ROUTE
CLEARANCE OPERATIONS
by
CPT John Leighow, Engineer Branch, USAISU.S. forces deployed to Bosnia as part of a NATO peacekeeping force will operate in an area estimated to be littered with millions of landmines constituting one of the most significant threats faced by our troops. Route clearance in this area of operations will be an oft-repeated mission.
Units training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) routinely conduct route clearance operations. Long-term observation demonstrates very limited success in these missions because of a lack of effective countermine technology, limited route clearance doctrine, and unit training shortfalls.
Since World War II, a steady increase in mine warfare casualties suggests deficiencies both in countermine technology and training. Landmines accounted for 4.4 percent of the casualties in World War II. This figure jumped to 33 percent in Vietnam. During Operation DESERT STORM, 20 percent of the U.S casualties were from landmines, and, in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, 26 percent of the casualties resulted from landmines. Mine technology and employment have surged. Countermine operations, however, are mired in technology over 50 years old, and receive limited training emphasis. Today's mines consist of blast-resistant fuses and use magnetic or seismetic signatures to initiate a blast. These technologically advanced mines are also cheap and readily available on the world market. Their abundant use in the Bosnia theater is graphic testimony to this reality. Yet, countermine operations too often consist of individual soldiers warily using bayonets to probe the ground for mines.
However, limited training and a lack of specific doctrinal guidance on route clearance/countermine operations, not technology, are the most significant reasons units experience problems.
The JRTC Opposing Force (OPFOR) uses mine warfare as an integral part of their tactics. Most OPFOR mine warfare concentrates on the routes comprising the BLUFOR ground lines on communication (LOC). These LOCs are the mobility corridors and avenues of approach used to move forces, equipment and supplies. BLUFOR units must clear the LOCs of any obstacles and enemy activity that could disrupt the free battlefield circulation of forces and materiel.
PROBLEM: Most BLUFOR units do not recognize route clearance as a combined arms operation. Units routinely attempt operations to clear LOCs without the required planning, task organizing, rehearsing and battletracking.
RESULT: Units routinely employ a technique called "Thunder Run." Unit soldiers drive roads and trails at approximately 15 mph, or greater, hoping to see minefields. They usually find them when the lead vehicle explodes.
The
continued use of "Thunder Run" demonstrates the shortfall in unit training,
which may be a result of a lack of specific how
to
doctrine.
While current countermine technology remains extremely limited, there are training
measures units can implement that will allow them to maintain their mobility
and avoid unnecessary casualties.
These
techniques and procedures can result in more successful route clearance and
countermine operations, both at the training centers and, more importantly,
during real-world operations.
Successful
route clearance and countermine operations result from a combination of predictive
intelligence, Battlefield Operating System (BOS) planning,
and then the employment of the appropriate route clearance method using the
most appropriate route
clearance technique.
Finally, units must then battletrack before and during mission execution.
Technique: Units need to use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products in conjunction with the Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) to establish a minefield/ambush situation template (SITEMP).
- 1.
The S2 and the engineer can use this SITEMP to identify the most probable danger
areas, and designate them as named areas of interest (NAIs).
- 2. Use engineers, working in tandem with scouts and infantry to conduct enemy obstacle reconnaissance. This effort should confirm the presence or absence of ambushes and minefields.
Procedure: Use these and other indicators as visible signatures for minefield locations, as well as starting points for finding the enemy and/or his cache sites -
- -
damaged vehicles
- - dead animals
- - avoidance by local population
- - signs of digging
- - signs of concrete removal
- - disturbance in road, such as holes or grooves
- - boxes or parcels placed along the road/shoulder
- - parked vehicles, bicycles, without operators
- - wires on the road surface, or extending onto the shoulders
- - evidence of vegetation disturbance along the shoulders
- - evidence of mine-peculiar supplies: wrenches, shipping plugs, wrapping paper, safety collars from fuses, etc.
- - signs posted that covertly alert the local populace to the presence of mines.
- - disturbances in previous tire tracks
- - dead animals
MINEFIELD INDICATORS
Enemy Technique: The OPFOR will "reseed" a minefield along a military supply route (MSR) once a vehicle or a sweep team has destroyed the previously laid mines. This takes no more than 30 minutes to complete.
