USING
DISMOUNTED MECHANIZED INFANTRY IN THE ATTACK:
SOME
PROBLEMS AND SOME SOLUTIONS
GEN George S. Patton's Third Army Standing Operating Procedures discusses the use of dismounted infantry in conjunction with their mounted brethren: "The heavy weapons set the pace. In the battalion, the heavy weapons company paces the battalion. In the regiment, the cannon company paces the regiment, but it is the function of the rifles and light machine guns to see that the heavy weapons have a chance to move. In other words, the rifles and machine guns move the heavy weapons in to do the killing."
The concept of integrating dismounted infantry into the heavy task force scheme of maneuver is not new or unfamiliar to our doctrine. Various FM 7- series and FM 71- series manuals address to varying degrees integrating the dismounted and mounted fight.
In the wide open, expansive desert environment of the National Training Center (NTC), however, units have great difficulty trying to effectively employ dismounted infantry, particularly in offensive operations. Many units at the NTC attempt to conduct dismounted operations, but fail to adequately plan and prepare for the mission.
This article identifies some of the most common problems employing dismounts in mechanized offensive operations, and provides some techniques to solve these problems that units can use to more effectively train at home station prior to their deployment.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Terrain analysis, as a part of describing battlefield effects, is frequently
overlooked as a part of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
2.
The military aspects of terrain are rarely considered when planning operations
integrating dismounts with mechanized forces.
3. Units too often fail to consider light data affecting dismounted operations, especially time of moonrise, percentage of illumination and Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT).
RESULTS:
1.
Dismounted units fail to reach the objective area in enough time to achieve
the assigned purpose.
2. Units get to the objective area, BUT they are combat-ineffective because they spent the night climbing up and down mountains along the route.
3. Units blindly stumble into an enemy position, and become compromised.
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Tailor IPB products for application by all
types
of
elements comprising the order of battle.
2. When planning dismounted employment, realistically calculate time-distance factors; include appropriate recovery prior to fight.
3. Whenever possible take advantage of available darkness when moving or maneuvering dismounted forces.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Some company commanders are failing to use the task-force situational template,
and are not adequately conducting their own IPB.
2. Many commanders fail to consider enemy dispositions when planning their unit's operations. They use only the task force S2's platoon position templates, rather than try to template vehicles on the objective in relation to the terrain.
3. Many units fail in the final step of the IPB process, determining enemy courses of action. EXAMPLE: Units do not consider what actions the enemy may take if a dismounted attack is launched against their flank early in the morning. Even a perfectly executed dismounted attack, if launched too early without the support of the mounted element, can easily be overcome by an enemy counterattack.
RESULTS:
1.
Dismounted elements frequently are expected to conduct night movements exceeding
8 kilometers forward
of the FEBA without knowledge of the enemy composition, disposition or strength
in the objective area.
2. Intended deliberate attacks degenerate into unsupported search and attack missions.
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Plan dismount and remount points along the designated route to avoid
detection and/or direct fire
in
case the dismounted element must remount in a hurry.
2. Carefully plan avenues of approach into an objective area used by dismounted anti-armor systems, and the assault positions they will use, whether mounted or dismounted. These systems, with the exception of the M220 TOW, must be employed within the ranges of the enemy tanks and BMPs they are trying to find and destroy.
3. Co/Tm commanders should use Terrabase products from the S2 to assist in templating objective areas down to individual vehicles.
4. At brigade and task force levels, consider using chemical strikes and/or FASCAM to tie the enemy's defense to restrictive terrain, and, therefore, cut down the enemy's mobility; ensure the employment of these special munitions is not a surprise to dismounted elements.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Too many commanders have an overly optimistic view of their unit's physical
conditioning.
2. Units fail to distinguish between the combat load that can be carried and the combat load necessary to achieve a specific purpose. Too often soldiers are overloaded with equipment they do not need for a given mission, especially if a link-up with their BFVs is planned and rehearsed.
3. Many units now create a consolidated dismounted element under the leadership of one platoon leader, or a company/team commander who has never trained with these dismounts before; squads from different companies and platoons within a task force are thrown together and expected to function. The differences in operating procedures alone worsen an already difficult time management problem for the element leader.
4. Too many task force and co/tm commanders are almost totally removed from the planning and preparation of dismounted missions. In many cases the task is left to a 2d lieutenant.
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Realistically tailor soldier load to the specific mission, i.e., a reconnaissance
and security mission probably does not require all the anti-armor systems the
dismounted element can carry. Refer to FM
7-10
for
doctrinal guidance relating soldier load to specific purposes.
2. Do not employ ad hoc organizations in a time-constrained environment and expect them to smoothly function. If you want to employ a consolidated dismounted element, then organize for combat that way at home station during training exercises, the same way you would task-organize your mech/armor elements to establish habitual associations.
3. Commanders at all levels should be as much involved in the planning and preparation of dismounted operations as they are in any other aspect of the planning and preparation for any other aspect of the mission.
Table
of Contents
Route
Clearance Operations
Using
Dismounted Mechanized Infantry in the Attack, Part 2
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