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PROBLEM: BSAs do not use wire to control the traffic flow in and out of the BSA.

RESULTS:

1. Soldiers wander the BSA looking for their point of contact for the classes of supply.
2. The soldiers drive through all areas, i.e., sleeping areas, mess halls, and command posts.
3. The constant driving towards the BSA on any trail makes it difficult for OPs to decipher between friendly and enemy, causing the OPs to become apathetic because everyone is coming from all different directions.

Technique: To control traffic in the BSA, The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) should practice setting up wire IAW the BSA defense plan and traffic control plan, then execute the plans during field training exercises. To do this, the BSA must review its load plans to ensure that each vehicle within the BSA carries needed obstacle material, especially wire and pickets, 55-gallon drums, dragons teeth, etc.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 51: Company fire support team Pre Combat Checks (PCCs) and Pre Combat Inspections (PCIs). Company fire support teams (FISTs) generally conduct inadequate PCCs/PCIs.

PROBLEMS:

1. Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLD) batteries fail when dismounted.
2. Protective masks do not seal during a chemical attack.
3. M-60 machine guns do not fire because they are dirty.
4. Radios will not hold a crypto fill.
5. Cables are missing.

Techniques:

1. Develop detailed PCC/PCI checklists prior to execution.
2. Make checklists mission specific, e.g.:
   • Dismounted operations
   • Copperhead shoots
   • Offensive operations, etc.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 52: Synchronization of ADA with Brigade Combat Team tactical operations. ADA Battery Commanders/LNOs are well integrated into BCT staff planning process. They are aware of their staff responsibilities in the planning process and are proactive in their integration and synchronization with the staff. Air defenders normally work closely with the staff S2s as they jointly develop the aerial dimension to the IPB and the are active participants during COA development and Wargaming.

Technique: Continue participating in staff order drills during Home Station training.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 53: Synchronization of mechanized, artillery and potted smoke. Units develop smoke plans to obscure breach sites without synchronizing the different types of smoke.

PROBLEMS:

1. The brigade chemical officer will work with the chemical company commander and smoke platoon leader and come up with a plan; the FSO will have a different plan, and rarely are smoke pots utilized.
2. No key person is identified to plan and achieve visibility criteria that is key to the commander's intent.
3. Field Artillery units often run out of smoke at the critical point in the breach operations.
4. There is no deliberate plan to tie in with the other types of smoke to increase smoke platoon survivability.
5. The brigade's allotment of smoke pots is usually left in the BSA or with a unit that will have nothing to do with the breaching operation.
6. For those units that do utilize smoke pots, the smoke pot guide is not used to determine numbers and spacing of pots to achieve the commander's intent.

RESULTS:

1. The breach is rarely obscured to the extent that it meets the commander's intent.
2. Smoke platoons that are sent too close to the breach and in direct fire range are often destroyed.

Techniques:

1. Make the Brigade Chemical Officer the sole proponent for smoke. Chemical Officers that have been smoke platoon leaders know more about smoke and those weather conditions that affect smoke more than anyone.
2. Establish a targeting cell that includes the Chemical Officer, FSO, Engineer, and S2 to come up with a synchronized smoke plan.
3. The Chemical Officer must develop a smoke annex to the brigade order and brief the plan.
4. Designate a single smoke control officer that adjusts both mechanized and artillery smoke. This control officer will have direct communications with the brigade chemical officer and FSO.
5. The smoke plan should be included in the brigade maneuver and FS rehearsals, with the chemical officer still the critical link.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 54: Integration of combat service support operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Combat service support and the other BOSs are normally not integrated during planning. This is especially evident for separate company/platoon operations, specifically MP, air defense, chemical, and signal units.
2. The brigade S1, S4, and Forward Support Battalion (FSB) security, plans and operations (SPO) officers are minimally involved in the planning process. Most units have a logistics cell at the main CP for the purpose of planning and current operations interface. This provides the logistics community with a full-time representative; however, units generally take for granted the experience level of the representatives and do not provide supervision.

RESULT:

1. Remote stations (such as check point personnel or RETRANS sites) do not have a concept of support; especially casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
2. Remote stations do not contribute to the brigade rear area (such as early warning from the checkpoints or air defense positions).
3. Planning considerations are often overlooked, and estimates used for concept development are flawed.
4. Normally, after issue of the brigade OPORD, the S4 and SPO must take the first draft CSS annex that was included in the order and rewrite it into a viable CSS annex.

Techniques:

1. The S4 must supervise.
2. Integrate the S4 during the planning process.

RESULTS:

1. As the CSS cell at the main CP gains experience, the concept of support (as developed by the planners) will improve.
2. Integration of the S4 will hasten the exchange of data between the rear and main CPs resulting in an ability for anticipation by the BSA.
3. The S4 will review the annex in the OPORD at the time of issue, ensuring attainability of tasks in the CSS annex.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 55: Breach Tenets in Mission Analysis and Course of Action Development.

PROBLEMS:

1. The TF commander must ensure synchronization through proper planning and force preparation.
2. Misunderstanding and application of the "breach tenets" at the TF level. The breach tenets (intel, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass and synchronization) are overlooked during mission analysis and COA development.
3. Generally units do not reverse plan actions on the objective there is no specified, clearly defined end state of what the TF should look like on the objective.

RESULTS:

1. The Task Force failed to synchronize breaching operations as part of the overall scheme of maneuver.
2. Recent trends Actions on the objective determine the point of penetration and the size/type of the assault force. The location of the point of penetration and the size/type of the assault force then determines the point of breach, number of lanes required and the size/type of security force (near and far side).
3. The ability of the enemy's infantry to interfere with the breach determines whether the breaching site is to be secured by fires or by force. Lane requirements and the type of obstacle then drive the allocation of mobility assets.
4. The enemy's fires at the obstacle determines the amount of suppression/size of the support force.

Techniques:

1. The commander's intent merits special consideration during breach planning.
2. Reverse planning drives the maneuver formation to ensure that forces are in the correct relative positions to accomplish their breaching roles and actions on the objective.
3. The keys are detailed reverse planning, clear sub-unit instructions, effective command and control and a well-rehearsed force.
4. The most effective tool available to the commander is the rehearsal. TF rehearsals focus on synchronizing the maneuver of support, breach, and assault forces to achieve the SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure and reduce) breaching fundamentals and highlight key events that must be coordinated during breach execution.
5. The TF main effort must be clear and must be supported by the SOEO (scheme of engineer operations).
6. The engineer must understand the scheme of maneuver and must plan to shift engineer forces and equipment consistent with the commander's main effort. This shifting of forces is critical in successive breach operations. The engineer planner ensures that the SOEO serves as a combat multiplier and not just a force provider.

(TA. 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 56: Synchronization of refueling operations in the brigade support area (BSA). Main Support Battalion (MSB) tankers habitually stay 12-24 hours on station in the BSA during refueling operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. MSB tankers normally move to conduct refuel operations in the BSA shortly after dusk. Because of poor synchronization, the tankers often wait on station for 4-6 hours (until early the next morning) for the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) to finish refueling the maneuver units.
2. If some of the tankers are not used, they are retained another 12 hours or more in the BSA until the FSB requires more bulk fuel.

Technique: A reasonable time for the tankers to remain on station in the BSA is 2-4 hours. Both MSB and FSB support operations officers (SPOs) must synchronize refueling operations with combat and refueling operations of maneuver units to ensure that tankers are in and out of the BSA within this reasonable timeframe.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

Table of Contents

Command and Control BOS, Part 6

Acknowledgements