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DISCUSSION: As with any operation, the first step of planning is to conduct a mission analysis. For most stability operations, the start point for the mission analysis is the peace agreement. The GFAP outlined the broad tasks that had to be accomplished along with the timelines that had to be met. For example, the GFAP required that factions had to be separated and all mines, obstacles, and fortifications had to be removed, destroyed, or dismantled by TOA + 30 days. Several implied tasks were also identified which represented the details of establishing the ZOS (e.g., establish joint military commissions to determine FWF courses of action (COA) for compliance, establish checkpoints, etc.).

The verbiage of the GFAP was often confusing. This point probably became evident when attempting to understand the intricacies of ACFLs, IEBLs, and AOTs. However, the inability to comprehend the nuances of the requirements could result in mission failure.

TOPIC: The Significance of JMCs in Planning.

DISCUSSION: The results of the JMCs were the cornerstones in developing the COA for establishment of the ZOS. The FWF leaders were required to jointly develop the COAs for meeting the requirements of the GFAP. The forum for the COA development was the JMC.

As already noted, the brigade had two weeks after deployment in the AOR before the first deadline of the GFAP. Within four days of the arrival of the initial two battalions (the third battalion did not arrive into the AOR for another month), the brigade commander held his first JMC. Because the commander deployed several weeks prior to the brigade's main body, he had the opportunity to discuss general concepts for separation of forces and establishment of the ZOS with the FWF leaders. This was instrumental in setting the stage for the JMC. At the JMC, the requirements of the GFAP were read and the commander told the factions to develop the COA. Within a couple hours, the plan for separation of forces and the initial tasks for establishing the ZOS was complete. Noteworthy is that the commander did require his staff to develop a generic COA if the FWF met an impasse during the JMC.

TOPIC: The Results of the Coordination Meeting Provided the Specifics to Task Execution.

DISCUSSION: Much like the JMC, the coordination meetings held between Company and Troop (TRP/CO) commanders with FWF leaders (many times brigade commanders) were key to planning and executing ZOS tasks. The broad tasks of compliance were agreed upon in the JMC (e.g., clearance of routes, removal of bunkers, etc.). However, the specifics of how those tasks would be accomplished were agreed upon during the coordination meetings. Initially, the TRP/CO Commanders met with the FWF daily. They would meet at a central location and discuss the plan for the day and then they would execute the missions. These daily meetings were time-intensive and often left only six to eight hours to accomplish the tasks. As a result, it was decided that the meetings would be conducted once a week. At the weekly meeting, the FWF were required to provide the TRP/CO Commander a schedule of tasks the factions would complete the next week.

TOPIC: Bottom to Top Planning.

DISCUSSION: The nature of operations in OJE entailed both decentralized planning and execution at the battalion and sometimes company level. The brigade's plan, quite often, was the compilation of sub-unit plans, developed by battalion staffs from information gained at daily coordination meetings with faction leaders. Battalions executed missions, more often than not, based on the brigade commander's intent, broad goals from Joint Military Commissions, and the results of their daily coordination meetings. Because the brigade staff was not always in "the information loop," supporting and tracking the missions could not be accomplished without the battalion's detailed input. The mission-tracking checklist (Refer to Appendix D), coupled with SITREPs and closing remarks reports, allowed the staff to identify support requirements, understand sub-unit missions, and track the battle.

TOPIC: Mission Tracking.

DISCUSSION: Because of the "bottom to top" planning phenomenon and the high OPTEMPO, it was essential that TFE units develop a system to track the many missions. On any given day a brigade would conduct up to 50 missions. Many times these missions were unrelated to one another and entailed small unit activities (e.g., bunker destruction verification, mine clearance, CA/CI/PSYOP assessments of local towns, and checkpoint operations). To facilitate tracking of battalion-level missions, the brigade required the battalions and squadrons (BN/SQDNs) to submit a daily report (Refer to Appendix D) of the unit's activities, to company level, for the following day's operations. The missions, by number and description, were recorded by the night battle captain and briefed during the morning staff update. The BN/SQDNs were then required to report every two hours on the progress of the missions (this included a negative situation report). The information from these reports was then annotated on the tracking worksheet. At mission competition, a closing report was required. The results of the missions (as per worksheet) were reported on the Operations/Intelligence (O and I) net for analysis by the S2. During the conduct of the mission, spot reports were rendered as required which further developed the operational picture of the AOR.

Section I: A Note on the Operational Environment in Bosnia

Section III: Establishing the ZOS