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SECTION V

Controlling the ZOS

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Once the ZOS was established and the verification process was well in progress, TFE forces had to control the ZOS to prevent violations of the GFAP. Particularly, it was imperative that the ZOS remained weapons free and unauthorized movement of FWF soldiers and equipment was denied. With the exceptions of a few minor instances of noncompliance, the FWF observed the policies agreed upon in the JMCs and those outlined in the GFAP. However, armed civilian groups (defined as two or more personnel with weapons) and the civil police (they could not have weapons in the ZOS until all prospective police were registered) presented unique challenges to TFE soldiers. These challenges were compounded with the requirement to detain suspected war criminals. An FWF soldier was detained for several hours, only for the TFE unit to discover that one letter in the soldier's last name was different from the actual war criminal's name.

ALL IN A DAY'S WORK A unit reported that two civil police attempted to pass through a checkpoint in the ZOS. One had one 9-mm pistol and the other had an AK-47 with a magazine. The soldiers at the checkpoint confiscated the weapons and let the police continue. A unit reported that two civil police were stopping traffic in the ZOS. The unit told them that they could not stop traffic in the ZOS because it impeded movement along the route. The unit escorted the police out of the ZOS. The military police (MP) inspected a faction police station in the ZOS revealing 22 weapons (assault rifles and shotguns) and live ammunition on site; some weapons were loaded. The MP confiscated the weapons and ammunition and a CA representative contacted the mayor to explain our actions. When MP arrived at the police station, there were three policemen there; by the time the inspection was complete, there was a total of twelve police on the site. The police chief was upset but did not interfere with the inspection or with the confiscation of the weapons. The MP also spoke with the police chief at the police station in the ZOS. The police chief reported to the MP that three faction soldiers were stopping civilian vehicles and demanding money on the northern side of the ZOS on the main route through the sector. A unit went to investigate the checkpoint but did not find any soldiers. A unit reported a civilian police checkpoint on the 2km ZOS line. The unit instructed them to leave three times and, after several hours, they finally departed the ZOS. In total, 24 weapons were confiscated in this 24-hour period.

TOPIC: Military Police Interaction with Armed Civilian Groups and Weapons in the Zone of Separation (ZOS).

DISCUSSION: The direct support military police of the brigade had an active role identifying armed civilian groups and weapons in the ZOS.

The Military Police Company was in direct support of the brigade. Most of the missions that the military police performed involved security in or around the Brigade Operating Base (BOB). In the brigade, entry in and out of the ZOS was controlled mainly by the MP manning traffic control points (TCPs) along main supply routes (MSRs).

Accordingly, the military police were actively involved in identifying armed military and civilian groups that, according to the GFAP, had to be disarmed. Per the COMARRC's guidance, the only authorized weapons in the ZOS (other than IFOR weapons) would be sidearms carried by legitimate police. The military police and civil affairs officer assisted the brigade in identifying those legitimate police who serve their respective communities within the AOR. Military police manning the TCPs along MSRs had lists with the official registered names (approved by the brigade commander) of local police officials.

Military police challenged anyone who was not on the approved lists and was in the possession of a weapon. The confiscation of any weapons was reported immediately to higher headquarters. After a serial number inventory had been accomplished, the confiscated weapons were processed through military police channels.

LESSON LEARNED: A proactive and positive working relationship between U.S. military police and host nation local civilian and military police can be beneficial to all parties involved.

TOPIC: Storage and Processing of Confiscated Weapons and Ammunition.

DISCUSSION: Confiscated weapons and ammunition in the TFE AO were stored and processed through military police channels. COMARRC's guidance was that civilian and military groups seen by IFOR patrols would be challenged and their weapons confiscated and destroyed. This policy was enforced by TFE soldiers throughout the entire TFE AO and ZOS.

TFE's guidance was that the confiscation of any weapons should be immediately reported to higher headquarters. A serial number inventory was to be made and the weapons would be processed through military police channels.

Further TFE guidance was published in fragmentary order (FRAGO), which included the following:

• All confiscated weapons are treated IAW USAREUR General Order No. 1 - no war trophies.

• Weapons must be held for a minimum of 30 days to allow local/military police follow-up action and requests for forensic investigations to be forwarded to IFOR.

• TFE Commander decides on any dispute involving a weapon in IFOR custody.

• Units will report weapons confiscated in daily commander's assessment report.

• After 30 days, confiscated weapons will be destroyed and then buried.

Various weapons and ammunition belonging to the FWF were confiscated by TFE soldiers. The direct support military police units for each brigade, were given the responsibility for properly inventorying and processing this equipment. When weapons and ammunition were confiscated, the capturing unit notified the respective brigade direct support military police unit to arrange for transfer of custody.

All confiscated property was jointly inventoried by the capturing unit and military police representatives. Model and serial numbers, quantity, lot numbers, and the general condition of the property were recorded on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document. The name of the capturing unit and military police representatives and the purpose of the change of custody was also recorded on the DA Form 4137. The confiscated property was then properly secured until the next change of custody transfer could be arranged. The DA Form 4137 accompanied the captured property through any subsequent changes of custody, all of the way to its final disposal action.

LESSONS LEARNED Military police are well suited to properly secure and process confiscated weapons and ammunition belonging to factions. Military police commanders must plan for the responsibility of securing and processing of confiscated weapons and ammunition when deployed in support of stability operations.

TOPIC: Determining Authorized Civilian Police in the ZOS.

DISCUSSION: The direct support military police of the brigade were actively involved in the establishment of guidelines for authorized civilian police in the ZOS.

Meetings were held by the brigade commanders reference the topic of authorized civilian police in the ZOS. The following guidelines were outlined:

• Civilian police in the ZOS had to be in an authorized local police uniform.

• They were authorized only to be armed with sidearms only, no rifles.

• They had to carry civilian police identification and credentials with picture.

• A list of authorized civilian police who wish to enter the ZOS must be presented to the brigade commander.

• The number of civilian police on the list must be reasonable (ratio of police to the number of local civilians).

• The role of the authorized police will be limited to only law and order for local civilians in the ZOS

It was stressed to the local officials that these same guidelines will be strictly enforced on both sides of the ZOS, so that neither side will question the number and the purpose of the civilian police. The local officials said that they were impressed with the impartiality and openness of TFE soldiers and also said that they looked forward to good relations.

LESSONS LEARNED That guidelines must be clearly communicated to local officials on both sides of the ZOS on issues such as authorized civilian police. This clear communication fosters an environment of trust and impartiality between IFOR and local officials and helps eliminate any question on the role of civilian police in the ZOS as well as their numbers. The presence of U.S. military police in initial coordination meetings helps in the establishment of good relations with local police officials.

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Section IV: The Verification Process
Appendix A: TTP for Clearing and Verification