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Military

INTRODUCTION

Establishing and Controlling a Zone of Separation (ZOS)


Concurrent with the deployment of Task Force Eagle (TFE) into Bosnia, the initial focus of operations was to separate the former warring factions (FWF) and ensure compliance in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). Paramount to the success of this mission was the establishment of the zone of separation (ZOS). In simple terms, the ZOS is a buffer zone between the FWF. However, the ZOS, as defined in the GFAP, was represented by several potentially complex control measures which merit further explanation.

The Agreed Cease Fire Line (ACFL): This is the place where the fighting stopped. TFE units marked this line and two-kilometer zones on both sides of the ACFL. This four-kilometer zone was the ACFL ZOS.

The Inter-Entity Boundary (IEBL): This is the line that the parties in Dayton decided would be the permanent boundary between them. In some instances, the IEBL and the ACFL were the same, and in other places, they were not. The IEBL came into effect 45 days after TFE accepted transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force (UNIPROFOR). At this time, the IEBL ZOS and its associated four-kilometer buffer zone replaced the ACFL ZOD and became the permanent zone of separation.

The Areas of Transfer (AOT): These are areas where the lines do not directly correspond. These are areas that are to be turned over from one party to another.

The 10-Kilometer Zone: The factions were also required to report the status of all their equipment and forces within a 10-kilometer radius on either side of the ACFL. This was not a bigger ZOS. However, TFE dedicated considerable assets to verify FWF compliance with the reporting requirements.

The ZOS was a dynamic area which changed in size in accordance with the requirements and specified timelines of the GFAP. Most of the timelines were based on events that followed the transfer of authority (TOA) from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the Implementation Force (IFOR). The following represents these requirements as they pertain to the establishment of the ZOS.

TOA + 30 Days: All parties must accomplish the following:
  • Parties must withdraw all forces to their respective side of the ACFL ZOS.
  • Remove all mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), explosive devices, wire obstacles and fortifications.

TOA + 45 Days:
  • The IEBL comes into effect.
  • Withdrawing forces must completely vacate and clear AOTs, to include the removal of mines, demolitions, and UXO.

TOA + 91 Days: Entities to which an area is being transferred shall not put forces into the new areas until this date, or as determined by the IFOR commander.

All TFE brigade-sized task forces were responsible for at least one ZOS in their area of responsibility (AOR). One brigade's assigned ZOS(s) will be represented in this newsletter (this particular brigade was actually responsible for three separate ZOS in their AOR). However, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) represented in this document generally reflect those TTPs generally employed by all brigade task forces (TFs) in theater.

The observed brigade had the unique responsibility of enforcing the GFAP through coordination with all three factions. Their sector spanned 58 kilometers north to south and 66 kilometers from the east to the west. Within their AOR, the brigade was responsible for 114+ kilometers of ZOS. Additionally, the brigade was responsible for verifying the removal of over 1,306 bunkers, 713 minefields, and 200 kilometers of trenchlines. The AOR also included seven major populated areas and numerous smaller towns which required dedicated assets to ensure mission success. To facilitate force protection and sustainment operations, 11 company-sized lodgement areas were established along with the Brigade Operating Base (BOB) and the Brigade Support Area (BSA). Platoon-sized units manned 11 checkpoints, four permanent observation posts, and secured several other critical nodes.



Foreword
Section I: A Note on the Operational Environment in Bosnia



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