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This scenario is typical of what the opposing forces (OPFOR) at the JRTC witness when a unit conducts a search and attack. The expansion of this scenario into a typical firelight serves to shed some light on some of the common mistakes observed by the OPFOR during a basic firefight and all the tasks upon which to train prior to a rotation to the JRTC. As the fight ensues, leaders and soldiers alike should easily recognize some blatant mistakes in initiating contact, executing battle drills, consolidating and reorganizing as well as knowing the casualty evacuation process. The scenario will also allow an observant reader to gain some insight into how the OPFOR fights.

INITIATION: First platoon continues to move through the sector in a Ranger file, clearing only a seam through their assigned sector. They have their rucksacks with them since their commander, CPT Harris, did not want to strain the company trains once the company reached its final objective.

SSG Peterson's squad is the lead element for the 1st platoon. Upon cresting a small hill, the point man spots a small team of OPFOR soldiers 50 meters away recovering some cached equipment. The point man, who clearly has the jump on the unsuspecting OPFOR, signals a halt and gives the hand-and-arm signal for enemy. The platoon quickly seeks cover and awaits instructions. At the same time, SGT Steiner, the OPFOR team leader, spots the lead squad of 1st platoon as it noisily seeks cover. He quickly takes three well-aimed shots at the team leader moving to confer with the point man. 1st platoon has suffered its first casualty in the pending firefight.

At this point, the OPFOR has already wrestled the initiative away from 1st platoon. Repeatedly, observations show that a large proportion of contacts are initiated by the OPFOR. This greatly aids the smaller and highly mobile OPFOR elements in their ability to dictate the terms of the engagement. Instead of 1st platoon instinctively initiating the contact and moving directly into a well-rehearsed battle drill, the OPFOR has already begun to set the scenario.

BATTLE DRILLS:SGT Steiner quickly begins to bark orders to his men to conduct a drill they have executed countless times before. The men are rapidly paired off into two-man teams and SGT Steiner tells them to "box 'em in!" Two pairs of the OPFOR soldiers quickly disappear into the woods as SGT Steiner and his wingman throw a CS riot control grenade and lay down effective fire on the immobile 1st platoon. Meanwhile, SSG Peterson, after reporting the contact to 2LT Franklin, tentatively orders his men to return fire, but most are too busy masking to return fire. Some of the men of 1st platoon have shed their rucksacks while others have not, reluctant to leave their home-away-from-home behind. Four minutes after the first shots, 2LT Franklin has made his way forward to assess the situation. He quickly orders the M60 machine gun team forward to help suppress the enemy.

A weakness observed frequently is the inability of units to instinctively react to contact and move into a well-oiled baffle drill. At the junior level, initiative is either not displayed or it is stifled by the chain of command. However, this is especially critical for a lead element in contact. The leader of a lead element must have the experience and the authority to quickly develop a situation rather than halt to wait for the platoon leader or company commander to assess the situation. This elongated period of transition allows the OPFOR to set the terms of the engagement.

LESSON: By focusing training primarily at the squad and platoon levels (situation exercises or STX lanes are an excellent method) to the near exclusion of training at company and battalion levels, a unit is actually building the blocks of a strong foundation. A strong foundation is one based on cohesively trained squads - also on squad leaders and team leaders who are confident, tested and have a mandate from their leaders, while remaining within the framework of the commander's intent, to control situations at their level.

2LT Franklin, with his M60 team emplaced and returning a heavy volume of fire, has bounded SGT Elias' 2d squad around to the right. As SGT Elias' squad is moving, they come under effective fire from their right flank by two of SGT Steiner's soldiers. 1st platoon is playing right into the hands of SGT Steiner. 2LT Franklin dejectedly receives the report of contact and fresh casualties. He now decides that the 3d squad is needed to assist the two squads already in contact. SGT Steiner, now feeling the tide shift, orders his two-man team to disengage. They handily move back, covering each other as one man bounds back at a time. 2LT Franklin has also sensed the shift, and he now orders SSG Peterson and the M60 team to move to their right to assist the supposedly flanking SGT Elias. SPC De Clerq, a seasoned OPFOR soldier, now feels it is time for his team to move forward from their hide position. As SSG Peterson's men move to the assistance of SGT Elias' pinned-down squad, his element begins to receive effective small arms fire from their rear. SSG Peterson's men quickly return fire inflicting a casualty upon the OPFOR, but not before SSG Peterson himself, among others, is also injured. This greatly adds to the already confusing situation. To compound the situation, SGT Steiner returns to hit the 1st squad in the flank again. He then orders the OPFOR elements to pull out just as the lead elements of the 2d platoon begin to arrive on the scene.

CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION: The entire firefight lasts 25 minutes. The final tally is three killed in action, two litter-urgent, three litter-priority and one OPFOR litter-urgent. The 2d platoon moves into the area and sweeps the immediate vicinity, turning up nothing, before emplacing a hasty perimeter. The 1st platoon deploys their aid and litter teams while most of the men move to retrieve their rucksacks. SFC Barnes begins to have the casualties brought to a small clearing in the center of the hasty perimeter. The combat lifesavers and the platoon medic begin to treat the casualties as 2LT Franklin radios a request for medical support to CPT Harris. Many of the soldiers are very tired following their movement with rucksacks and the subsequent strenuous firefight. As the leaders busy themselves with preparing reports and discussing what needs to be done, the soldiers, sensing that the action is over, have become complacent, especially in light of the 2d platoon moving in and helping secure the area. Therefore, no one notices when SGT Steiner and his RTO creep back to within 250 meters of the perimeter.

Instead of initiating contact, SGT Steiner pulls out his map and binoculars. Within seven minutes, while the disjoined 1st platoon is still gathering rucksacks and transporting casualties, mortar rounds begin to fall in and around the perimeter following one adjustment. The platoon is forced to pick up and move out with all equipment and casualties in tow. Unhindered by a lack of early warning, such as observation posts or alert local security, SGT Steiner redeploys along with the 1st platoon. The mortar scenario is played out once again forcing the already exhausted platoon to move a second time along with their growing casualties.

LESSON: Consolidation and reorganization must be leader-driven, but initiated by the individual soldier to quickly accomplish all necessary tasks. This allows the unit to effectively continue the mission. Consolidation and reorganization is another task that should be routine. Units must never allow the security posture to erode during this process, and the immediate area must also be secured. Soldiers must remain alert, and junior subordinates must be prepared to fill vacant leadership spots. Instead of clearing the area of any OPFOR, this unit has ceased its search-and-attack mission to concentrate solely on consolidating and the evacuation of wounded soldiers. The focus of the mission has shifted from a search and attack to an exercise in casualty evacuation.

CASUALTY EVACUATION: SGT Steiner has also switched gears. SGT Steiner has now set up two ambushes along the most likely avenue of approach leading to the casualty collection point (CCP). Fully one and one-half hours into the contact, two unescorted front-line ambulances (FLAs) slowly plod their way toward the CCP. Suddenly, 200 meters from the CCP, fire once again erupts as the two unarmed FLAs are quickly taken out in SGT Steiner's snare. The FLAs have become part of the problem instead of part of the solution. Now, two hours into the contact, three litter-urgent patients have died of wounds, including the OPFOR soldier, a missed opportunity for the task force counterintelligence team. CPT Harris now calls for another evacuation mission and wisely warns the TOC of the OPFOR in the area. He also orders the 2d platoon to clear, but not to secure the area. 2LT Lynn of 2d platoon details one squad to sweep the local area. The small, highly mobile squad bumps into SGT Steiner and part of his element as they are withdrawing from the ambush site. The squad quickly initiates fire, and the squad leader deploys the trail team. Once more, a casualty is inflicted upon C Company; nevertheless, the squad has pushed SGT Steiner away from the perimeter, while 2LT Lynn has dispatched another squad to flank the OPFOR. SGT Steiner hears the squad pushing on his flank and determines it is time to depart the immediate area for good. The two squads from 2d platoon do not pursue. Instead, they begin to move the wounded soldier back to the now burgeoning CCP just as the last mortar rounds called in by SGT Steiner fall in the immediate area. SGT Steiner moves further out along the major avenue of approach leading to C Company's position. He emplaces a deception minefield using some wooden boxes on the road and sets in another ambush awaiting the next attempt at casualty evacuation.

LESSON: During Casualty evacuation, it is the responsibility of the unit being supported to secure the area around the CCP or pick-up zone for the safe passage of the FLAs or helicopters. Unescorted FLAs are extremely vulnerable, and a task force is negligent when allowing this to repeatedly occur. Units must also be careful not to allow the casualty evacuation process to become their primary focus and detract from the mission at hand.

This time the two FLAs are being escorted by a section of Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs). SGT Steiner decides it's a good time to depart the area, and he and his element melt into the woodline. As the sun begins to set, fully four and one-half hours after the initial contact, SGT Steiner and his men head for their well-hidden patrol base for some much-needed rest. Meanwhile, the BFV section leader has called CPT Harris to tell him they have come across a minefield and will be delayed while the dismounts clear the road of mines. 2LT Franklin and SFC Barnes look tiredly at one another, grudgingly accepting that it will be another long night.

CONCLUSION: A rotation through the JRTC is a great opportunity for a unit to put all its elements through a rigorous test. However, units must ensure that all critical tasks and battle drills have been thoroughly perfected, especially at the squad and platoon levels, prior to the rotation, to receive the most out of the rotation. The scenario highlighted in this article is one repeatedly witnessed at the JRTC by the OPFOR. Realizing this, unit leaders can use the common mistakes illustrated here when training to ensure that the common pitfalls are avoided. SGT Steiner inflicted maximum casualties, yet wisely conserved his force to fight another day, while the 24-man 1st platoon has been temporarily rendered combat ineffective due to its 11 dead and wounded. Luckily, this is not actual combat, rather, a classroom named JRTC.

Table of Contents

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Part I

National Training Center (NTC)