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Military

LOGISTICS -
SUPPORTING THE OFFENSE

CHAPTER II - DURING


OVERVIEW

Execution is the bottom-line phase of military operations. It begins at the conclusion of the plan and prepare phases. For CSS units supporting the offensive battle, it is the provision of logistics resources to support the friendly maneuver force s engagement of the enemy.

Troop-Leading Procedures: CSS NCOs must follow the troop-leading procedures that are presented in every U.S. Army leadership school. These procedures are intended to provide a standardized method of leading soldiers to accomplish the mission. Commanders must emphasize this to subordinates.

Pre-Combat Checks: CSS NCOs are often unfamiliar with the concept of pre-combat checks that is presented in FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training. Pre-combat checks ensure that soldiers are prepared for the mission and that every detail has been performed.

Arm, Fuel, and Fix: The most critical supplies are Classes III, V, and IX. These relate to the terms Arm, Fuel, and Fix as introduced in FM 100-5, Operations. Failure of one of these systems can influence combat power and adversely affect the outcome of the battle. Therefore, preplanned combat-configured packages of these essential items pushed forward to the maneuver units are necessary.

Coordination: Coordination is a key element of successful logistical support. The quality of the forecasts and requirements submitted by supported units is in direct proportion to the quality of logistical support received. Maneuver and support units must work together to attain an effective logistics system.

Continuity: The plan-prepare-execute model is a continuous process. Logisticians often must execute one mission, while planning and preparing for the next. This concept must be clearly understood to generate the most efficient and effective logistical support.

Battletracking: Battletracking is key to providing responsive support. Logisticians must be prepared for short-notice mission changes. While communications capability remains a major shortfall for the forward support battalion (FSB), there is sufficient equipment to monitor the brigade net during the battle.

Task Force (TF) HHC Commander: The TF HHC Commander can be a key resource for the FSB commander and staff. He often has superior information on the TF and Brigade plans and operations, and can help integrate logistics into the maneuver plan.

Night Operations: On today s extremely lethal battlefield, night logistical operations remain the best way to provide support and protect the logistical forces. Many FSB commanders remain skeptical of night operations because of safety considerations. This creates a training shortfall. Intensify night training to master successful night operations.

CSS Execution Matrix: The CSS execution matrix is a technique used at the CTCs to synchronize and echelon logistical support. This technique smoothly integrates the logistical plan into the maneuver plan.

TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

Many CSS NCOs do not follow the troop-leading procedures. This leadership function is not discussed in any of the CSS manuals. Troop-leading procedures help standardize actions necessary to prepare for a combat mission. Figure II-1 illustrates the troop-leading procedures.

1. RECEIVE THE MISSION.
2. ISSUE THE WARNING ORDER.
3. MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN.
4. START MOVEMENT.
5. RECONNOITER.
6. COMPLETE ORDER.
7. ISSUE ORDER.
8. SUPERVISE.

The troop-leading procedures are taken from FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. They are applicable for any branch or military organization. A CSS NCO uses this list to ensure that the unit has a plan to accomplish the mission, understands what is required, and performs the mission to standard.

LESSON(S):

  • Familiarize CSS NCOs with the troop-leading procedures.

  • Ensure the troop-leading procedures are integrated into the CSS mission.

PRE-COMBAT CHECKS

Many CSS NCOs are also unfamiliar with the concept of precombat checks. Pre-combat checks are detailed first checks that all units conduct before and during execution of combat operations. Pre-combat checks ensure that soldiers are prepared to execute the mission. They are also conducted at the beginning of each operation as part of the troop-leading procedures. The following list illustrates some examples of pre-combat checks applicable to all units:

  • OPORD briefed.
  • Safety checks and briefings completed.
  • All required equipment on hand and operational.
  • Soldiers and equipment inspected and camouflaged.
  • Compasses, maps and strip maps present.
  • Communications checks completed.
  • Ammunition drawn and issued.
  • Rations drawn and issued.

