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The emergence of the Local Air Defense Warning (LADW) in air defense doctrine has given Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) commanders the authority to establish LADWs. This has created a need for developing a standard to change LADWs. Currently, there is no technique or procedure in air defense field manuals explaining a standard for changing LADWs. This paper explains a technique for establishing such a standard, a Division Early Warning Line (DEWL).

Early warning is a function of a time and distance relationship. The goal of early warning is to alert all units to a possible air attack prior to the attack, yet guard against unnecessarily raising the warning and "calling wolf." Aircraft must be picked up far enough out to allow raising the LADW and passage of the early warning, but not so far out that the system loses credibility. The too-close, too-far-out issue can be resolved by applying the six-minute rule.

The standard at division level to pass early warning from the Air Battle Management Operations Center (ABMOC) to all units down to platoon level should be six minutes. Six minutes is a reasonable goal. With command emphasis, priority and training, this goal can be obtained.

Six minutes is used as the goal because it erases the identification of the DEWL. The international standard for aircraft speed is nautical miles per hour (KTS/MPH). To ease the time and distance relationship and navigation, pilots fly at speeds easily divisable by 60, i.e., 300 KTS, 360 KTS, 420 KTS. To establish an early warning line, you identify the primary threat aircraft, take its normal ingress speed, divide it by 10, and convert the answer to nautical miles. The result is the distance from the unit boundary that you draw the DEWL. Using the F-16 as an example, with a CAS ingress speed of 540 KTS, the DEWL would be set at 54 nautical miles from the unit boundary. If there are no aircraft tracks, the LADW is SNOWMAN (ADW White); if tracks show up beyond the DEWL (54 NMs), the LADW is LOOK OUT (ADW Yellow). When the F-16 crosses the early warning line, the LADW would go to DYNAMITE (ADW Red).

Different DEWLs would be established for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, based on threat doctrine and normal flight profiles and speeds. It is conceivable that within the division sector there would be separate DEWLs for forward and rear areas, if threat doctrine supports it. For example, if the threat does not conduct cross-FLOT or deep rotary-wing attacks, there may be no reason to bring the rear to DYNAMITE if rotary-wing attacks only occur in the close battle area.

Commanders should review their procedures on the air defense of their units. Air defense is the responsibility of the unit commander, not the ADA unit. Maneuver commanders need to ask themselves, "If faced with an air threat and no supporting ADA, would I do things differently?" If the answer is yes, the following information can be useful.

Experience at the National Training Center (NTC) has shown that most commanders, when supported by ADA, abdicate their air defense responsibilities and place it entirely on the supporting ADA unit. They do this because they do not understand the difference between air defense and ADA.

Air defense is defined as all actions, active and passive, that reduce or nullify the effects of air attacks. ADA provides air defense fires against attacking aircraft and early warning of air attacks. ADA fires are an active measure. All other active and passive measures are the responsibility of the commander. But why should a commander concern himself with air defense especially if there is supporting ADA? Because the commander is a target for enemy air. Are commanders sure that ADA is available 100 percent of the time? Commanders need to realize that ADA unit commanders are primarily concerned with providing the best ADA coverage possible.

The key word is ADA, not air defense. Air defense is the commander's responsibility. While willing to provide advice and expertise on air defense, ADA commanders generally do not concern themselves with a unit's active or passive air defense measures.

The following, a true incident from the NTC, illustrates this point:

A brigade was conducting a defense in sector mission and had ample intelligence that the enemy would conduct an air assault into the brigade's sector. The air threat had been briefed to all unit commanders at the orders issue and at the brigade rehearsal. The ADA battery developed a counter air assault plan based on the S2's templated LZs.

In the late afternoon, intelligence from division indicated the enemy was preparing to conduct an air assault. In the evening, the Division Early Warning (DEW) net broadcast tracks of in-bound rotary-wing aircraft. The air defense warning was raised to RED/DYNAMITE. The early warning and change in the air defense warning was quickly rebroadcast over ADA and the brigade command nets. Military police reacted by repositioning to templated LZs. ADA units were alerted and ready.

