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If offensive momentum is not maintained, the enemy may recover from the shock of the first assault, gain the initiative, and mount a successful counterattack. Therefore, the Combat Service Support (CSS) priority is to maintain the momentum of the attack. A successful attack may develop into an exploitation or a pursuit. CSS planners must be flexible to support this contingency.

The CSS system must be responsive and predictive. It must meet needs that change with little notice. Forward Support Battalion (FSB) personnel must assume that changes in priorities, support operations, and organization will be the norm; they must be ready to respond quickly. As the name of the FSB implies, the focus of the CSS structure is on providing support as far forward as practical. All CSS and logistical operations must be designed, coordinated, and executed toward providing comprehensive and uninterrupted support to the customer unit.

Continuous CSS operations require careful personnel management. Routine details, perimeter guard, and operator maintenance must be performed during any available downtime. A carefully planned and strictly enforced rest-work schedule or sleep plan is necessary to ensure continuous capability.

Sound preparation is the precursor to sound military operations. Preparation is the phase of a military operation that encompasses the procedures necessary to ready the force for successful mission accomplishment. The one-third to two-thirds rule states that the staff should spend no more than one third of the available time on planning and give the remaining two-thirds to subordinates for planning, preparation, and execution. CTC experience indicates that units that adhere to this principle outperform those that do not.

Command and Control (C2): Battle command is key to good logistics support. The FSB commander and staff must be able to keep combat power and priority of support concentrated in space and time. Knowing the supported maneuver commander's plan, intent, and task organization is key to this effort. The logistics plan must be developed simultaneously with the tactical plan.

Support the offense: Supporting the offense differs dramatically from supporting the defense. Supply, maintenance, medical and other logistical support requirements all need adjustment. A combination of "unit distribution" and "supply point distribution" logistics can be used to provide effective support. Logistics planners must develop highly mobile, flexible support packages that meet this challenge.

Medical operations: Medical operations in the offense will intensify. The violent nature of offensive operations and the fact that soldiers are more exposed will lead to more casualties. Medics must be ready to move as far forward as possible to support advancing friendly forces. Innovative techniques, such as ambulance exchange points (AXPs), meet this requirement.

Automation: Automation can significantly assist the management of support for customer units. The Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) can provide a beneficial link between the supported unit and the supporter. Trained TACCS operators speed up logistics operations. The keys to battlefield automation are standing operating procedures (SOPs) and practice.

Logistical reporting: Supported units frequently fail to adequately report logistical requirements and status to supporters. This slows down the flow of logistics and makes it difficult for the maneuver commander to sustain his combat power. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM units stated that logistical statistics (LOGSTATs) and other logistical reports provided meaningless information to maneuver commanders.

CSS leaders and staffs must know and understand the commander's plan to incorporate the sustainment imperatives of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation. They must know the supported unit s task organization. These factors help tailor logistics support. Often the plan development process used by the brigade does not incorporate input from either the brigade CSS staff or the FSB staff. As a result, the CSS plan is developed after the development of the maneuver plan.

The brigade commander and staff must plan the tactical and CSS operations concurrently. The FSB commander and staff must provide the required input to the brigade planning process to ensure the scheme of maneuver and fire support plan can be supported logistically. Poor planning puts the CSS staff in the reactive mode, rather than the pro-active mode required to support fast-paced offensive operations.

LESSON(S):

• Brigade commanders, supporting unit commanders, and FSB commanders must plan tactical and CSS operations concurrently. (NOTE: Supporting units (field artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, etc.) are often-CSS intensive and, therefore, their plans must be developed, wargamed, and published concurrently.)

• In the planning process, know the task organization of the supported brigade, including all attachments and OPCON units. (NOTE: FSBs do not doctrinally support OPCON units, nondivisional, and divisional units passing through the brigade sector. The FSB should plan on providing support to these elements; this means that the FSB must determine what augmentation is required from the MSB, DISCOM, and/or COSCOM to provide responsive support to the brigade sector.)

Priority of support for offensive operations is different from that required for defensive operations. Figure I-1 illustrates the support differences for defensive and offensive operations. These considerations must be clearly understood and addressed when planning for offensive operations.

(-) Fewer Requirements

(+) Greater Requirements

Figure I-1

The FSB supports the maneuver element through a combination of unit distribution and supply point distribution logistics. Logistics operations at the maneuver unit occur in the field trains. Field trains directly support the maneuver companies. Field trains form LOGPACs IAW FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, pick up supplies and perform other support requirements. Normally field trains elements pick up supplies at the FSB. This is supply point distribution. CTC trends indicate that collocating field trains in the BSA facilitates this support relationship. Often CSS units must resort to supply point distribution because of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T) constraints such as lack of personnel, equipment, transportation, or maneuver box constraints. Another technique is for the FSB to project support forward through the use of logistics release points (LRPs). This is unit distribution logistics. The CSS element transports supplies to this LRP for pickup in lieu of the supported element traveling to the BSA. This technique is important when METT-T dictates that the field trains must be located some distance from the BSA or direct support of maneuver companies is necessary. LRPs shorten the distance supported units must travel. Other examples of improvisation that provide logistics to the supported unit in a proactive manner are ambulance exchange points, forward tactical refuel points, and maintenance support teams. These subjects are covered throughout this newsletter.