Figure II-2. Example of Pre-Combat Checks

LESSON(S): Familiarize NCOs with pre-combat checks. Help NCOs develop pre-combat checks for every type of routine mission the unit performs.

COORDINATION

Successful CSS begins with the relationship between the supporting and the supported unit. It is imperative to get close to the supported unit. Supply schedules, maintenance schedules and medical operations must all be worked out. The supported unit must be able to accurately forecast requirements and provide current logistical status (supply and maintenance) to CSS operators. CTC experience indicates that coordination between CSS and CA units is a major shortfall. Unfamiliarity can lead to a loss of confidence.

TECHNIQUE: Many FSBs that support their brigade task forces at the CTCs hold tenant meetings for all units located in the BSA. The field trains commanders should attend these meetings to coordinate support for the next 24 to 48 hours.

TECHNIQUE: At these tenant meetings, the support operations officer (SPO) passes out a support matrix (CSS synchronization matrix) he has developed. It is used to coordinate and manage CSS support. The matrix includes all units supported and all classes of supply, maintenance, and services. The SPO normally provides the times that support is to be available, locations, amounts, priorities, and other pertinent information on the matrix and issues it as a FRAGO.

Other formats have been used at the CTCs to coordinate CSS support and provide information to both supported and supporting units. A good CSS synchronization matrix, however, seems to be the best method. A good matrix should include the following to be effective:

  • Fit on one page.
  • List all classes of supply, maintenance, and services.
  • Cover the next 24 hours as a minimum.
  • Give grid location for LRPs, ROM sites, etc.
  • State time windows for issue and receipts for all units.
  • Provide priorities and unit of priority.
  • Support the commander s intent.

The SPO should have wargamed the matrix to determine the best way to execute the missions and to develop alternate contingencies for the critical warstoppers. The matrix is used during execution by the FSB and field trains. The field trains commander uses the matrix to develop the CSS execution matrix discussed elsewhere in this newsletter.

In some rotations at the CTCs, insufficient combat power is generated to conduct the mission. Part of the problem is the inability of units to pass information from platoons up to battalion on maintenance status. A maintenance meeting can serve as a focal conduit for information passing. Only through the aggressive pursuit of maintenance status and accurate reporting will commanders and CSS planners be able to sustain a high level of combat power.

LESSON(S): Foster improved communications with supported units. Stress the importance of accurate logistical requests and reporting.

ARM

Although ammunition expenditures may not be as high in the offense as they are in defensive operations, responsive ammunition resupply is essential. A significant challenge is maintaining this support over extended supply lines. The sustainer cannot require artillery vehicles to travel far from firing elements or maneuver battalion support platoons to haul ammunition great distances. The FSB must ensure ammunition transfer point (ATP) elements are as far forward as tactically feasible.

LESSON(S):

  • Place the ATP as far forward as possible. Use the factors of METT-T to determine the best location for the ATP.

  • Anticipate future ammunition requirements.

  • Consider the increasing distances and longer travel times to ammunition supply points (ASPs) and ammunition transfer points (ATPs).

TECHNIQUE: Several divisional units successfully used combat-configured loads (CCLs) during Operation DESERT STORM. This significantly reduced the amount of time maneuver units spent handling ammunition. Coordination with the maneuver unit and corps support area is critical with CCLs. CCL operations are outlined in Chapter 7, FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion.

FUEL

Fuel requirements are highest in the offense. To handle high fuel consumption, forward stocks are built up, and the Class III point is prepared to move forward rapidly. Another technique is to set up forward tactical refuel points. Fuel is provided through supply point distribution. Fuel resupply points should be positioned far enough away from the supply points to prevent contamination, or in the case of an attack, collateral destruction. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, host-nation support was critical for petroleum, oil, lubrication (POL) operations. Enemy POL stocks may become available during operations. This fuel must be tested by POL personnel before use; such kits are available through Self-Service Supply Center (SSSC) channels and can be used at the organizational level.

