TOPIC: BATTLE STAFF PROFICIENCY
DISCUSSION. Where are we now?
"(Battle staffs) are hungry and young. We throw a lot at them. They don't habitually train with CA, PSYOPS,... and so it's kind of awesome and overwhelming starting out.... They have a burning desire to do well and serve their boss. They are smarter than I was as a captain. They have to contend with far more lethal systems on the battlefield. There is not much margin for error. They are inexperienced."
"I think they are not totally equipped to do what they need to do. We are weak in battle staff training. We have some promising folks in battle staff positions that are trying their hearts out. However, they do not know the task, how to do it, the demands of the conditions, and the expected standards."
"What (the staff) doesn't understand are their requirements collectively to horizontally integrate among themselves. We don't teach it anyplace. We don't teach it in the unit very often. It is an exceptional commander who does, and if he does do it, he is doing it by the seat of his pants cause he doesn't know how to do it either. There is no book that I know of where you can grab it and really try to figure it out in terms of task, conditions, standards, or any other type of detail."
"Staffs are generally unpracticed in the combat decisionmaking process, hasty combat or quick decisionmaking. They just don't do it often.... Commanders don't know what the hell we don't know about wargaming or the synergism associated with getting the staff together and making them work together."
"Many lose sight (of the fact) that the name of the game is not to execute the plan but to kill the other guy. There is a lack of flexibility and battle awareness skill of understanding the dynamics of the battlefield and reacting to...queues."
What's causing the problem?
"I've seen too many times when we had people who were not tactically or technically competent."
"Commanders are not taking risks. We continue to see cookie-cutter approaches with regard to tactics, like keeping two up and one back...that generally results in frontal attacks instead of any really innovat(ive) or risk-taking effort on the part of unit commanders."
"Captains have 12-18 months as company commanders, but they are not getting any time on the tail end at battalion and brigade staffs as battle captains. So what happens, you end up with a guy straight out of school going into the battle staff. Generally, you have immature staffs."
"The tremendous rapid turnover and failure to allow people to concentrate. It takes six months to figure out what to do; then you only give back six months of really productive time. When you combine that with all the mating dances people must do to learn an organization, we really create some tremendous obstacles for ourselves. I see that as an immediate problem.... That means (officers) haven't been able to develop the intuitive sense that comes from experiences. That's going to mean our training confidence...is going to go down.... We are going to lose if we are not careful."
"To my mind, the art of battle command is only ingrained through experience. The less experience that you have, the more problems you are going to have, the more you are going to have with teaching and understanding the art of battle command. Therein lies the problem that the Army has to come to grips with."
"You can have continuity files and SOPs out the ying yang, but if you don't have folks who have practiced together and who can visualize the battlefield, you are going to have a hard time."
What should we do?
"What we are going to do is come into a very complex environment here in 10-15 years with folks who don't have the grounding, the basic technical grounding.... It's probably the repetitive assignments that build that intuition.... And guys are going to die because they didn't have the right kind of leadership they could have had."
"There is more of a need (at the CTC) to put hands on and train the guy, rather than muse about why he is so ineffective."
"We need to develop an MTP (Mission Training Plan) for staffs. We do have some things captured in various places that are sort of a staff MTP, but it doesn't clarify tasks in the way they need to be."
"I lean more to the side requiring a staff proficiency gate.... We currently use a gate, but there (are) no qualification standards associated with the task. Units must just do it. That may be one of our problems. We haven't started and exacted performance standards for the complete battle staff's mission."
CURRENT ASSESSMENT. Battle staff proficiency, as evident in CTC rotations, will continue to erode due to several interrelated factors. First, the turbulence in our personnel system must subside. "Force resizing" has only amplified the problem. The effect is most apparent at division level and below. Most battle staff positions become transition points for officers and NCOs just arriving or awaiting assignment to another unit or position. As such, professional on-the-job training is rarely formalized. In many ways, this mirrors the Vietnam era with the same potential long-term implications.
Second, the absence of battle staff Mission Training Plans and authoritative doctrine on staff operations (e.g., FM 101-5 and ST 100-9) further complicates the battle staff training challenge.
Third, like their subordinates, many commanders are not adequately experienced in battle staff training, from the hasty decisionmaking process to tactical operations center (TOC) operations. They are the products of short, 12-month duty assignments as executive officers and operations officers. Many do not know "what right looks like." With 12 to 18 months between CTC rotations, some primary staff officers never experience a CTC rotation. They do not have the opportunity to experience what is really demanded of their position on the battle staff under realistic battlefield conditions. They, therefore, cannot develop, much less hone, proficiency in combined arms synchronization. This deficiency compounds as inexperienced officers and NCOs move to higher staffs. The inexperience of these emerging commanders will yield future battle staffs even more removed from the rigor and discipline of effective battle staff operations.
Fourth, our school system has not adjusted to teach horizontal synchronization to battle staffs. With OACs focused on company command and CGSC focused on division and higher operations, we do not effectively train battalion and brigade S3/XO skills in the schools. These skills must be self-taught in the unit. Too large a portion of the battle staff training responsibility remains in the unit--with insufficient tools to execute the task.