RESULT: As the brigade loses more equipment and personnel to reseeded minefields, brigade and battalion task forces divert more combat power to convoy escort. This results in command and staff frustration, and saps the brigade's maneuver initiative.
Ambushes, executed in conjunction with minefields, are the other major threat in route clearance operations. Predictive intelligence can pinpoint potential ambush sites so they can be cleared and secured. Ambushes can occur at almost any portion of a specified route. Typically they center in areas of limited trafficability and they generally require effective fields of fire, cover and concealment.
Small arms fire is the number one killer at the JRTC, and mines are the second highest killer. Several three- to five-man teams with small arms can effectively neutralize a brigade's convoy operations using well-placed ambushes.
Typically the OPFOR will use a minefield to stop an element along the LOC and trigger an ambush to complete the destruction of the BLUFOR element.
Predictive intelligence can help focus where to best use the resources necessary for route clearance and countermine operations. Planning route clearance requires extensive coordination and the prudent use of all available combined arms assets.
Technique: Route clearance operations are very similar to breaching operations; use breaching fundamentals suppress, obscure, secure, reduce (SOSR) as a basis for planning route clearance operations. The task organizing is also very similar:
| BREACHING ELEMENT | ROUTE CLEARANCE |
|---|---|
| assault | security |
| breach | sweep |
| support | support |
The significant difference is that breaching usually occurs during an attack, under enemy fire. Route clearance carries the ongoing risk of enemy contact at any point in the route. However, if the results of predictive intelligence and the subsequent reconnaissance effort are solid, units can reasonably know where risk is the greatest.
BOS Techniques/Procedures -
Intelligence:
Techniques:
1.
Focus IPB on routes to identify high threat areas, e.g., chokepoints, bridges,
culverts, tunnels, intersections, etc.
2.
Identify the most probable locations as NAIs for the reconnaissance effort
3.
Coordinate overflight by UAV and attack helicopter teams to provide daily intelligence
updates; film route by OH-58D if possible.
Procedures:
1.
At battalion level, maintain a minefield incident map and chart to facilitate
pattern analysis. Compare minefield incidents to situation templates and adjust
accordingly.
2.
Provide intelligence updates to company and convoy team leaders before departure.
Maneuver:
Techniques:
1.
Clear and secure flanks (at least 100 meters in forested areas).
2.
Clear and secure the far side of suspected and known obstacles before marking
and clearing of obstacle or route.
3.
Identify and clear potential sniper positions before clearing obstacles.
4.
Provide overwatching fire for sweep team element.
5.
Provide Scout Weapons Teams for route overflight and for security.
Fire Support:
Techniques:
1.
Prepare to fire obscuration and suppressive fire along route on reported and
suspected obstacles and sniper positions.
2.
Prepare to cue the Q-36 radar for counterbattery fire on enemy indirect fire
systems.
Mobility/Survivability:
Techniques:
1.
Conduct Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) in conjunction with the IPB of
the routes.
2.
Provide clearing and sweep teams for routes. (See FM 20-32, Chapter 10.)
3.
Conduct coordinated route reconnaissance to update map information.
Procedure: Provide detailed obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) on minefields.
Combat Service Support:
Technique:
1.
Provide Military Police (preferably with explosive sniffing, military work
dogs) to assist in route clearance and convoy security during and after clearing
operations.
Procedure: Plan for both air and ground evacuation of casualties (CASEVAC).
Command and Control:
Techniques:
1.
Plan centralized (brigade level) or decentralized (battalion/task force level)
route clearance operations according to METT-T.
2.
Task-organize appropriately for the mission and to ensure unity of effort.
3.
Determine routes with definable start and end points.
4.
Fix clearance responsibility between brigade- and battalion-level elements.
5.
Establish clearly identifiable checkpoints along routes to control traffic
and monitor route clearance progress.
6.
Coordinate with adjacent units.
7.
Coordinate additional support forces with unit(s) occupying the surrounding
terrain if the operation is conducted from the brigade level.
8.
Track progress and then revise/adjust maneuver/CSS plan accordingly.
9.
Ensure ground commanders have communication with indirect fire systems, scout
weapon teams, higher headquarters and adjacent units.
10.
The maneuver platoon leader or company/team commander should be the controlling
element on the ground.
These BOS planning considerations demonstrate the necessity for integrated staff planning that results in combined arms mission execution.
Table
of Contents
Route
Clearance Operations, Part 2
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