LESSON(S):

  • Plan for increased consumption of POL.

  • Use host-nation POL support where feasible.

  • Plan for usage of captured enemy POL (before use, test for contamination.)

  • Whenever possible, move fuel assets with the maneuver force to sustain momentum during movement to contact or in an attack.

TECHNIQUE: Refuel on the Move (ROM) has been used successfully at the CTCs, in past REFORGERs, and during Operation DESERT SHIELD.

FIX

Despite popular opinion, maintenance requirements do increase while units conduct offensive operations. This is because of increased movement, dispersion, and difficulty in getting maintenance recovery and evacuation resources to multiple forward positions on the battlefield. The key differences in terms of providing the required maintenance support are: defense is more centralized than the offense; there is less dispersion; it is less difficult to establish unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs); and very little recovery and evacuation are required when compared to the offense.

To maintain momentum during offense operations, U. S. Army doctrine emphasizes the concept of "fix forward." Maintenance support teams (MSTs) are a product of this concept. Each MST will work closely with the supported battalion s battalion maintenance officer (BMO). Make maximum use of lulls in the battle to repair as much equipment as possible. During the planning process, prioritize what equipment should be repaired immediately, what equipment should be placed or collocated at maintenance control points, and which should be evacuated to the rear.

LESSON(S):

  • Customize combat-load packages of major assemblies to match task force's projected needs.

  • Have the BMO attend daily maintenance meetings in the BSA.

  • Ensure that all documents sent in an air LOGPAC are delivered promptly to the addressee.

  • Ensure that air LOGPAC resupply of major assemblies, RX parts and Class IX parts are clearly marked and properly delivered to appropriate units. Proper control measures must be in place and exercised by the element that meets the aircraft.

  • Ensure BMOs include the MST in their planning process.

  • Use controlled exchange and cannibalization as a source of repair parts.

  • Establish maintenance priorities based on the commander s guidance or intent and the factors of METT-T. Priorities may change as different phases of an operation are completed.

  • Plan for increased vehicular maintenance requirements, especially when the unit is negotiating rough terrain.

  • Make maximum use of company maintenance teams and maintenance support teams in forward areas.

  • Task-organize the MST prior to deployment with tools, manuals, Class IX push packages and MOS-qualified soldiers.

CONTINUITY

The logistician s mission does not end once requested supplies and services have been provided. He must simultaneously plan and prepare for the next mission. The plan-prepare-execute model illustrates this point.

Figure II-3. Continuity Execution Model

The staff must be trained to accomplish this feat. A mindset must be developed that asks the questions "What s necessary to accomplish the next mission?"; "What is necessary to support the customer units 72 hours from now?" Many units fail to grasp this concept, concentrate on one phase at a time, and become sidetracked. This lessens the efficiency of logistical support.

LESSON(S):

  • The staff must be trained to plan, prepare, and execute simultaneously.

  • The staff must be able to prepare and execute different aspects of different plans simultaneously.

BATTLETRACKING

Battletracking is the constant monitoring of the supported maneuver unit's operations to determine the status of the battle. Battletracking includes:

  • Analyzing the maneuver unit s operation order.

  • Monitoring the maneuver unit s tactical net during the battle.

  • Maintaining and updating a battle map to stay current on the battle.

  • Keeping in close contact with the supported unit.

Logisticians must be prepared to provide additional CSS on short notice to allow the maneuver commander to exploit any tactical success. FSB personnel need to be aware of the supported brigade s mission and current status at all times. Battletracking and close coordination facilitates this effort. Track the battle to anticipate future support requirements.

Battletracking is critical during offensive operations for three reasons:

1. The FSB needs to know if the supported maneuver unit has overrun the enemy defense and is about to conduct an exploitation or pursuit operation.

2. The supported maneuver unit may have been turned back and is starting to conduct a defensive operation.

3. The supported maneuver unit has bypassed some enemy forces that may pose a threat to the BSA.

Any of the above examples will cause the FSB to rapidly change its support operations.

