission adjustments are necessary, the S2 does not have the tasking authority to redirect recon assets. and usually must request subordinate elements to change their plans.

Techniques:

  1. Appoint a Chief of Reconnaissance at brigade level. We have an officer in charge of chemicals, why not recon?
  2. Give the Chief of Recon a small, part-time planning staff, and the equipment and authority to task and receive reports from all elements of the brigade for reconnaissance missions.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 3: Task Force S2 planning and coordination of Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) operations.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Task force S2s do not have a clear understanding of how to utilize GSR teams at the TF level and below.
  2. They are not including GSR teams in the TF OPORD or R&S plan.
  3. When they give a mission to GSR teams, there is no clear task and purpose.
  4. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures continue to be a problem between the TF and GSR teams.

Techniques:

  1. Foster better habitual relationships between GSR teams and TFs.
  2. Develop training scenarios at Home Station to train the TF S2s on how to utilize GSR teams.
  3. Make it the GSR Platoon Leader's and PSG's responsibility to ensure that their teams are included in OPORDs at all levels.
  4. GSR Platoon Leaders and PSGs should have more input in mission planning.
  5. Team leaders should have input in the development of the R&S plan, to be sure that the team can accomplish the mission.
  6. The TF S2 must make sure that the task and purpose is clear and understood by the team before deployment.
  7. Train at all levels to develop effective CASEVAC plans.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 4: Planning, synchronizing, and supervising the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Task force and squadron S2s, S3s, and commanders continue to inadequately plan and supervise R&S operations.
  2. Task force staffs do not convey an appreciation for technical abilities of R&S assets, required force protection (CS) or sustainment (CSS) operations.

RESULTS:

  1. R&S assets are overtasked by superimposing repetitive and redundant collection requirements.
  2. Failure to coordinate R&S efforts with staff to include adjacent and higher headquarters often leads to the loss of lives and poorly executed or unsuccessful plans.

Technique: If task force S2s are on the blame line for planning and supervising R&S, then it is essential they receive the necessary CS and CSS support and authority required for success. Task force commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. This will allow TF and squadron S2s time to analyze recon data and recommend redirection of collection efforts.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 5: Integration of Scout Platoon in reconnaissance planning, preparation and execution. Task Forces (TF) too often do not integrate reconnaissance planning, preparation, execution, and support into Home Station training. This critical training is often left to the Scout Platoon Leader, with little or no integration of other TF assets.

RESULTS:

  1. Scouts are rendered combat ineffective early and do contribute to TF mission success.
  2. The commander and staff are limited in gathering intelligence necessary for planning and execution and must rely on other varied means to collect that critical information.

Techniques:

  1. Task Force must assume responsibility for recon training and integration at Home Station.
  2. R&S planning must be integrated into every orders drill so usable products are produced prior to R&S execution.
  3. Scout Platoon focus in training should be directed toward enemy or friendly decision points, thereby facilitating the decision making process.
  4. TF success relies on the proper integration of the Scouts into the reconnaissance effort which can only be affective with sufficient combat power marshaled to ensure their survival.
  5. Allow Scouts time to execute proper troop leading procedures.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 6: Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development.

PROBLEMS:

  1. The Task Force S2s are often the only ones developing the R&S effort.
  2. The Scouts usually leave for a mission with only an execution matrix, minus the details needed for fire integration or CASEVAC. At times they even leave without an enemy SITEMP and with weak, non-prioritized PIRs which are not linked to NAIs.

RESULTS:

  1. Plan is developed late.
  2. Orders produced are not integrated products with input from each of the staff elements, and are therefore incomplete.
  3. R&S products generated lack critical pieces of information.
  4. Scouts prepare for mission without details necessary for success. Because the details are incomplete time used to prepare for mission is wasted and troop leading procedures suffer.

Techniques:

  1. R&S plan needs to be an integrated product.
  2. TF should produce an R&S OPORD written by the S-3 with input from the other staff.
  3. The S-2 should include the enemy SITEMP in the order.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 7: Integration of Air Defense into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). A lack of integration in the air portion of the IPB creates a situation where the TF commander gives the Air Defense Officers (ADOs) very general guidance that does not focus on defeating the threat.

RESULTS:

  1. Task Force Commander cannot prioritize ADA coverage against threat and balance with his own intent for maneuver on the battlefield.
  2. This poor air IPB denied the TF and Company commanders a real appreciation of the enemy air threat and capabilities.
  3. TF placement of ADA assets to protect the force at critical points on the battlefield is seriously hampered.

Techniques:

  1. TF S-2 and ADO must work closely together to refine/conduct the air IPB and ensure its integration into the SITEMP.
  2. Use Home Station training to integrate the ADO into all aspects of planning and the Military Decision Making Process.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

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