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JRTC OBSERVATIONS AND TRENDS

by Senior Observer Controllers, JRTC

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BRIGADE C2

Brigades continue to show great improvement in integrating the combat functions in deliberate staff planning. Targeting meetings at brigade level are conducted on a regular basis, although improvement is needed in following through on decisions made at those meetings. Most brigades have developed staff battle drills, but very few execute them in accordance with their own SOPs (with the exception of clearing fires). Of major concern, battle tracking continues to cause problems for brigade staffs.

Battle tracking is key to mission success during a JRTC rotation. Commanders do not always have a clear vision of the battlefield because reports are either untimely or staff members do not seek and compile the critical information the commander needs to make his assessment. Battle tracking is an integrated staff effort at the command post. The key person in charge of the shift, the Battle Captain, must be able to manage the information flow in the command post and integrate all elements to track the battle. Units will succeed in this task if they take the time to establish an SOP for what information is required, how it is received, tracked within the command post and then distributed. If units establish a battle-tracking system that corresponds with critical information requirements for the commander, chances of mission success will greatly improve.

ARMOR/MECHANIZED

Units must concentrate on home-station training and staff coordination with the Task Force headquarters. Preparatory training programs at home station need to be developed for the heavy teams participating in light/heavy operations. Additionally, teams must articulate their capabilities and sustainment requirements to the Light Bde staff. The key to improving these issues lie with the team LO. There are two fundamental requirements in choosing an adequate LO for light/heavy operations. Both requirements are equally important. First, the LO must have the rank (muscle) to deal with a light brigade staff. Secondly, the LO must have the position within his organic battalion (home-station unit) to influence annual preparatory training for light/heavy operations. Perhaps the best LO is the organic Bde/Bn S3, or assistant S3. These individuals have the rank, expertise, and job position within the unit to effect staff planning during the rotation and home-station training.

CHEMICAL

Units that place command emphasis on NBC training do the best against OPFOR-generated chemical attacks. In a recent quarter, units showed outstanding NBC Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), excellent command and control and battle tracking of chemical assets, and effective NBC defensive planning at the brigade level. Concerns are the lack of NBC IPB at the battalion level, an understanding of planning and execution of smoke operations, and NBC defensive planning other than MOPP analysis. Smoke/decon platoon operations went well during a recent quarter. Training emphasis for these platoons at home station should be on smoke operations and basic warfighting skills.

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

As mine warfare takes on greater significance, units are realizing that route clearance operations (on a Flight Landing Strip or a Main Supply Route) require well-trained engineers, security support and, above all, adequate time. To protect the force mobility on the battlefield, units are using route clearance techniques, Named Areas of Interest (NAI) templating, and paying greater attention to the terrorist threat. Units have realized that mines are an indiscriminate killer; friendly mines should be marked to reduce fratricide. Units are attempting to improve their tactical obstacle integration principles (FM 20-32) and combined arms breaching operations (FM 90-13-1).

AIR DEFENSE

Brigade task force logisticians must understand the expenditure rates of Vulcan 20mm and Stinger weapons systems. Because these weapons systems are critical to defend the force and their munition expenditures are high, they must be pushed forward to the supported unit's trains. When there is no air defense liaison at the Forward Support Battalion's Ammunition Transfer Point, the likelihood of a continual flow of Air Defense munitions to the battalion task force trains is reduced. Air defender unfamiliarity with the supported unit's ammunition resupply procedures has also been a contributing factor in units exhausting Stinger/20mm ammunition supplies. Air Defense Officers (ADOs) must become familiar with the Restricted Supply Rates/Controlled Supply Rates (RSRs/CSRs) and must establish an RSR for the operation. The failure to establish an RSR often causes units to deplete their basic load and initiate emergency resupply action to maintain combat effectiveness.

Air defense for Combined Arms and passive air defense measures are significant combat multipliers on the battlefield. Passive air defense measures, if followed, will greatly reduce the possibility of detection and attack by hostile aircraft. If detected and attacked, effective Air Defense for Combined Arms measures will reduce the severity of the air attack. Units remain unaware and untrained on these combat multipliers. FM 44-8, Small Unit Self-Defense Against Attack, provides procedures and techniques which, if implemented, will enhance unit survivability.

SIGNAL OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Brigade commanders, staffs, and battle captains must fully understand signal support systems communications architecture and capabilities to effectively use signal operations as a combat multiplier. To orchestrate and synchronize command and control efforts, brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs must be educated on communications, command and control architecture and capabilities. This will enhance the brigade task force's ability to effect staff coordination and planning, execution, and information management. This education should emphasize all types of communications systems available to the brigade task force -- how they are doctrinally employed, and how to best integrate them into the brigade task forces information management system.

According to FM 100-5, signal operations must provide "reliable signal support systems to enable the commander to conduct operations at varying operational tempos." Further, "Signal planning increases the commander's options by providing the requisite signal support systems to pass critical information at decisive times, thus leveraging and exploiting tactical success and facilitating future operations." This creates an implied task for commanders and staffs at all levels to understand and to be involved in planning and synchronizing the communications architecture required to ensure mission success.

