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Introduction. This section provides an update on the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), some new initiatives at the center, but more importantly, training trends and observations over the last quarter.

BRIGADE COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

Brigades are integrating the battlefield operating systems in the deliberate planning process. The brigade task force commanders, executive officers, and S3s are all fully involved in the staff planning process. The executive officers are integrating and driving the staff planning process for the brigade task forces. The S3s are the catalyst for operational planning and the monitoring and battle tracking of the current battle.

However, battle captains often do not understand their role in the tactical operations center (TOC). Frequently, they do not analyze and manage the information provided to them. Often, battle captains receive information from the radio or the radio-telephone operator and post it without analyzing how the information impacts on the brigade's operations. Units must train battle captains on their duties and responsibilities. Units must focus the battle captains' duties as the "processor" of all information received in the TOC. This processing of information must be battle-drilled in all training to ensure that all players understand how information flows. Battle captains must be trained to process the information.

CHEMICAL

Strengths and weaknesses varied during recent rotations. One rotation had little chemical play, but the unit conducted a good intelligence preparation of the battlefield (BIB). Chemical officers considered the use of artillery and air delivery assets for smoke employment to make up for a shortage of attached chemical assets.

Integrating chemical units into the tactical decision making process was a weakness at brigade level. Some units were unable to plan, coordinate and execute smoke missions. Inexperience of chemical personnel and unfamiliarity with smoke employment doctrine created problems. Smoke platoons are routinely tasked to conduct multiple missions throughout the brigade sector even though the sections are not organized or trained to operate independently. C2 and logistics concerns must be addressed when determining and prioritizing smoke missions.

Several units had problems with NBC defensive plans. Some units had a very good divisional-level threat contingency (THREATCON) standing operating procedure (SOP), but failed to follow it. In some cases, the brigade SOP was not complete. However, subordinate units did a credible job of following it. The SOP did not provide sufficient guidance that linked required actions to an escalating NBC threat. Even though the IPB was satisfactory, units could not link actions to the threat that would minimize the dangers of a chemical attack.

ARMOR/MECHANIZED

As the heavy team deploys to the JRTC, it is very capable and adequately trained to execute assigned missions at the team level. Often, the team finds itself executing decentralized operations down to the platoon level. The optimal solution is for the heavy team to remain under control of the brigade task force. However, platoons continue to be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of, or attached to, subordinate battalion headquarters.

In addition, platoons are tasked down to light infantry companies. Typically, platoons are required to execute missions they do not normally train for at home station (i.e., convoy security, route security, and elements of search and attack missions). Feedback from heavy team commanders indicate that these type missions do not typically appear on heavy team Mission-Essential Task Lists (METLs). Consequently, they are not properly trained to execute these tasks to standard. It is recommended that teams develop and rehearse battle drills and SOPs for executing these missions. A crosswalk of the heavy team's METL against that of the brigade task force will identify those tasks that the heavy team should be prepared to execute at all levels. Additionally, a modification to the team's METL may be required when deploying with a light infantry task force.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

Air defense officers have improved their ability to visualize the battlefield by developing an aerial IPB. The aerial IPB provides the basis for developing the air defense plan to support the scheme of maneuver. Placing air defense fire units at the critical place and time on the battlefield with an adequate supply of STINGER missiles has enhanced air defense effectiveness. Air defense effectiveness has been further enhanced by maneuver units contributing to this effort through effective combined arms air defense (self-defense) fires.

Maneuver units continue to sustain avoidable losses by failing to take passive air defense measures. Passive air defense measures are a significant combat multiplier. If the enemy is unable to visually detect a target, it is forced to bomb and strafe blindly, lowering its probability of success.

Air defense fire units continue to sustain avoidable losses. Failure to establish a deliberate fighting position, failure to move to an alternate fighting position after firing, and poor situational awareness have been the major reasons for the greater than 100-percent attrition rate experienced. By following existing field manuals and battalion SOPs, this trend can be reversed.

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

Engineers continually prove that they are well trained at the soldier level, but not in the collective and leader skills with the combined arms team. Challenges encountered include visualizing the battlefield, anticipating events, allocating resources, and battle tracking. Engineer leaders must understand their doctrine and how it applies on the combined arms battlefield. Lack of synchronization is one of the greatest impediments to engineer success.

