Military

TECHNIQUES:
1. Task force commanders must decide if the potential gain of pre-battle dismounted employment outweighs the potential risk to the overall mission success if the dismounted element is destroyed. Is there a place on the battlefield later in the course of the battle where the use of dismounts is more critical?

2. IF the commander determines the employment of dismounts is so important to the success of the task force that he is willing to risk their loss forward of the task force, then the dismounted element must be focused on a clearly defined and achievable purpose.

3. Regardless of when and where the dismounted elements are employed, their purpose should be linked to the task force main effort and the accomplishment of the task force purpose at the decisive point.

PROBLEMS:
1. Unit dismounted elements conduct attacks forward of the task force, hours before the mounted task force elements cross the line of departure (LD).

2. Units fail to plan for, and conduct, defile drills. While the fundamentals of the drills are conceptually understood, task force and company/team commanders lack the patience for the dismounted element to adequately clear the defile.

RESULTS:
1. Uncoordinated dismounted attacks, even if initially successful, allow the OPFOR to both counterattack the dismounts, and also to reposition forces prior to the mounted portion of the operation.

2. As the dismounted element conducts the clearance of the defile, the maneuver commander will lose patience with the speed of the operation and order the movement of the mounted force through the defile, usually resulting in the loss of all or most of the company/team.

TECHNIQUES:
1. EXAMPLE: Conduct a coordinated attack in which a dismounted element clears a route along a flank of an enemy position to guide or assist the mounted element in getting to the position of advantage.

2. EXAMPLE: Conduct a coordinated attack where the dismounted element attacks the enemy's flank simultaneously with the mounted elements initial attack on another axis.

3. Use the dismounted element as a reconnaissance force with the mission to guide the mounted elements into attack by fire or support by fire positions. The dismounts would have reconnoitered the positions, and would know they provide the necessary protection for the mounted force, while providing the best fields of fire on the enemy vehicle positions.

EXAMPLE: Ideally these positions would be established along the enemy's assailable flank with covered routes as close to the positions as possible. Even if the dismounted force was unable to identify a clear route for the mounted force, the confirmation of the enemy template could provide the task force commander enough information to decide if attacking that flank with his mounted force is viable.

4. Proper clearance of a defile takes time. Detailed rehearsals of this drill will provide a good estimate for the amount of actual time necessary.

5. When planning the employment of dismounted elements in the attack, the key to success is to have the dismounts remain uncompromised until that time when the task force can bring both the fires of the mounted and the dismounted force to bear against the enemy at once. 

PROBLEM: Task force FSOs have a tendency to concern themselves only with planning fires for the task force-mounted elements.

TECHNIQUES:
1. The task force FSO must plan supporting fires for the dismounted element(s) that support their scheme of maneuver, and then retain the flexibility to refine target as necessary.

2. The company/team FSO must be sure not to neglect planning fire support for the mounted element, IF the FSO is going to accompany the dismounts.

3. The co/tm FIST traveling with the mounted element must carefully prepare the observation plan.

PROBLEM: The employment of dismounted elements forward of the brigade main body prior to launching offensive operations dramatically increased the risk of fratricide for the dismounts, as well as other specialty elements forward of the main body.

TECHNIQUES:
1. ALL units in the brigade must understand that friendly elements, including dismounts, are forward the respective task forces.

2. Units, such as the task force security company, the task force scouts, the brigade COLTs and air defense and electronic warfare elements positioned forward, must know where friendly dismounts will be operating; the dismounted elements must also know the locations of the specialty units potentially operating in their zone of attack.

3. Establish and disseminate restricted and no-fire zones.

4. Devise detailed direct fire plans specific to the mounted and dismounted forces. Measures to control direct fires must be understood by all elements if mounted elements work to support by fire the dismounted element.

5. Consider the discarding sabot arc of both Bradleys and main battle tanks when planning direct fires and unit schemes of maneuver.

6. Plan for link-up and remount points.

7. Conduct detailed rehearsals.

EXAMPLE: The direct fire fight of the dismounted and mounted forces, and how they must position and orient their fires into the objective area in relation to each other.

8. Refer to FM 90-4 for the specific formats for Air Mission Briefing and Air Assault Operations Order, if dismounted infantry will be inserted into the area of operations, and if unit SOPs lack specific procedures for air assault/mobile operations.

PROBLEM: Inadequate prior planning and coordination to ensure the communication capability of the dismounted element.

TECHNIQUES:
1. The task force signal officer must be part of the planning process and try to predict potential problems impacting the communications ability of the dismounted element. Then, to prevent these potential problems, the signal officer must recommend potential solutions so the element can be adequately equipped prior to their mission.

2. Using a task force retrans or company/team relay to facilitate communications are two successful techniques. NOTE: Company command posts must be prepared to execute this support.

PROBLEM: a lack of detailed casualty evacuation planning results in an unacceptably high died of wounds (DOW) rate for dismounted elements.

TECHNIQUES:
1. Plan to use company wheeled assets, positioned forward, to assist in the evacuation of dismounted casualties.

2. Plan to use an attached M113 ambulance, or the first sergeant's M113, if so organized and/or equipped.
NOTE: If the M113 ambulance is used forward, the task force medical platoon leader should plan to support the company's mounted element and request support through the forward support battalion medical company.

3. The dismounted element should include as many combat lifesavers, with properly stocked lifesaver bags, as possible. NOTE: Make the necessary sacrifices at home station to get as many soldiers as possible trained as Combat Lifesavers.

4. Consider using the task force physician's assistant (PA) to move with the dismounted element. However, in a risk assessment, factor in the cost of the PA's potential loss, and the limited amount of Class VIII that he can physically carry.

Dismounted mechanized infantrymen can be a significant combat multiplier for mounted forces - even in the open, desert terrain of the NTC. Successful dismount employment, however, requires detailed planning, coordination, and rigorous home station training to be successful - the same formula for mission accomplishment that applies to the employment of all combat elements.

Table of Contents
Using Dismounted Mechanized Infantry in the Attack, Part 1
The Salute Report