At a task force TOC, the battle captain acknowledged the early warning, logged it in, and ensured it was passed on to the ADA unit. Ten minutes after the first early warning transmission, two HINDs and six transport helicopters directly overflew the TOC at about 50 feet and landed at the LZ only 800 meters away. The HINDs then flew back and destroyed the TOC. What makes this interesting is that the TOC had a total of eight M2 .50 caliber machine guns, but only one was manned. There was the potential for TOC personnel to destroy the entire air assault, but instead, they died needlessly. Why? The battle captain thought that early warning and air defense warnings were for ADA only. He had no standing operating procedure (SOP) or drill on early warnings other than to rebroadcast it. It never occurred to him that this "air assault" information required action on the part of non-air defenders.

The task force commander failed in his air defense responsibility. His task force had no SOP or drill associated with changes in the local air defense warning. If an SOP was available, the eight machine guns would have been manned. In the task force, there was an attitude that air defense is the sole responsibility of ADA. The attitude cost dozens of soldiers. As for the ADA unit, they made the mistake of covering the S2's templated LZs, rather than the rotary-wing air avenues of approach.

Effective air defense requires a combined arms approach that includes ADA and other arms. ADA cannot do it alone. While ADA units generally do very well at the NTC, the combined arms approach varies greatly between units. Stripped down to its essence, most unit's air attack drills state, "If the aircraft is shooting at you, shoot back." As a commander, if you want to execute your responsibility for air defense professionally, you need to pull out of your kit bag something stronger than "shoot back."

The first step in building the air defense kit bag is realizing that it is necessary. Many will argue that according to history, World War II shows that units do not need air defense. Many believe that the air force can protect units from all possible enemy actions. Ask yourself the following questions: What is the attack helicopter threat that I might face? Is it growing or decreasing? What is the cruise missile UAV/RPV threat to me? What is the impact on my unit if an RPV overflys my positions providing targeting data to enemy artillery? What is the-tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat to me? What is the capability of the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy to engage and destroy attack helicopters, RPV/UAVs, cruise missiles, and TBMs? Is it a high or low priority mission? Have the S2/G2 find the answers to these questions, and then decide whether an air defense kit bag is necessary.

Should the maneuver commander decide that he could use a kit bag, solicit the help of an expert to put it together. ADA battalions are willing to provide the commander with expertise. Normally, at brigade level, this would be a battery commander or his designated LO. Task forces normally have a designated ADA platoon leader. Other units should be able to obtain guidance and expertise through the ADA battalion's S3 section. The doctrinal reference for building the kit bag is FM 44-81, Combined Arms Air Defense, May 92.

When building the kit bag, the commander should approach it from a non-ADA perspective. Otherwise, it will become too ADA specific, leaving the nonair defender with insufficient knowledge. Integrate actions with ADA, but do not make them solely dependent on ADA. Continually ask, what or how would the task be accomplished without ADA support?

Following is a list of lessons that may be useful. It is not all-inclusive, but it should provide a sound foundation.

LESSON: Early Warning. Early warning is essential to effective air defense. Commanders must have a means of obtaining it, disseminating it, and an action or drill associated with it. Anyone can and should report unknown or hostile aircraft. The SALUTE report should be used. Despite this, it is surprising the number of soldiers that do not report the observation of aircraft because, "It is the air defender's job." Task force scouts and security elements are a potential source of air attack warning. However, anyone can alert the force. Once early warning is obtained, regardless of the source, it must be treated as FLASH traffic and be rebroadcast. Command nets are the most efficient. There also should be a system of passing information to those not near a radio. Use visual and audio signals, such as flares, flags, horns, and if necessary, the air raid siren.

LESSON: Air Attack Drills. Once early warning is out, it should cause soldiers to do something specific. SOP air attack drills need to be developed for execution on receipt of early warning, not when the first aircraft makes its pass. Drills will vary depending on the unit, mission, and tactical situation. It could be as simple as taking cover in a fighting position, moving to concealed positions, manning crew-served weapons, or engaging aircraft with small arms. What it cannot be is business as usual. Air attack drills should not just exist in SOPs. They must be practiced and included in training events.

LESSON: Know the Air Threat. Air is a combat multiplier that the enemy is going to use against friendly forces. Despite this, few maneuver units know when and where to expect enemy air. They will spend a lot of resources trying to figure out where the AT-5s are positioned, but no effort is given to when and where the HINDs will attack. The battlefield is three dimensional and the third dimension must be given more than a token consideration.

LESSON: Passive Air Defense. Passive air defense is more than just camouflage and standard OPSEC measures. It is considering the air threat in course-of-action development, wargaming, and position selection. It is not positioning the brigade main under the fixed-wing avenue of approach or scheduling the leader's rehearsal during the prime enemy air assault window. Ninety percent of passive air defense is common sense.