Signal operations in support of Joint/Combined arms integration and command and control is becoming increasingly complex. Signal officers have the critical task to orchestrate this complex communications architecture and present it in understandable terms to commanders and staffs. They have the responsibility to know how to use individual and unit communications equipment and understand the communications architecture to effectively use it as a combat multiplier.

COMMAND & CONTROL (BATTALION TASK FORCES 1 and 2)

Battalions continue to emphasize the confirmation brief and rehearsals. When conducted, they often turn into wargaming sessions, where synchronization tools are developed instead of during the decisionmaking process. The synchronization tools should be used to drive the rehearsal. Effective confirmation briefs and rehearsals ensure subordinates understand the commander's mission and intent. This process identifies problem areas and how to better synchronize assets according to the BOS, allowing the commander to focus combat power.

AVIATION C2

Observer/controllers still see the Aviation Task Force strength lying at the individual staff officer level. Current trends indicate that emphasis on battle staff integration and synchronization should remain a top priority in the units' yearly and pre-rotational training plans. Brigade commanders must be involved in the training of subordinate battalion commanders and their staffs on the tactical decisionmaking and orders process. This can be easily accomplished by scheduling a Battle Command Training Program, followed by a brigade CPX to exercise the training programs for the battle staff. Coordination of the battle staff efforts is the executive officer's responsibility and should be the focus of the training. During this training, battalion commanders should focus on giving guidance through their intent to the staff and ensuring that each staff officer is aware of what he is expected to produce. All actions of the staff revolve around its ability to understand what the commander wants and how he intends to fight the battle.

FIRE SUPPORT C2

Brigade FSOs are integrating well into the maneuver staff in the staff planning process. Noted during the first rotation at Fort Polk, LA, is bottom-up refinement in top-down fire planning. A detailed fire support execution matrix with a complete target list is a decisive tool that needs to be provided to subordinate battalion fire support elements for planning guidance. Specific allocation of resources (in terms the maneuver commander understands, such as minutes of smoke and illumination, and number of battalion volleys of 105mm), is also a piece of the pie that needs inclusion in planning guidance for subordinates. The current doctrinal fire support execution matrix in FM 6-20-50 has led to this lack of specificity in fire support execution matrices.

Most units arrive at the JRTC with excellent SOPs defining battle-tracking procedures and clearance of fires. These SOPs adequately cover procedures to update locations and activity on a regular basis. Trends indicate that subordinate elements do not report as required, and, when reports are received, the information is not disseminated to other members of the TOC. The brigade fire support element must include the ANGLICO's assets in the reporting and battle-tracking process. With responsible battle tracking, responsiveness of fires increases, and provides the brigade an increased ability to prepare for support in future operations. Commanders must succinctly define clearance of fires procedures and battle drills throughout the brigade.

INTELLIGENCE C2

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R & S) planning and execution continues to challenge rotational units at JRTC. Most S2s develop an R & S plan before the OPORD is issued, but it is rarely integrated with the rest of the staff or synchronized to support the unit's mission. Because the S2's collection plan is not integrated with the S3's maneuver courses of action before the commander's decision brief, the chances that R & S assets will not be effectively employed increase dramatically. Many units rely almost exclusively on company patrols and scouts for R & S. TOW sights, snipers, aviation, LRSD, and forward observers should be incorporated in the R & S plan.

Units can strengthen and refine their R & S plans by focusing on the staff planning process. Early in the staff planning process, identify Priority Information Requirements (PIRs), develop Special Intelligence Requirements (SIRs), and then list indicators for each NAI. Integrate the R & S plans to not only answer the SIRs, but also to support the commander's plan of maneuver. Conduct lateral coordination and coordinate with higher headquarters to ensure full coverage of the area of operations. Disseminate the R & S plan in both written and graphic form. Task assets in the OPORD and hold subordinate commanders accountable for their respective NAIs. These measures will be worth the effort.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

As the Joint Integration (JI)/Deployment phase of the rotations continues to be observed, there are some significant points that merit dissemination. Forward Support Battalions are identifying the need to echelon support to ensure the brigade TF has some support capability early in the deployment. They are also doing an admirable job repairing nonmission capable (NMC) equipment, while trying to outload themselves. Units across the board have shown improvement in preparing vehicles and secondary loads for deployment. Areas needing emphasis include identifying priority vehicle lists (PVLs) and deploying with adequate computers to support the outload. PVLs need to be identified as early as possible and locked in. Air movement tables can then be developed before the "eleventh hour." The greatest stumbling block observed at the JRTC is adequate computer support to prepare load plans. Units need to deploy as many Computer-Assisted Load-Manifesting (CALM) 5.0-capable computers as possible (at least one per each Departure Airfield Control Group and Bn and Bde TFs). This will enable units to update load plans with current data and print them quickly.

LIVE FIRE

Live fire has been a great success story at Fort Polk. Units are eager to train and ready to fight. It has been noted that platoons conducting live-fire missions must train more in the use of night observation devices before coming to the JRTC. JRTC observer/controllers have noted that many soldiers are still not properly trained in the wear and use of the AN/PVS 7. Because soldiers are unfamiliar with the AN/PVS 7, command and control and early warning during live-fire exercises are stressed. Increase command emphasis at all levels in the proper use of the AN/PVS 7.
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