SECTION I
A Note on the Operational Environment in Bosnia
One of the most unique aspects was the concept of verification of FWF compliance. One must keep in mind that when the GFAP stated that all mines will be cleared from the ZOS, it was the FWF that cleared the mines, not TFE units and soldiers. Ensuring or enforcing compliance translated into TFE soldiers and leaders observing the FWF execute the mission and then verifying that it was completed to standard. Caution had to be applied to ensure impartiality. If one FWF perceived that TFE units were providing additional assistance to another FWF, then the consequence could be the degradation of consent of the slighted faction. This was a source of friction for TFE because of the disparity and quality of equipment (the FWF had one mine plow among all three of the factions), and levels of training (some FWF subordinate units were more efficient in completing tasks than others). At the same time, there were instances where the mission would not have been completed without the assistance of TFE forces. It was a leadership challenge to weigh task accomplishment vice maintaining impartiality. Therefore, the parameters of TFE assistance had to be delineated at the JMCs and coordination meetings.
Operation Joint Endeavor exposed US commanders to the concept of Joint Military Commissions (JMC) for the first time. Operations during OJE required substantial direct contact and political interaction between military commanders and faction military or political leaders. The aim of this interaction was resolving conflicts or securing the consent or cooperation of local leaders. This may require commanders to bring together protagonists to negotiate agreements or mediate disputes. In short, U.S. forces, even at the tactical level, found themselves engaged in a political process. In such situations, commanders could not expect to function successfully using purely military principles and logic. The ability to also manipulate a combination of political power and interests, cultural values, personalities and, perhaps, most important, perceptions, was critical to mission success. In OJE, TFE found that the JMC process was extremely valuable and an indispensable part of their mission to guarantee the peace in the former Yugoslavia.
| Note: The term "Joint Commission" is used throughout this newsletter as a generic term to describe formally established bodies in which local representatives of different parties in the conflict meet under the implementation force's supervision to make decisions, be informed of implementation force intentions, and to resolve disputes. |
The stability operations environment provided unique considerations for maneuver and mobility. Maneuvering and positioning for advantage, at times, entailed relatively little movement or relocation of forces after the initial positions and lodgement areas are obtained. The mobility challenges were much the same as in combat environments, with the exception that TFE forces were not only applying their own mobility assets, but also worked with faction forces and civil authorities to overcome mobility challenges.
In conventional combat, units change location with respect to each other or add combat power to mass their effects by changing force ratios. The early phases of OJE demonstrated that maneuver had very little to do with movement of forces. In OJE, following the entry operation, maneuver sometimes took the form of forceful discussion carried out at a JMC. Maneuver also took the form of movements and positioning to provide security to the opposing factions as they carried out the agreed-upon peace plan. "Positional advantage" sometimes was best be gained and retained by ensuring the factional perception that the TFE was an impartial enforcer of the GFAP.
The extraordinary number of mines in the theater caused mine-clearing and marking operations to have an influence on all levels of the operation. Mines were the greatest threat to force protection and the success of the mission. The ability of the TFE forces to conduct the mission without sustaining casualties communicated the proficiency and competency of NATO forces. Such a perception would be a major contributor to the successful fulfillment of the end state
One of the characteristics of OJE was that the FWF had been engaged in a war of attrition, fought from trenches and bunkers along battle lines that changed hands several times. The trench systems lined either side of the confrontation line in the ZOS and, between these trenches, were numerous mine fields and destroyed villages. The roads through the ZOS had been blocked by means of mine fields, craters, tank ditches, berms, and bunkers.
The minefields off the roads and between the trenches were very difficult to clear because there was often confusion as to the exact positioning of mines. Since the battle lines changed hands, the factions could not guarantee the location of the mines. They would not clear many of these fields, while TFE was only responsible for mine-clearance verification. Therefore, until a mine-clearing capability was contracted, there were many off-the-road regions within the ZOS that may never be cleared for civilian use. Although this does not hinder mobility on the primary routes, it does restrict any movement off of the roads if there was a need to deploy off of the route of march.
Regions of the ZOS that were not cleared hindered the continued dismantling of the FWF defensive positions. As long as mine fields remained uncleared, collapsing trenches and destroying bunkers could not take place. The uncleared areas would always be a threat to force protection as long as TFE forces had to continue operating in the ZOS.
The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) was extremely high. Partly, this was due to the phenomenon of simultaneous deployment and employment, requiring TFE to conduct the deployment concurrent to executing its mission of enforcing the GFAP. Essentially, units were arriving into their AOR, immediately commencing operations, while at the same time establishing their operating bases. This was a result of the stringent timelines of the GFAP. For example, by the time the brigade had deployed two battalions in the AOR, two weeks remained before the requirements of TOA + 30 had to be met.
The size of the observed brigade's AOR, the number of obstacles that had to removed from the ZOS, and other operational requirements contributed to the high OPTEMPO. TFE units exceeded yearly OPTEMPO norms within weeks. By the end of January 1996, the one TFE unit had exceeded the average yearly OPTEMPO by 300 percent. In the early phase of the deployment, M2 and M3 usage was averaging as much as 100-130 Km/day/vehicle. Many of the wheeled vehicles had exceeded 3,000 miles since deployment. The demands of the exercise greatly exceeded the historical demands placed on the system during training.
Even with the friction caused by all these factors, the ZOS was established and the timelines were met. The success can be attributed to many factors to include excellent pre-deployment training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), soldiers and leaders who were mentally and physically prepared for the mission, and the willingness of the FWF to comply with the GFAP. However, most important, TFE units executed the tasks in accordance with their training, adopted and refined TTP when required, and maintained flexibility in both planning and execution.
Introduction
Section
II: Planning ZOS Operations
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