LESSON(S):

• Develop mobile, flexible logistics support capabilities that support the mission.

• Provide distribution to forward locations when possible.

• Unit distribution logistics is the U. S. Army standard and is expected by maneuver commanders. Plan for, and reconfigure, logistics packages of essential CSS items when possible.

• Use supply point distribution logistics only when absolutely necessary.

• Plan for increased use of meals, ready to eat (MREs), during offensive operations.

TECHNIQUE: Classes of supply can be combat-load configured and prepositioned in the brigade/battalion field trains. They can then be brought forward immediately upon request.

Deliberate attacks will likely result in high casualty rates. Before the onset of an attack, place FSB medical company assets as far forward as combat operations permit. Once operations begin, the Division Medical Supply Officer (DMSO) pushes prepackaged sets of class VIII supplies through the FSB medical company to Task Force aid stations. To keep the medical company mobile, patient holding in the BSA is minimized. Maneuver element ground evacuation assets are positioned at battalion aid stations. In many cases, evacuation demands may require that nonmedical transportation assets be used. If required, this intensifies the burden on the already stressed transportation system.

The inability to account for soldiers in the medical system was one of the top three concerns of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM units. The evacuation hospitals were described as "black holes." One soldier was not located by his unit until the soldier was seen on CNN. An NCO asked, "If we can track a class IX part, why can t we track an injured soldier?" Units gave soldiers postcards to mail back to the unit once they arrived at a hospital. This technique works if the soldier is conscious. Some units sent liaison officers to each hospital to locate their soldiers. The process was time-consuming and frustrating, but yielded good results.

LESSON(S):

• Plan for increased casualties and additional evacuation requirements for offensive operations.

• Consider using one of the above techniques to track evacuated soldiers.

• Use of a variation of the DA Form 2405, Maintenance Request Log, is a means for medical units to track patients, just as it is used to track direct-support maintenance jobs.

TECHNIQUE: At the CTCs, AXPs have emerged as a technique to place FSB medical assets far forward to support the offensive battle. Position a transfer point midway between the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and the location of the medical facility. Casualties can be collected at the AXP and taken to the rear for treatment. This technique keeps ambulances more readily available for casualty evacuation. Those units that use AXPs are generally more successful at casualty evacuation, and reduce died-of-wounds (DOW) rates.

Tactical automation is used to manage information and to optimize use of scarce resources. Automation can help offset the difficulty of providing logistics to supported units. TACCS is standard U. S. Army issue and is available to combat arms (CA) as well as to CSS units. In some instances, CA units can submit their requisitions via modem using TACCS. This can dramatically speed up processing, and also can provide a means to achieve requisition status information more rapidly. However, this type of automated processing must be worked out and rehearsed before execution with the supporting unit. Units experienced great difficulty with automation during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Few units had SOPs for setting up, operating and maintaining their automation equipment. Many units do not routinely deploy with their automation systems during field exercises. Insufficient training and unfamiliarization with how to integrate automation into battlefield logistics support are often cited as reasons for the lack of experience.

LESSON(S):

• Practice the automation link between the supporting and the supported unit.

• Establish a sound working relationship with supported units. Determine how automation will be used to enhance logistics.

• Develop SOPs on how automation will be used to support the battle.

• Routinely deploy with automation.

• Intensify training on employment of automation.

• Use cross-training to increase the number of TACCS-trained soldiers in your organization.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, many maneuver commanders stated that the logistical reports they received were meaningless. Terms, such as "days of supply (DOS)," and number of short tons of supplies did not readily translate into the information they needed to win the fight. Logisticians think in terms of the retail and wholesale levels, while maneuver commanders are concerned about the end user level. Maneuver commanders want user-friendly information. Logisticians at the BSA and maneuver Brigade/Battalion levels must compromise by developing two sets of numbers: one set dictated by SOP outlining retail/wholesale supply statistics for higher level CSS channels, and another indicating number of rounds per tube, tank, or soldier for maneuver commanders. The second set of numbers can be developed locally. However, it must be a joint effort between maneuver and CSS commanders, and practiced during field training exercises. Another general consensus is that the desire for information by higher headquarters is quickly exceeding the subordinate commander s ability to provide it in a timely manner. Commanders at all levels must carefully define their critical information requirements.

LESSON(S):

• Supported units must discipline themselves to submit timely, accurate logistical reports.

• Develop logistical report requirements and procedures with the supported unit that meet the needs of the maneuver commander.

• Practice logistical reporting at home station and during field training exercises.

• Develop a practical logistical reporting system for the end user.

• Logistical reports required from subordinate commanders must not be overly detailed or unnecessary.

Foreword

Chapter II: Supporting the Offense - During