TOPIC: ADAPTIVE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT
DISCUSSION. "...trying to stay relevant so that you are training your forces, not for the last war, but you have broken that mind-set and mold, and you are now preparing your soldiers for a future war, activity, or mission that they might have to do tomorrow. To that extent, then, we have developed a new scenario which extends from the former WARSAW PACT, Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment model to the multi-faction and regional "Danubin" scenario."
"The Training Center has the ability to adapt scenarios to what we are facing in the world. That's what is so beautiful about what we have right here.... We now have scenarios from combat operations to peace enforcement to peacekeeping on the shelf, that are fed by current situations in the world."
"They are training the group that is going into Haiti from the United Nations. The scenario that they went into Rwanda with was all OOTW. The scenario going into Bosnia or Croatia to pull out the UN or NATO folks who are in there were also all operations other than war."
"It probably, in some respects, is a more challenging rotation for a task force. There are so many things going on simultaneously that draw the commander's attention. Additionally, by the very nature of peace operations, while they tend to be centralized planning, they are certainly decentralized execution. The impact that an individual soldier may have on the outcome of an operation in terms of what he does or doesn't do, may have an impact, certainly a political impact, well beyond what he would normally have in conventional military operations. In that respect, I think it is more challenging."
"We watched in the streets of Mogadishu as helicopters were being shot at with RPGs. We started playing with that. Our CLFs (Cortinian Liberation Front, a fictitious guerrilla movement) started shooting at helicopters with Vipers."
"We've had the Brits and the French in; we've helped train up a Dutch unit for a UN mission in Cambodia. We've had them back with some of their key leaders so we could debrief them to find out just how accurate we were, to see what we could do better to make our training and scenario development even more relevant."
"First off, we have scenario writing teams that develop the scenarios. They watch very closely what's going on in the world, both in open sources as well as staying tied into the INTEL community to make sure that we know what forces, not only our own forces, but what other allied forces may be involved with in situations. We are taking those, replicating them, and building those kinds of situations into our scenarios. The other thing is, I have had the commander of the operations group and a number of his folks on his staff, as well as O/Cs, go out and visit some of our allied forces to see what they are doing with some of their peacekeeping or UN schools."
"We are always in an OOTW environment until we go into these brief battles. Then you are in a combat environment. When you leave, there you are back in OOTW. You're planning to execute your combat operations. You're in this complex environment. You can call it what you want. It may not be high intensity at that moment, it may not be combat, but you are about to go into it. A lot of serious work has been done on the transition that we do between OOTW. I really wonder sometimes if we are not in a constant state of transitioning back and forth all the time."
"Since March 1993 our rotations have been a combination of heavy combat operation and OOTW. I don't think that is all bad. I really believe that we need to maintain our capabilities to fight across the spectrum. The U. S. Army's worldwide responsibilities do not allow us to have forces that are just competent in doing peacekeeping operations or combat operations. Because of the capacity of our force structure, we need forces that are dual-capable. We need to fight across the spectrum. That is kind of our overarching philosophy...."
"We were able to tailor a scenario to train up forces. What started out as let's run a trial PKO (Peacekeeping Operation) ended up being an actual training exercise for a unit to go to Haiti. So, it has evolved and that's the nature of this institution."
"We are trying develop in the division commander and ADC an ownership of the scenario. We are trying to get them to articulate to us what they want to do with their brigade because it isn't my brigade, it is theirs. So, to the extent that they can articulate to us what the battle tasks, the missions, the training objectives that they have, then we can develop scenarios that meet their training needs because they ought to be the ones that understand the needs of their organizations better than us."
CURRENT ASSESSMENT. The world has changed considerably since the first Combat Training Center was opened in the early 1980s at NTC. Today's Army does not face the primary threat of Soviet armored divisions attacking across the plains of Central Europe. Today's missions are more likely to include Operations Other than War; Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance, which require a different type of training and proficiency.
Today each CTC has a different focus. The NTC trains primarily heavy brigades and task forces in large-scale combat operations. JRTC trains light brigades and special operations, and specializes in joint training. CMTC has a European flavor that spans the spectrum from conventional combat to OOTW for heavy task forces and brigade combat teams. BCTP trains command and control in conventional operations for headquarters from enhanced National Guard brigades through Army Corps. One can see the wide range of training addressed by the CTCs. What O/Cs are finding is that the basic principles of sound planning, rehearsals, and synchronization, which are the hallmarks of training during large-scale combat operations, also apply in Operations Other than War. O/Cs are stressing that while the TTPs change, the fundamentals, such as soldier discipline and leader creativity, remain the same across the spectrum of warfare. Can the CTCs adapt to remain the premier training facilities in the Army? We believe that they clearly can. CMTC, BCTP, and NTC, led by the JRTC, have all modified their training scenarios to better prepare today's units and soldiers to fight and win in the very complex environment of the 1990s. Civilians on the battlefield, ethnic factions, nongovernmental organizations, media, and interagency coordination are the realities that today's leaders and their units must face. They are facing them at the CTCs.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS. Army units must retain their capability to fight and win across the spectrum from large-scale combat operations through OOTW. Tomorrow's smaller force will not be able to designate specific units to handle only one type of mission. Operations Other Than War belong to more than just light infantry units. We will need flexible and versatile forces who can hone their kills on the complex battlefields of the CTCs before they go into an operation.
The CTCs must do several things to continue to provide challenging, relevant training for the Army. First, all CTCs should increase contact with division senior leadership and shape rotations to the potential missions facing the rotational units. Commanders determine METLs and know the future challenges their units face. CTCs provide the challenging training experience thatcan hone collective skills, provide valuable experience for unit leadership and build soldier confidence.
Second, each CTC should expand the complexity of the battlefield. This does not mean more missions. It means more realistic training in unpredictable situations. It means exposing leaders from corporal through colonel to situations where they must know rules of engagement and act accordingly. Once you have been in these situations and learned from them, your confidence soars.
Last, CTCs must retain the capability to challenge rotational units in large-scale combat operations. Because of America's world leadership role, our Army must be prepared to fight and win across the spectrum of combat. Each year new leaders, new soldiers, and different units come to the CTCs to fight the world's toughest enemy. CTCs must continue to have the world-class OPFOR that can help shape the scenario to fit the unit leadership's needs.
CTCs must also have a flexible instrumentation system and tactically proficient, certified O/Cs that provide absolute fidelity in training. These are the keys that permit allowing rotational units to assess and learn from their performance.
The tremendous value of the CTCs in the future is the opportunity they provide numerous units to experience all the challenges of the full spectrum of conflict, define their METLs, develop their leaders, and build soldier self- confidence in nontraditional situations. The long term result will be an even better Army that is confident, competent, and prepared for any assigned mission.
by COL LEONARD G. SWARTZ, FA
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Topic:
Experimentation
Topic:
Battle Staff Proficiency
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