TOPIC: EXPERIMENTATION
DISCUSSION. "The CTCs have to play in the experimentation business... (because there is no other) place in our Army where training is done under such rigorous conditions.... So if we reshape our Army...remodernize...redesign, use new equipment, new information management systems...they have to be tested in the CTC environment.... (But it) has to be done in a very careful and deliberate manner so that we don't unnecessarily distract a unit.... (Experimentation must be done) with proper preparation, planning, synchronization...."
"Clearly, there is a role for the CTCs in AWE (Advanced Warfighting Experiments),...but there can't be any last minute, hey you, great ideas when we are on short final for a rotation that is going to impact on the training experience that a unit has."
"If we are going to have units come to the (CTC) that are experimental in nature, if the (CTC) is not sufficiently resourced to instrument, monitor, and feedback to the unit the results of using (the experimental equipment), you are going to suboptimize the value of the (CTC). If you don't make the investment now, two years from now you won't have the ability to collect all that stuff."
"So if we are talking about trying to reshape our Army, remodernize our Army, redesign our Army, use new equipment, new information management systems, I just believe they have to be tested in the CTC environment."
CURRENT ASSESSMENT. The CTCs clearly have a role to play in experimentation programs in the future. The CTC's unique characteristics--a rigorous, realistic training environment; near-combat conditions; comprehensive instrumentation--are unmatched anywhere else. Those resources that make CTCs unique include: professional O/Cs; realistic, professionally trained, dedicated OPFOR; and sophisticated instrumentation in an isolated battlefield to determine what happened in each training event. However, the fidelity of the training and feedback at the CTCs is of such high quality that nothing, not even Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), should be allowed to negatively affect it or interfere with training the current force. Experimentation should be nearly transparent to the training unit. Based on AWE 94 at NTC and the planning for AWE 95 at JRTC, key leaders see the need for proper, timely planning and preparation so that the CTCs can facilitate such experiments. Timely preparation includes proper resourcing of a collection and observation architecture, augmentation with subject matter experts (SMEs), clear and comprehensive experiment objectives, and adequate preparatory training of both the training unit and the O/Cs.
Exactly those things that make the CTCs so valuable to the U. S. Army make them so ideally suited for AWEs. The first of these is the professional group of O/Cs at the CTCs, properly trained and equipped to observe the unit in training and make observations using doctrinal standards and the unit's SOP. O/Cs are experienced at determining cause-and-effect relationships on the battlefield and facilitating unit self-discovery of lessons for future training and operations. They provide the ground truth about unit performance. Such skills are especially important in an AWE, where feedback on the relative level of effectiveness is required. O/Cs will be especially helpful in providing experience to envision the potential of new capabilities.
The second valuable commodity the CTCs provide for experimentation is a dedicated, world-class OPFOR, vastly experienced and superbly led. This OPFOR cannot be replicated outside of the CTC boundaries. They are probably the best trained units in the world because they are in the field, fighting and training every month, year after year. Their tactical experience level far outweighs that in Blue Force units. This allows for experimentation against the very best.
The third valuable commodity for experimentation is the unique nature of the training environment--the CTC reservations themselves. They are relatively isolated locations--extremely isolated in the case of the NTC. This means few training distractors, and, therefore, few experiment distractors, as well as realistic conditions. More important, the CTCs are packed with a vast array of instrumentation designed to collect training data on units training there. The O/Cs are accustomed to working with instrumentation and using it to show units what happened during each mission. They can provide an accurate database that reveals unit warfighting capabilities for comparison. The O/Cs may not have sufficient instrumentation, however, to collect and analyze data on new equipment that may be in the experiment. And they may not be adequately trained on the experimental equipment or organizations. They cannot provide feedback on what they cannot see, hear, understand, and record. This implies some additional preparatory steps will be necessary for successful experiments at the CTCs in the future.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS. Based upon key CTC leader comments and observations from AWE 94, there are some rules that should be followed for future CTC experiments. First, planning and preparation for an AWE must begin about one year in advance at the installation hosting the experiment, with a dedicated staff of at least eight personnel to plan it properly while other normal training is ongoing. This means AWEs should not occur more frequently than once a year. During this planning and preparation phase, we must work to maintain the fidelity of training, accomplish the experiment objectives, and do so under exercise rules of engagement and other parameters agreed upon by all. Any equipment to be brought to the battlefield must prove its functionality within the framework of existing instrumentation and coordinated exercise ROE, at least one rotation prior to the AWE. For instance, training fidelity cannot be maintained if the Training Analysis and Feedback Facility (TAF) cannot monitor all communications links, and, therefore, could not provide the field O/C the proof that certain orders had been given/received. Neither could fidelity be maintained if many equipment technicians were required to stay in the maneuver box and adjust or repair experimental equipment to keep the AWE in progress. Second, O/Cs will require both augmentation and additional training. O/Cs should be augmented by subject matter experts (SMEs) who are well-trained on the functionality of the experimental equipment. They should come from the TRADOC schools and should have participated in the unit's special trainup period. They must also be familiar with the particular requirements of the CTC where the experiment is taking place. These SMEs must be trained on the equipment used and the provisional doctrine for using it, as well as current doctrine. This professional augmentation allows O/Cs to make key observations while retaining the ability to train the force. O/Cs also require some functional training on the equipment in the experiment to maintain fidelity and expertise.
O/Cs must be instructed to facilitate the experiment up to the point where training is affected. CTC exercise ROE are effective and, once agreed to, must not be compromised. They must be enforced, even with the experiment technicians, to maintain the professional integrity of the CTC and the rotation. Enforcement of the experiment ROE also forces coordination among the various agencies with pieces of the experiment pie, and supports unity of effort. The Commander of the Operations Group (COG) must remain in charge of the training. Data collection must be nonintrusive. It must not be allowed to interfere with, or distract, the training unit. Additionally, visits by the media and various important visitors must be strictly controlled, because every interested party with access to the training area will want to observe and ask questions and the unit will become overwhelmed. Separate observation areas and After-Action Review areas must be provided to allow visitors to focus on AWE performance.
Third, and probably fairly obvious, the better trained the unit is in the experiment, the more valuable the AWE is to the Army. The unit must be firmly rounded in basic doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures and should have recent field training experience, to include a successful externally evaluated ARTEP. Equally obvious, the unit must be adequately trained on the particular equipment being tested, both hardware and software, and there must be a good-idea-cutoff date for changes to experiment objectives and format. Otherwise, the unit will expend an inordinate amount of unit and leaders' personal energy trying to catch up on the basics, and the Army will not receive the maximum benefit from the AWE.
Finally, investments in sufficient equipment for the CTC to use in the AWE must be made early to be effective in the data collection and feedback processes. This will require contractor and developer familiarization with the CTCs through field rides and research. The Army must also demand that equipment developers either build their equipment to ensure compatibility with current instrumentation or invest in new data collection equipment at the CTCs to prove worth.
By LTC WILLIAM G. WEBSTER, AR
Main
Table of Contents
Topic:
Joint Training
Topic:
Adaptive Training Environment
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