Battletracking by the FSB is improving at the CTCs, but still requires constant practice. Trends show that although FM radio communication is sometimes difficult for CSS units to monitor, aggressive use of the BDE Admin/Log net by the FSB, BDE S4, and maneuver commanders is a must if requirements and support are to be adjusted in a timely manner.

LESSON(S):

  • Use battletracking to enhance the FSB's capability to react to the rapidly changing battlefield.

  • Graphics and battle maps must be accurate at all times. They must be continually updated by personnel assigned to this task.

TASK FORCE (TF) HHC COMMANDER

The HHC commander of the maneuver battalion is often collocated at the BSA. A trend has been developing that employs this officer as a key player in BSA operations. This commander sits in at all BSA meetings. The HHC commander often has superior information on TF operations, up-to-date battle maps and graphics, and a current operations order. Sharing this information with the BSA staff provides a significant resource.

LESSON(S): Use the maneuver battalion HHC commander as a source of additional information.

NIGHT OPERATIONS

Most enemy air attacks on "soft targets" occur during the day when visibility is the highest. This tactic hinders daylight CSS operations. Many FSB commanders are hesitant to fully exploit the advantages of night operations. Most soldiers lack the training necessary for safe, comprehensive night operations; however, that training is a commander s responsibility and must be undertaken. Night operations reduce the daytime signature of the BSA, and promote BSA survivability.

Most units at the CTCs conduct moves at night. A key point to remember here is this: Night or limited visibility operations require rehearsals under similar conditions. Many units conduct their rehearsals for night operations during the day, with a kind of "check-the-block" attitude. However, terrain appears significantly different at night. As many CTC units have discovered, one wrong turn at night can take them kilometers away from their intended site. Not conducting a night rehearsal is the best way to get lost during a move. Night rehearsals and operations during any periods of reduced visibility are essential to both maneuver and CSS success.

LESSON(S):

  • Reduce daylight resupply.

  • Intensify training on night movement, noise, and light discipline, and land navigation at night.

  • Coordinate and enforce unit issue schedules.

  • Practice night movements.

  • Conduct night rehearsals.

CSS EXECUTION MATRIX

The best measurement of successful CSS has always been the generation of combat power at the decisive time and place. It is critical that execution of CSS plans is synchronized with the maneuver plan. One method used successfully at the CTCs is the CSS execution matrix. The CSS matrix is most effective as a timeline driven tool, keyed to the maneuver event-driven (phase line, objective) matrix. This tool helps synchronize logistical support. The following CSS Execution Matrix and Vignette will illustrate some of the key points.

LESSON(S):

  • Practice the use of CSS execution matrices to enhance logistical support.

  • Routinely use CSS execution matrices during brigade-level FTXs and CPXs.

  • Incorporate CSS execution matrices into SOPs.

Figure II-4. CSS Synchronization Matrix

* * * *

VIGNETTE

Task Force 1-3 Armor, 1st Brigade, 52d Mech Division, is currently located at its assembly area. It has coordinated with 1st FSB for resupply of Class I/III/V, medical and maintenance support. Its next mission is to conduct a night attack on Objective RED. It will be the main effort. It will cross the LD at 0001 tomorrow morning. Medical support has been requested at AXP 1 and 2. The TF expects to be resupplied after seizing Objective RED at LRP Red.

Task Force 1-2 Armor and TF 1-77 Mech, 1st Brigade, 52d Division, are located in their assembly areas. TF 1-2 will conduct a supporting attack and seize Objective WHITE. On order, it will seize Objective BLACK. TF 1-77 will conduct a supporting attack and seize Objective GREEN. On order TF 1-77 will seize Objective BLUE. TF 1-2 and TF 1-77 will cross the LD at 0001 tomorrow morning. Medical support has been requested at phase AXP 2 and 3. TF 1-2 will be resupplied at LRP WHITE after seizing Objective WHITE, and TF 1-77 will be resupplied at LRP GREEN after taking Objective GREEN.

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