If commanders are successful in building the kit bag and then practice using the tools, the commander will fulfill the responsibility, and the unit will be better prepared to face an air attack. With a kit bag and a supporting ADA unit, the enemy air may decide to avert the attack.

The battery-level rehearsal is a significant combat multiplier that is key in integrating and synchronizing the air defense effort. The challenge faced by most units is when and how to conduct a rehearsal. With subordinate Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units spreading throughout the sector with their supported units operating on different planning time lines, conducting a rehearsal may seem too difficult.

Successful units conduct some form of rehearsal for each mission. The type of rehearsal conducted is METT-T-dependent, with time being the main factor. There are two basic types of rehearsals, sand table or terrain model and FM radio. One-on-one briefs and back briefs or rehearsals conducted with several key players missing does not constitute a rehearsal.

The terrain model is the rehearsal of choice. It has the advantage of having key players meet face to face where they can visualize the terrain and scheme of maneuver together. Issues can be quickly discussed and resolved. The main disadvantage of the terrain model rehearsal is time and distance. Finding a time that all key players can meet is very difficult in normal scenarios and impossible in a compressed planning scenario.

The alternative to the terrain model is the FM rehearsal. All key participants come up on the net at a designated time and conduct the rehearsal. The main advantage of the FM rehearsal is that it does not take key leaders from their units, and it is not as dependent on daylight as are most terrain model rehearsals. Thus, the FM rehearsal is more flexible in terms of time.

The key to a successful rehearsal is a plan or standing operating procedure (SOP) on the conduct of rehearsals. Units should train on how to do rehearsals and practice them. It is critical that me FM rehearsal has a set format and procedures. Otherwise, personnel quickly become confused. Most units use the OPORD format with emphasis on paragraphs one and three. C2 and service support are often overlooked, yet they are war stoppers. Units should provide:

• A discussion on early warning.
• NET requirements and users.
• Status of ammunition.
• Casualty evacuation and reporting.

Many ADA batteries choose to conduct a terrain model rehearsal immediately after the brigade rehearsal using the same terrain model. If the key players attend the brigade rehearsal, their understanding of the overall plan is clearer, and it saves time in the conduct of the battery rehearsal. It is important that key leaders have their subordinates conduct troop-leading procedures while the leader is at the rehearsal.

Who needs to attend the rehearsal? Attendance is driven by mission and not by rank. Each unit, regardless of size, that has a specific or unique mission, should be represented. For example, the GS STINGER section with the mission of countering air assaults on AAAs one through three, the ADA scout or sensor moving out with the brigade R&S team, and the DS platoon leaders with the task forces should all attend.

While most Air Defense Artillery (ADA) battery commanders understand the purpose behind expressing a commander's intent, few know how to form a clear, meaningful intent. When the intent process and purpose are not understood, the results are meaningless verbage that do little to focus subordinates in developing sound ADA plans.

Typically, battery orders contain a "check-the-block"-type intent statement. The intent will repeat standard air defense phrases about ADA forward and engaging enemy aircraft to provide freedom to maneuver. However, it says little about what must be done and how to do it.

Successful commanders know that their intent is the foundation of their plan. As such, the plan should contain two essential elements: what must be done to be successful (task and purpose), and how to do it. The intent is a general statement. It is not a detailed discussion on the scheme of maneuver. Begin the intent with a friendly critical events list from the mission analysis and an enemy critical events list from the IPB. From these event lists, the commander should be able to determine critical air defense tasks. For example, the mission may be to conduct a deliberate attack to seize key terrain. A deliberate attack implies prepared enemy positions with obstacles. In turn, this implies air defense of a breach force and the choke point and assembly areas that the breach creates. Once the air defense task list is compiled, the commander should review it and determine how to do it.

The "how" portion of the intent may be a simple statement of responsibility of tasks of GS and DS or gun and missile systems. It may determine air defense phases and assign tasks to specific ADA units during particular phases.

LESSON: A good intent, when combined with a wargamed course of action, provides a framework for the ADA plan. When developing the ADA plan, refer back to the intent to see if the commander's intent has been met and if all events are covered. Then add the details to the "how" portion of the intent. If this can be accomplished without any major changes or omissions, a good intent has been developed.

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