Mine warfare continues to hinder engineer operations. Engineers do not appreciate the considerable mine threat that exists and are not prepared to accomplish their mobility mission. Frequently, the enemy will steal the initiative by using point minefields on the main supply routes (MSRs). The engineers find themselves merely reacting to the enemy's actions. All soldiers need mine awareness training.

In the defense, engineers are neither following doctrine in developing obstacle plans nor integrating obstacles with direct and indirect fires. Rarely do engineers prepare engineer estimates, preventing the logisticians from re-sourcing the large scale obstacle plans the engineer envisions.

Because of synchronization problems during offensive operations, engineers commonly find themselves conducting breaching operations without the full support of the combined arms team. The breaching tenets (intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass synchronization) of FC 90-13-1, Combined Arms Counter-Obstacle Operations, In-Stride Breach, are seldom achieved.

SIGNAL OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

To maximize the use of signal assets as a combat multiplier, brigade commanders, staffs, and attle captains must fully understand signal support systems and their capabilities just as any ther weapons system. Educating commanders and their staffs on the C2 communications architecture and capabilities will enhance the brigade task force's ability to orchestrate and synchronize C2, staff coordination and planning, execution, and information management. Emphasis should be placed on all types of communications systems available to the brigade task force. This emphasis should include how to employ the systems doctrinally, and how to best integrate them into the brigade task force's C2 structure and information management systems including the TOC, tactical command post, brigade support area (BSA), slice elements, subordinate commands, joint or combined elements, and civilian or host-nation establishments.

Signal operations supporting joint or combined arms integration and C2 are increasingly complex. They include joint and service-unique communications such as combat net radio (CNR); FM, VHF, UHF, and HF radio systems; mobile subscriber equipment (MSE); single-channel and multichannel satellite systems; commercial, civilian, and host-nation communications. Signal officers have the critical task of orchestrating this complex architecture and presenting it in understandable terms to their commanders and staffs. However, commanders and staffs have the responsibility of knowing how to use communications equipment, and understanding the architecture as it applies to them to maximize its use as a combat multiplier.

TASK FORCE 1 (MANEUVER)

Troop-Leading Procedures. Operational time lines are critical to the execution of good troop-leading procedures. Units often develop time lines that do not identify key and essential planning and execution tasks. Development of a tentative plan falls short because of incomplete application or understanding of the estimate of the situation and IPB process. Mission analysis fails to identify essential and implied tasks specific to mission accomplishment. Orders generally lack clarity; the commander's intent, concept of the operation, and subunit tasks cannot be overemphasized. Confirmation briefs and back briefs are conducted, but generally without established formats that prescribe what is to be included in the briefs. As a result, subordinate unit commanders have trouble expressing their mission orders.

Air Assault Operations. Units plan and conduct the five phases (i.e., staging, loading, movement, landing and the ground tactical plan) of air assault operations. However, poor troop-leading procedures; mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) factors analysis; and contingency planning, coupled with incomplete integration of aviation assets, cause problems in execution. A time line based on executing critical tasks to standard will help solve this problem.

Air mission coordination is generally a weakness. This is due to the lack of staff preparation by both the maneuver and aviation battalions. Air mission briefings are not conducted. Contingency planning for hot landing zones, extraction, and medical evacuation is generally incomplete. The air assault chain of command and communications, as prescribed in FM 90-4, Air Mobile Operations, are rarely established and exercised.

TASK FORCE 2 (C2)

Battalion task forces deployed to the JRTC are improving in their ability to manage and control combat power. The majority of units successfully accomplish their assigned tasks. Efficiency and the ability to continue to press the fight or conduct other follow-on operations are areas that need continued emphasis.

Battalion communications are improving. After the initial 48 hours, battalions begin to communicate with, and are able to control, subordinate units. Battalions maintain good radio communications by employing RETRNS, relays, backup systems, and other means to maintain redundancy. Use of all available radios, including the tactical air control party (TACP) and ship-air liaison team (SALT) radios, assists in communications. Maintaining a hard-copy capability between battalion and brigade facilitates the transmission of orders. Battalions must have a plan for countering VINSON and signal operating instructions (SOIs) compromises. The plan must be practiced. Battalions have made good use of the mobile subscriber radio telephone (MSRT), particularly when remoted into the TOC.

