UNIT
TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS
1.
The Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
have the opportunity to observe units deploying to combat in the country of
Cortina on a monthly basis. Here are some observations and considerations for
improving tactical deployment.
a.
GENERAL.(1)
Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs). Units do not enforce a rigorous set of PCIs
prior to deployment. This cannot be a "check-the-block" drill. Units should:
perform radio checks at a distance; perform functions checks of all weapons
and devices completely; and get "eyes-on" accountability of critical items,
such as spare barrels, batteries, acetate, and cleaning equipment, as well
as computer and reproduction items. (2)
Load Plans. Units normally have basic load plans for vehicles and trailers
but do not use them. Adherence to load plans can assist in PCIs by providing
an orderly array of equipment for inspection. (3)
The most difficult deployment problems that BLUEFOR commanders deal with are
those involving sequence of airflow to the battlefield. Each BOS representative
has strong feelings on his assets' place in the airflow. The decision clearly
belongs to the commander based on the mission and the situation. Consider all
systems and make a final decision, not a haphazard one, based on a "let's-just-get-there-and-sort-it-out-on-the-ground"
attitude. The ground tactical plan and the logistical support of that plan
must drive the deployment flow. Many of the observations and considerations
in this article reflect on airflow/deployment sequencing. b.
INTELLIGENCE.(1)
S2 Sections: (a)
Often arrive without sufficient materials to conduct staff functions in support
of combat operations. Common items, such as acetate, batteries, and paper,
are packed away in field desks and are not immediately available for startup
of tracking operations upon arrival in the area of operations. (b)
Are often low on priority of movement and arrive late in the flow. (c)
Routinely deploy without necessary intelligence references (i.e., FM 34-1,
FM 34-2, FM 34-2-1, FM 34-8, and FM 34-130). (d)
Conduct good Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) with their commanders
prior to deployment.(2)
Collection and Jamming units routinely have problems operating their SINCGARS
radio properly. (3)
REMBASS team leaders do not receive adequate input to OPORDs. (4)
Human Intelligence (HUMINT). (a)
Units do not have SOP for conduct of Counterintelligence (CI) operations. (b)
HUMINT is not integrated into brigade/battalion staff planning process. (c)
Units arrive with unrealistic Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) evacuation plans.
c.
MANEUVER.(1)
Airflow considerations based on METT-T. (a)
Mission. Is
this a show of force or a passive movement into an AO? Direct
combat, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping? What's
critical in the first, second, and third 24-hour periods? (b)
Enemy. Is
the entry opposed, and what is the enemy's mission? What
is the enemy Order of Battle and probable course of action? Can
we recognize the enemy? What
are the armor, artillery, mine, air, and chemical threats? (c)
Terrain. Is
engineer support required immediately? What
are the effects on communications? Transportation
requirements to move from entry point? (d)
Time. Is time available for a deliberate airhead line/logistic and fire support
buildup or extensive early security operations? Or, must the unit establish
a hasty airhead line or move to specified targets? (e)
Troops Available. When fortunate enough to have numerous combat multipliers
(ANGLICO, CA/PSYOP, MPs, TACSAT, SOCCE, etc.), where and when are they needed
based on the mission? (2)
Heavy Team Integration. Conduct planning and linkup early with heavy (mech/armor)
elements task- organized to the force.d.
FIRE SUPPORT.(1)
Marine/Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) have Modular Universal
Laser Equipment (MULE) for use in locating targets by providing accurate distance
and direction. The MULE can also be used as a laser designator. Ensure the
Task Force requires the ANGLICO to bring and exploit the capabilities of this
equipment. (2)
Although units deploy with Light Tactical Fire Direction Systems, many do not
use the Forward Entry Devices or the Fire Support Digital Message Device for
fire planning. (3)
Units routinely deploy without the M90 Chronograph (measures muzzle velocity).
This significantly impacts on the accuracy of artillery fire. (4)
Units lack historical data on weapon systems. Units routinely deploy with inaccurate
DA Form 2408-4s or without the forms. Many weapons are deadlined without this
form. (5)
Artillery units are deploying without sufficient Drop Zone Safety Team (DZST)-certified
individuals. This limits their ability to receive aerial delivery of equipment
and ammunition. (6)
Units deploy with Crater Analysis Teams, but do not deploy with the crater
analysis kits or appropriate forms. This hinders a valuable intelligence-gathering
source. (7)
Units lack an established Class IV Unit Basic Load (UBL). (8)
Units routinely deploy with inadequate quantities of shoring for tactical deployment.
e.
AVIATION.(1)
Aviation units are deploying without AN-ALQ 144. This item can significantly
reduce the risk of accurate Air Defense engagement. (2)
Aviation units are deploying without battle damage kits aboard their aircraft.
These kits allow for repair of common battle damage if the aircraft is forced
down in hostile territory. f.
MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY.(1)
Units are not fully considering how they will clear their "life line" -- the
Flight Landing Strip (FLS). Deliberate
mine sweep is time intensive. Are
there any (intel) "eyes on" the FLS before deployment? If
damaged, how will the unit repair the FLS? How is the Light Airfield Repair
Package (LARP) delivered, and how time-sensitive is this operation? Does
the engineer definition of "clear" equal the C-130 pilots' definition? (2)
Where are engineers in the airflow if FLS repair is required after the deployment
begins? Will there be security? (3)
Once on the Drop Zone (airborne operations), what immediate countermobility
assets are available to thwart an unexpected ground attack? The ground Volcano
(5-ton truck with Volcano racks) is a responsive asset -- where is it in the
airflow? (4)
Once on the airhead, who has responsibility for: Emplacing airfield matting
for helicopters? Survivability support of USAF/Airbase Ground Defense (ABGD)?
g.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS).(1)
Is adequate logistical support available to support the heavy task organization?
(2)
Consider fueling requirements after air deployment. (3)
Provide a maintenance capability at the departure airfield. (4)
The Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) slice is normally too small to
repair component parts; no hydraulic personnel routinely deploy with the unit.
(5)
Leaders are not planning medical treatment and evacuation in all phases of
deployment. Plan for Casualty Collection Points (CCPs). (6)
CSS C2 nodes must operate continuously throughout deployment. Consider echeloning
deployment of C2 assets. Streamline reporting and tracking. (7)
CSS planners must clearly illustrate capabilities of CSS units to commanders
to ensure informed decisions can be made. h.
COMMAND AND CONTROL. (1)
Communications capability must be introduced very early in the airflow if the
mission is to succeed. (2)
Commanders and staff must understand Joint C3 architecture. This provides a
basis to determine equipment, LO reporting requirements, and mission- tasking
authority for the operation. Knowledge of the system also provides redundant
avenues for passing critical information in case standard communication nets
break down. (3)
Commanders must track deployment and know where their personnel and equipment
are in the flow at any time. This allows commanders to efficiently adjust airflow
as the mission and the situation change. (4)
Tailor the Tactical Command (TAC) Post for sustained operations in case of
delay of the main TOC. (5)
Plan employment of redundant strategic assets (SATCOM) early. i.
AIR DEFENSE. Units must consider the placement of Air Defense assets in the
airflow.2.
Remember,
the Ground Tactical Plan and the logistical support of that plan should drive
the way your unit deploys. Make informed decisions that consider all available
assets. 
Table
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Foreword
JRTC
Observations and Trends
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