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• Commanders determined which routes were required to be opened and then synchronized resources to facilitate deliberate and faithful execution.

• Troop and company commanders held daily coordination meetings with the factions in their AOR. The coordination meeting set the framework of how the factions would execute their tasks of compliance (e.g., destroying bunkers, clearing minefields) and how the TFE forces would verify the completion of the tasks.

• The TFE forces received detailed maps marking minefield locations. Coordination was made to determine what equipment the FWF units would require to clear routes through their minefields and locate and mark other minefields. The TFE forces had to be ready to provide body armor, Kevlar helmets, medical support, and standard marking supplies to the FWF to get them to clear the fields. All of this coordination had to be worked out through interpreters on the ground in the days before the clearing effort was to begin.

• As U.S. forces moved into sector, the engineers made contact with UN forces and received good information from the NORD bn units in the TFE sector. The information was disseminated to other TFE units through the use of sketches, copies of mine markers, and photographs. UN forces had extensive experience with the mine threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, therefore, were very useful in TFE force protection efforts. Units coordinated with all the factions of the former warring factions (FWF) to clear designated mobility corridors through the ZOS. Either at the JMCs or through direct commander to commander meetings with the FWF brigades, times and linkup points were defined and agreed upon. Usually, the schedule was 0830 linkup with a 0930 work time. At the designated time, the TRP/CO commander or platoon leader would move to a linkup point.

• Simultaneously, both sides would effect a linkup with the TFE elements and begin to organize their work for the day. Usually the mission would be for one or two routes at a time, but it took as many as three per company-size unit initially to facilitate freedom of movement.

• Mobility teams moved to designated checkpoints and made face-to-face coordination the morning of the mission. The lineup for a mobility team was FWF engineers, followed by an M1 tank roller, ACE or a CEV, followed by an engineer squad, followed by a Bradley section or tank platoon, and accompanied by a medic. Often the HVO provided medics as well. After the linkup of forces, the leaders were identified on both sides. The leaders of the clearing teams were further identified and the TRP/CO and FWF leaders physically linked up. At this point the team leaders made detailed plans for the day's work.

• The teams departed together, with the FWF leading the clearing teams into the zone. The FWF forces gathered the necessary equipment, if they had it, and began to clear mines. Very often, one or both of the factions involved would request demolitions, body armor, gasoline or diesel, mine sweepers, and an assortment of other items. It is difficult to determine if they really did not have the means to clear the mines or were merely stalling.

• At this point, it often became necessary to remind the faction leaders that it was their responsibility to clear their mines, not ours. On occasion, the CO/TRP leader on the site had to announce that if the faction leader could not accomplish his mission, he left us with no other recourse than to report failure to comply to our higher headquarters. In essence, this meant that the faction was not fulfilling the GFAP. Usually this was not the case, but in stability operations, the CO/TRP leader on the ground has to be prepared to lay down the law according to the international agreement he is charged to implement.

• The easiest mines to clear were the surface-laid mines. The faction engineers gathered them together and separated the reusable ones from the rusted or semi-destroyed mines. Many were in very bad condition. Some mines were defused and collected, and others had to be blown in place. On-site negotiations were conducted for clearing the shoulders up to 10 meters on either side of the road. The method used by the factions for probing was very different to U.S. methods. The factions had long poles (about a meter) with a three-inch spike on the end. They would merely walk slowly forward jabbing the ground in front of them. They related they were primarily looking for AT mines just below the surface. The factions were very nervous about clearing the PMA-1 AP mines.

• The lanes were cleared in two directions at once. For example, one faction cleared from South to North and another faction cleared from North to South. The CO/TRPs provided security for them as they moved toward each other. One issue that had to be worked on the ground was a meeting point between the two forces. At one point, one side wanted to stop 100 meters short of where the other side would stop. CO/TRP forces on the ground had to push the issue firmly to ensure the job was finished according to the standards of the GFAP. Again, the job of carrying out international policy was subordinated to the ranks of lieutenant, captain and lieutenant colonel.

• Mobility work had to be done to finish the work on the lanes. Often, berms had to be cut, walls or other mobility obstacles had to be dismantled, and craters had to be filled. The ACE was very useful for this. If traffic on a lane was expected to be high, then gravel was needed to pour over filled-in trenches. Otherwise, within 48 hours the earth would sink into the trenches and stop wheeled vehicle traffic on that lane. An example of the battle drill follows:

*The drill also applies to one fraction; half side of drill applies.

Appendix A: TTP for Clearing and Verification

Appendix C: The Mine Threat