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Military

SECTION III

Establishing the ZOS

TOPIC: Separation of Forces.

DISCUSSION: The willingness of the FWF and the early deployment of TFE leadership to effect coordination with the FWF greatly facilitated the separation of forces. For the most part, the FWF were already separated. However, the major task of TFE units was to ensure that the FWF maintained the integrity of the ACFL ZOS and to ensure confrontations were avoided. The FWF were required to provide TFE overlays with the location of all units, weapons and equipment, not only in the ZOS, but also within a 10-kilometer radius of the ACFL. The FWF were also obligated to notify TFE units when any personnel or equipment moved through the ZOS. Communication was maintained with FWF headquarters (HQ) and ultimately factional liaison officers (LOs) were located at the brigade HQ to facilitate this process. NOTE: A TTP for separation of forces is outlined in Appendix A.

LESSONS LEARNED
  • To separate the forces, you must know their locations - - require the factions to provide maps and overlays of the disposition of their forces and equipment.
  • Require faction LOs to collocate with your TOC. Establish a separate location for their working area, but ensure they are accessible.
  • Ensure you have communications with the faction's headquarters.

TOPIC: Establishing Freedom of Movement.

DISCUSSION: Part of the implementation of the GFAP included ensuring freedom of movement through the ZOS. Freedom of movement was not solely for TFE convenience. The goal was to assist in providing the FWF with the ability to restore normal commercial and civilian traffic along the main highways of the country. All of this required an enormous effort on the part of the TFE combat soldiers. As a result, the initial focus of the brigade's efforts was to clear routes within the ZOS.

LESSON LEARNED: When establishing a ZOS, one of the initial priorities is to establish freedom of movement - - for both your force and civilian traffic.

TOPIC: Positioning of Forces.

DISCUSSION: Force positioning often became an issue during JMCs as it pertained to guaranteeing freedom of movement. It must be underlined that TFE forces would not be positioned by the faction forces, but in a manner that TFE commanders saw fit to accomplish the mission. Primarily, the faction forces were concerned with the security of one of their villages. Often these villages were on the confrontation line or just on the other side of the confrontation line.

The faction military leadership tried to barter deals. They would offer to pull back on the condition that we establish checkpoints. Initially, this sounded correct. Part of the TFE mission was to establish checkpoints to guarantee freedom of movement across the ZOS. It quickly became obvious that the intent of the factions was to create a picket line with TFE forces because they had doubts in the security of their people. TFE commanders were forced to face this issue at a JMC. The result was to tell the factions that the TFE troops were not theirs to command.

TFE had only a finite number of forces, and placement of those forces depended on several factors. TFE commanders had to place checkpoints where they could guarantee freedom of movement and at the same time be visible to the local population. This could not be accomplished with soldiers positioned in an isolated area with any tactical significance.

The placement of TFE forces could be accomplished in many ways. The key to the operation was visibility. Soldiers had to conduct day and night patrols along all routes and across country that were cleared. TFE forces manned checkpoints along the primary commercial and civilian traffic routes to ensure that freedom of movement was retained once it was established. Key intersections, interchanges, and bridges had to be secured and retained by the TFE elements.

LESSONS LEARNED
  • Placement of forces must perform two roles - - ensure freedom of movement and
  • maintain visibility.
  • Placement of forces must help build a feeling of security for the population and
  • the armies of the factions to establish the environment for separation of forces and a return
  • to peace. Placement of forces must not be tied to the outpost concerns of the faction
  • military. If this happens, we lose the initiative.

TOPIC: Route Clearance in the ZOS.

DISCUSSION: Route clearance or "ZOS Breaching" was the technique used by TFE units to clear routes in the ZOS to facilitate freedom of movement. TFE TRP/CO commanders would link up with their FWF counterparts and coordinate the tasks to be accomplished from the task schedule agreed upon at the weekly coordination meeting. Linkups would take place on both sides of the ZOS with the respective FWF leader. FWF soldiers (overwatched by TFE units) would begin clearance from their side, working toward the ACFL. It was essential that the clearance be conducted simultaneously because the FWF were concerned that their factional counterpart was not executing their responsibilities in the clearance. NOTE: The detailed steps and performance measures are outlined in Appendix B.