Fifth, MQS is outdated to keep pace with current training and mission demands; self-study is an expected discipline for all officers and NCOs. Its fidelity is a function of the senior commander and pace of the unit's training schedule. Many tasks previously taught in our school system -- at all grades and skills -- have been abrogated now as unit or individual responsibility. The accelerated OPPACE of most units seriously erodes any coherent long-term program to train these critical tasks and maintain a coherent self-development program.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS. Battalion and brigade battle staffs require a comprehensive MTP. In its absence, commanders are developing unit-level battle staff training programs -- without any formal guide. Army-wide standards must be emplaced. Staff operations doctrine, especially for battalion and brigade battle staffs, must be updated and published to provide guidance for staff and command post organization and operations. FM 101-5 is too focused at the division/corps staff and too outdated to be useful at battalion/brigade staff operations.
Branch schools must expand their training of battle staff officers/NCOs in their basic, advanced, and command and staff level courses. Officers and NCOs must arrive in a unit clearly understanding more than just some of the basics of battle staff positions at their level of responsibility. Accelerated unit deployments and shortened tours of duty in staff positions reduce the capability for units to "grow their own" staffs and leaders. The training base must provide better qualified battle staff members.
CAS3 should be integrated into OAC and reinforce warfighting skills. The staff skills developed in CAS3 are needed on arrival in a unit after OAC. Units cannot afford the time to send an officer back to CAS3 during his tour. Often, CAS3 attendance comes after staff assignments. The unit, the officer, and the Army never fully reap the benefits.
Just as the Army acknowledges all LTCs will not command, not all MAJs should serve as battalion S3s and XOs. Only the most qualified should be afforded this privilege and opportunity. Objective proficiency gates must be established for command and XO/S3 selection. Officers with demonstrated battalion command potential should have second company commands and multiple XO/S3 assignments at battalion and brigade levels. They must instinctively know all there is about fighting their unit. In an Information Age and smaller Army, this emerging two-caste system -- of leaders and followers -- must be accepted. It requires a change in culture that appreciates the complexity of new technologies and the art of war. Not all can master these skills!
At the Pre-Command Course, new commanders must review effective techniques to train and assess battle staff proficiency. Commanders must know each staff member's role in the planning, preparation, and execution of missions. We assume too much; the knowledge is not there. In all likelihood, their new staff will not be experienced. The commander must know the tasks, conditions, and standards expected of his battle staff to synchronize horizontally as well as vertically.
New battalion- and brigade-level commanders should right-seat at a CTC prior to assuming command as part of the Pre-Command Course. The new commander should observe at least two missions. It takes one mission to "know what the elephant looks like." For the second mission, the new commander can focus his attention on critical battle staff and subordinate commander skills.
Greater discipline must be applied to the officer assignment system so that officers assigned to the staffs serve tours that give them more experience. Principal staff officers should remain in position for 12-18 months. Executive Officers and Operations Officers (XO/S3) should remain for 15-18 months. This ensures an opportunity for development and participation in unit-level battle staff training; mentoring aspiring young officers in battle staff techniques; participation in at least two CTC rotations (one to see the challenge, and a second to solve it!); and stabilizing and molding "high performing" battle staffs.
Self-paced, exportable, interactive training simulations should be developed for each staff position. The officer/NCO could execute each of the tasks expected of his position (e.g., selecting specified and implied tasks from a higher unit OPORD, or identifying key terrain) and receive objective, on-line critique on each one. The CTCs can provide valuable input to the proponent schools. These programs should be both pamphlet- and personal computer-based and would instruct a staff member through his responsibilities in operations order development, functional area rehearsal, and monitoring execution. This remains the XO's training program; indirectly, it will mature his understanding of his staff's tasks. Associated with these individual training packages, full-staff training simulations and external observer-trainers would build on individual battle staff skills and train the battle staff as a team. CTC-based leader training programs could support this task. Emerging doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as critical lessons-learned, can be rapidly transferred from the CTCs to unit battle staffs. This will allow staff officers/NCOs to see the true breadth of the staff task, demands of the conditions, and expected performance standards. Simulations developed for CTC missions could provide the basis for this unit home-station battle staff training.
MTP-based proficiency gates should be met by a battalion and brigade battle staff not just for CTC deployment. The gates should be established by TRADOC and administered by the unit's senior headquarters. CTC Leader Training Program (LTP) should not be party to the assessment. LTPs must remain a non-threatening and highly focused training -- not evaluation/assessment -- program.
The "system" that selects and trains battle staffs and the "culture" that matures them must change to meet the FORCE XXI challenge or we'll have "second wave" commanders leading a "third wave"' force. The "system" needs objective selection criteria, extended and multiple staff assignments, and a staff MTP. The "culture" change is tough -- it requires a mindset change. CTCs are a critical part of the solution. They are the battlefields of application to teach the force.
by LTC G. CHESLEY HARRIS, IN
Main
Table of Contents
Topic:
Adaptive Training Environment
Topic:
Force Projection
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
