SUBJECT III: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
While force-on-force battles at the NTC are excellent training vehicles for units, they do not replicate all of the battlefield effects of actual combat. To fill in the blanks, CALL utilized historical records and memoirs of commanders. We researched Allied, Axis, NATO, Warsaw Pact, and Middle East sources for mid-intensity battles similar to those conducted at Ft. Irwin.
The NTC casualty rates are consistent with historical experience and may be a harbinger of the casualty intensive nature of future armor battles.
World War II
On the average, US infantry divisions in World War II lost the equivalent of their 132 authorized infantry second lieutenants every 88 combat days, their divisional complement of 99 infantry captains in 294 combat days. Between D-Day and 31 July 1944, American rifle companies in Normandy lost 68.7 percent of their officers and 59.6 percent of their enlisted men. In June alone, the 12th Infantry Regiment lost 76 percent of its officers and 63 percent of its enlisted men.
The slugfest in the Huertgen Forest in November 1944 obliterated the command structure in General Barton's 4th Infantry Division:
"In thirteen days some companies had run through three and four company commanders. Staff sergeants and sergeants commanded most of the rifle platoons. The few officers still running platoons were either replacements or heavy weapons platoon leaders displaced forward. Most squad leaders were inexperienced privates or privates first class." [1]
In American armored units as well, officers died at greater rates than enlisted personnel. The 3rd Bn, 66th Armor lost 73 percent of its officers and 43 percent of its enlisted strength during 28 July - 1 August 1944. Of the 311 officers who served in the 67th Armored Regiment from November 1942 to May 1945, 107 were hit at least once; 34.4 percent were killed or wounded. Most came from the armored battalions or the reconnaissance company. Only four officers (three killed) were hit in the headquarters, maintenance, or service companies. Thus the officer casualty rate in the close combat battalions was well over 50 percent.
At greatest risk in the US Army of World War II were platoon leaders and company commanders. However, field-grade officers shared the hazards. Between November 1942 and May 1945, 23.8 percent of the field grade officers in the 67th Armored Regiment sustained wounds. The regimental commander was wounded and the regimental S2 killed. Five battalion commanders and four battalion executive officers were hit; one of each were killed. The 67th Regiment suffered twelve company commanders killed and eight wounded. However, World War II American armor units never lost battalion commanders at a rate per mission approaching that currently seen at the NTC.
Generally, the Germans concentrated their armor in the East and thus were tank poor in the West. Also, until close to the end of the war, American tanks were outgunned by German tanks and shied away from armor-on-armor battles. Thus, in Northwest Europe, armor accounted for 10.6 percent of the total US casualties (as opposed to infantry's 66.7 percent).
On the Eastern front, the German Army experienced officer losses at the battalion commander level and below, comparable to NTC rates. Major Wray reported on the dismal state of German command structures in late 1942:
"The wastage in combat officers and noncommissioned officers since the beginning of Barbarossa had been tremendous. By mid-December, lieutenants were commanding many German infantry battalions, while sergeants or corporals led nearly all platoons and many companies." [2]
During the massive Armor battles around Kursk, the German Army Group South took over 20,000 casualties in the nine days between 5-13 July 1943. These included 7 division commanders, 38 regimental commanders, and 252 battalion commanders.
The Ramadan or Yom Kippur War October 1973
In the Arab-Israeli wars, officer casualties in the Israeli Defense Force were unusually high. During October 6-9, all but one of the battalion commanders in the 7th IDF Brigade (Armored) were hit. The exception was LTC Kahalani of the 77th battalion, who suffered burns later in the battle.
Kahalani's battalion lost its deputy commander (WIA), two company commanders (one WIA, one KIA), one major who had been taken on as a company commander replacement (WIA), five platoon leaders (2 KIA, 3WIA), and one forward observer (KIA).
Recognizing that the tank and mechanized battles at Ft. Irwin represent the high end of mid-intensity spectrum, NTC casualty rates for officers do not appear wildly out of line with the most intense World War II or Arab-Israeli armored combat.
| "Our
job is to develop bold audacious leaders, competent enough to know the difference
between risk and gamble, and willing to take risk to get inside the decision
cycle of the enemy in order to wrest the initiative from him. We must develop
commanders who trust their subordinates, who delegate responsibility and authority
to them, and who encourage them to exercise initiative within the framework
of their intent." |
Table
of Contents
Subject
II: Trends at the National Training Center
Subject
IV: Lessons Learned
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