• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

DISCUSSION: The process of verification of compliance with the GFAP was at times impeded by the magnitude of the number of the obstacles and fortifications in the ZOS and the combat power available to accomplish the mission. To accomplish the tasks, the minefields, bunkers, and trenches had to be identified first. Second, the factions required the manpower and equipment to execute the missions. Finally, U.S. forces required the personnel to verify the process while concurrently executing the other missions inherent to the operation.

Although the factions provided the brigade overlays of the fortifications and obstacles, these locations were not always reliable. Consequently, the responsibility remained to confirm the locations. It was argued, for instance, to verify the dismantling of bunkers, the unit should know the grid and numbers by sector. The grid and numbers should be documented and then annotated as "dismantled/destroyed" sequentially as the factions completed the task. At first glance, this seemed a reasonable technique to measure the success of verification tangibly. However, as already noted, it was estimated by the brigade S2 that there were conservatively more than 1,300 bunkers and over 200 kilometers of trenchlines.

To assist in confirming the numbers, aerial reconnaissance was conducted over the ZOS with AH 1 and OH 58s. These reconnaissances were generally effective in identifying bunkers and trenchlines. However, grids were determined using PLUGGERs on the aircraft which provided approximate, but not completely accurate, locations (determining the locations on the ground from the air has a certain degree of error factor). Ideally, the OH 58 should have been equipped with PADs to laze the target for a more definite grid location. Also, the Scout Weapons Team has limited station time. The problem was compounded by the fact that the brigade's air assets were also tasked to conduct reconnaissance of another brigade's ZOS. Because of the limited station time, the reconnaissance was not nearly as detailed as it could have been. In addition, OH-58s and AH-1s do not have video recording capability. The brigade could have conducted a much more thorough analysis of the ZOS and completed a much more thorough debrief if helicopters had video-recording capabilities.

Confirming the exact grid locations of the obstacles and fortifications by ground forces would have exacted more manpower (read combat power) than was available to accomplish the task in a timely manner.

TOPIC: The ZOS Reconnaissance Board.

DISCUSSION: One of TFE's primary missions was to conduct ZOS reconnaissance to confirm or deny faction compliance with the peace accord. TFE initiated a ZOS reconnaissance board, modeled roughly after a targeting board, whose function was to synchronize intelligence information, reconnaissance assets, and verification requirements into a workable, comprehensive ZOS reconnaissance plan.

One of the unique and sensitive aspects of stability operations can be a requirement to verify the extent of treaty compliance by various factions. TFE leadership realized the necessity early on of ensuring the ZOS reconnaissance was a coordinated effort among air and ground assets, division and maneuver brigade elements, and U.S. and allied forces. The task force commander designated the ADC-M as chairman of a ZOS reconnaissance board, with the DFSCOORD as board director and the G2, G2 collection/production, G3, G3 operations/air, weather, and brigade liaison officers as members. The board met daily at 0815 with the goal of planning reconnaissance missions 96 hours out. The group developed a ZOS reconnaissance matrix (see attached) which listed each ZOS block, the possible items of interest in each area, and the assets planned to reconnoiter each block, to include Army aviation, ground reconnaissance, observation points, TAC RECCE/AIR, SIGINT/IMINT/HUMINT, and SOF. The goal was to reconnoiter each ZOS block every day with a mix of assets, and to vary the reconnaissance in time and duration to avoid predictability.

First, fusing current intelligence and operations in a timely manner was difficult, especially at the beginning of the process. The board meeting would produce a tentative FRAGO by late AM, but the current day's reconnaissance results were not available until approximately 1800. Often this caused major changes in the following day's plan, and the maneuver units executing the reconnaissance often received last-minute changes hours before execution. Added to this were the normal difficulties of getting several key staff members to yet another meeting, as well as the challenge of integrating valuable, but dispersed, SOF assets. As the board drew closer to its goal of issuing a FRAGO 48 hours out, the process smoothed somewhat. Second, there was an initial disconnect on whether the process should be top or bottom driven. TFE was pressing the brigades for information on how much of their ZOS portion they could cover with organic assets, while the brigades were clamoring for the plan on the use of TFE resources. Finally, TFE players had to adjust their mindset. The targeting board format and the "decide, detect, deliver, assess" methodology was useful as a starting point, but many other factors came into play in the TFE's stability operations reconnaissance mission. Reconnaissance is fundamentally different from targeting, which in this scenario involved changing perceptions. Board members had to consider political ramifications, coalition partners' input, regional history, and specific ROE every time a sensitive situation arose.

TOPIC: The Collection Plan and the Verification Process.

Note: The 10-kilometer zone mentioned in this observation was not a ZOS. However, the TTP developed by the brigade for verification of FWF compliance with the reporting requirements merit discussion because they may be useful in future operations.

DISCUSSION: The brigade's collection plan, developed from known faction locations, was oriented on verifying continued compliance to the peace agreement through reconnaissance and site inspections. In accordance with the GFAP, the factions were required to provide the brigade with overlays of their equipment and weapons collection points within a 10-kilometer radius of the zone of separation. The brigade S2 compiled this information on a database with the grid, amounts and type of equipment, the faction organization, and the most recent date it was observed. This information and the overlays were passed to the G2 for incorporation into the division collection plan. These locations, along with additional sites confirmed by reconnaissance, were designated as named areas of interest (NAIs). From the division collection plan, the brigade was required to reconnoiter the designated NAIs to confirm or deny that the equipment/weapons, by number and type, were still being maintained at that location. In turn, the brigade S2 developed a collection plan which contained a total of 81 NAIs, including those tasked by division. In the brigade plan, units were tasked to conduct either a visual reconnaissance ("drive-by") or a site inspection. The NAIs were prioritized by number 1 through 4:

Priority 1 - Must be reconnoitered every 5x days
Priority 2 - Must be reconnoitered every 7x days
Priority 3 - Must be reconnoitered every 10x days
Priority 4 - Must be reconnoitered every 14x days

(There was a period of increased tension between the FWF and TFE which resulted in collection sites being reconnoitered every two days.)

To facilitate this process and focus the collection and verification procedure, the brigade S2 developed a system to coordinate the effort over time with a "10-day forecaster." This provided the day-by-day reconnaissance tasking by unit. However, the focus of the undertaking remained the collection plan with associated PIR, SIR, NAIs, and SOR. If it was determined that factions had moved equipment or increased amounts were identified at the collection point, a unit would be tasked to notify the collection site commander that he was delinquent in complying with the peace agreement.

This procedure assisted in the verification process. Although grids of collection points provided by the factions were sometimes 500-800 meters off, reconnaissance confirmed the locations. This provided the brigade S2 with fairly accurate information to begin his collection planning. With this information, the requirement remained to verify the faction's continued compliance. Any change in the composition or disposition of weapons or equipment could be an indicator of noncompliance. Because of the vast number of collection points, there was the potential of focusing the entire intelligence collection effort on these sites. This put a great demand on the units and possibly deterred reconnaissance and surveillance planning to identify other significant faction activity. However, the plan developed by the S2 to collect and verify, by priority, over time ensured that units were unrestrained to conduct other reconnaissance missions as required.

The procedure was also effective in facilitating "stability engagements." Units employed combat camera crews to photograph equipment at the sites periodically. Often changes in the composition of equipment were identified. If the faction had not notified IFOR of the changes, the photographs were used as a tool to demonstrate noncompliance and force the factions to submit reports and updates in a more timely manner.

Section III: Establishing the ZOS

Section IV: The Verification Process, Part 2