Frequently, commanders and staffs do not effectively develop, update, and use synchronization tools to assist in fighting the battle. Prepared tools are not routinely updated or used at the C2 nodes to track the battle. This is closely linked to the units' inability to effectively integrate their staffs. The direct result is often a nonsynchronized fight of the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs). Each staff must focus its efforts on synchronizing all available combat power at the decisive point and ensure all efforts support the main effort. This focus can be achieved by mission analysis that results in a clear task and purpose for the task force. The task force is then task-organized to accomplish the mission. The task organization weighs the main effort to ensure success.

FIRE SUPPORT

Top-down fire planning was first introduced as a concept for planning fires at the brigade and below levels in a series of articles published in the Field Artillery Journal in June and August 1989. The process at the JRTC has brought out the need for a better understanding of the key elements of top-down fire planning.

First, the brigade fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and fire support officer (FSO) must develop, with the maneuver commander, a clearly understandable and achievable commander's fire support guidance. One of the best methods of articulating commander's guidance is to relate a specific purpose for each fire support asset (i.e., field artillery, mortars, close air support, naval gunfire, and electronic warfare (EW)) to each phase of the operation. This then serves as guidance for subordinate maneuver commanders and their fire support elements and all other members of the fire support community.

Second is the development of a detailed fire support execution matrix to serve as a script for executing fires during each phase of the operation. The fire support execution matrix is detailed enough when it can be used as the primary rehearsal tool for both maneuver and fire support rehearsals.

Third, the targeting process (target value analysis) is critical to the top-down fire planning process. Targeting meetings conducted during course-of-action analysis, and, subsequently, during the operation, serve to focus the combat power of the brigade. This allows the attack of high pay-off targets in a synchronized manner to achieve the commander's intent for the operation (not just fire support guidance).

Fourth is resource allocation. When allocating resources, include lethal and nonlethal field artillery munitions (based on an attack matrix), targets, close air support, naval gunfire, and EW assets. Munitions should be related to battalion or battery volleys for field artillery, and platoon volleys for mortars. These figures give a clearer picture to the maneuver commander of what his lethal systems will be able to achieve against high pay-off targets. Additionally, smoke and illumination munitions should be related to minutes available. Munitions allocation allows subordinate commanders to plan fires for their portions of the fight. Top-down fire planning has proven to be the road to success in contingency operations at the JRTC if the above fundamentals are followed.

INTELLIGENCE

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Mar 94, states that, "The mission of Army intelligence is to provide timely, concise, accurate, relevant, and synchronized IEW support to tactical, operational, and strategic commanders across the range of military operations. " Commanders understand the mission of Army intelligence and are working closely with this BOS in focusing their efforts.

Intelligence sections are doing well with the initial IPB process. Terrain and weather analysis and their integration are consistently on target. Situational templating is understood and done well. Intelligence dissemination is strong.

Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning and execution continue to challenge rotational units at the JRTC. The S2s' plans lack clear and understandable goals. S2s normally do not have a clear end state to properly focus on collection assets.

The IPB process begins well, but is not continuous. Event templates are rarely produced. The planning and execution of the Ground Surveillance System (GSS) and EW operations are also challenging units. This is a result of a lack of understanding by S2s on the capabilities and planning needed for employment, and procedures for requesting EW support.

Units must focus on home-station training, keying on the lowest level soldier and leader skills. This will increase proficiency in the individual skills necessary to effectively and efficiently employ their unit and equipment. It will also increase the survival rate on the battlefield.

Training should also focus on the staff planning process. The intelligence BOS must understand its relationship within the battle staff and be able to input its product during the planning process.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Logistical planning and coordination continues to be a weakness at all staff levels. When it occurs, planning lacks detail, particularly for ground and air casualty evacuation. Coordination between the forward support base (FSB) and the brigade is insufficient, particularly the preparation of logistical estimates and synchronization of external logistical operations.

Preparing for air movement operations is also a weakness. Units tend not to be organized to execute the unit staging area tasks and have insufficient or inadequately trained movement personnel. Units also lack familiarity with Computer-Assisted, Load-Manifesting (CALM) 5.0, computer load planning software. These deficiencies result in slow joint inspection processing. Logistical operations overall have improved since forward support battalions operating in the brigade rear area have replaced the forward area support team (FAST).

Table of Contents

Air-Ground Operations School (AGOS)

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Part II