LESSONS LEARNED
  • To the greatest extent possible, make the factions do the work. Demonstrate impartiality when providing assistance - - identify the requirements in the coordination meeting with all factions present.
  • Your responsibility is to verify that the factions complete the task to standard and to provide security to prevent a confrontation.

TOPIC: Proofing Routes.

DISCUSSION: Ideally, the FWF would have been responsible to both clear and "proof" the routes, ensuring that the area was free of mines. However, as already indicated, the FWF did not have the appropriate equipment (e.g., mine plows) to effectively complete the task to standard. Consequently, TFE units were often required to proof the routes. After the FWF completed clearance of the route, the route was then usually proofed by an M1 tank with a roller. Proofing could be a potentially dangerous business given that three mine detonations occurred in the brigade's sector during proofing missions. Nonetheless, the impact of these detonations was minimized, resulting in no injuries to soldiers and minimal damage to equipment because of the TTP employed by TFE units. These TTP were developed and refined as a result of a highly successful after-action review and lessons learned program adopted by TFE.

LESSONS LEARNED
  • Mines deteriorate over time and perform unpredictably. In two incidents of detonations, mines did not function as they were designed nor as they should have given the specific incident scenario. In one incident, the mine was crossed by an M1 with a roller at least four times. It did not detonate until a much lighter CEV traversed the mine. On the other mine detonation, the mine had been traversed by an M1 with a roller twice with no reaction. It was the third crossing that initiated the mine reaction. Both of these events indicate that we cannot absolutely depend upon published technical data.
  • Terrain affects proofing, specifically road conditions. In each detonation, the roads were unimproved (not paved). The brigade has dictated that no unimproved road will be traversed by a wheeled vehicle without the expressed permission of a battalion commander.
  • Environmental conditions affect proofing. In each of the incidents, the environmental conditions may have contributed to the event at that moment in time. For example, light or soil conditions due to time of day or temperature. However, the bottom line is that the environment can neither facilitate nor negate the issue that there is an estimated six million mines and countless UXOs in theater. Prudent and deliberate risk analysis in concert with mission development must be sustained.
  • Require the factions to provide minefield records. In all but one of the minefield incidents, minefield records, with varying degrees of detail, were being translated. The Division's Mine Action Center provided an extremely valuable tool to further negate mine incidents in known minefields. However, there were countless minefields and lone mines in addition to the thousands of unexploded munitions and miscellaneous ordnance that litter the countryside. This was TFE's greatest threat. It was soon discovered that the premier defense against unrecorded mines and other ordnance would be trained and vigilant soldiers.
  • Some new technological advances, not available to the unit at the time, could prove to be useful in the future. These technologies include:
    • The M60 Chassis which could be used for remote controlled clearing (proofing) operations.
    • The Panther which is a remote-controlled M60 blade-tank chassis.
    • The Vallon Detector is mounted on a remote-controlled 5-ton or HMMWV. The detector is tied into the brakes to stop the vehicle upon detonation of a mine.
  • Mine plows have potential in facilitating the proofing process. Because of the composition of the soil on unpaved roads and the deteriorated state of some mines, mine rollers often force mines into the ground rather than detonating them. Most mines employed by the factions function optimally buried from zero to 6 inches (the exception is the TMM 1 which can function buried up to 59 inches). The mine plow moves up to 12 inches of dirt. Consequently, mine plows may be the best option for clearing/proofing. However, mine plows will have an adverse impact on the conditions of the roads which would require a considerable engineer effort to reverse.

Section II: Planning ZOS Operations
Section III: Establishing the ZOS, Part 2



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